36. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State1

1323. Subj: Bulgaria after Czechoslovakia.

1.
Bulgarian policy appears primarily to be designed to keep Moscow well satisfied with Bulgarian support in all matters and, now, especially in Czechoslovakia. In this Bulgaria is running true to form. In other areas, the regime seems to be following a “watch and wait” line. Business as usual is the motto in contacts with most Westerners. The GOB has taken care not to close out the possibility of continuing to cultivate increased trade with almost any willing partner “regardless of differences in political system.” Condemnation of the US, the FRG, Yugoslavia and other standard targets of criticism continues to be severe but by no means as extreme as it could become. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the recent announcement of new economic arrangements with the USSR, arrangements which promise to leave Bulgaria sunk even deeper in the Soviet embrace, the regime appears to have taken advantage of the present situation to squeeze more economic aid out of Moscow.
2.
While the events in Czechoslovakia have clearly been unsettling to the population and a burden to the regime, the effects are probably somewhat less severe in Bulgaria than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Postwar Bulgarian history is unmarked by shock comparable to the uprising in East Germany in 1953, the October events in Poland in 1956, and the Hungarian uprising of October 1956. Despite a degree of liberalization [Page 144] carried out slowly since 1956, the regime has remained essentially conservative and hence does not have to retreat very far now. Geographically, economically and socially, Bulgaria is further removed from the Czechoslovak events than any of the other four Warsaw Pact countries. The majority of Bulgarians are decent enough to regret what has happened in Czechoslovakia, but the intensity of their identification with the Czechoslovak people is not remarkable.
3.
The regime is working along predictable lines to limit the damage to its moral position and that of the Soviet Union arising from the invasion. The plausibility of the arguments advanced is very low, including heavy dependence on such conceptual slogans as “machinations of Western imperialism.” Even Pavlovian conditioned reactions should have difficulty with reference to “Morgans and Duponts,” “Rockefeller and Franco” as somehow justifying use of Communist tanks to combat Communist words and ideas. That the Czechoslovak people as a whole sought to move away from the more oppressive aspects of Soviet-style socialism is probably widely accepted here. If, as we believe, large segments of Bulgarian public are seriously depressed by Czech events, it is because they are seen as harsh object lesson that any significant steps toward liberalization will be forcefully repressed by Moscow as an intolerable attempt to “restore capitalism and detach the country from the camp of socialism.”
4.
The regime’s propaganda effort is probably intended more to persuade Moscow of Bulgarian loyalty than to win credibility among Bulgarians. For the latter the message is to stick with the regime, enjoy such increased material benefits as are being made available and forget any vagrant thought that any measure of liberality is to be expected in the near future in Bulgaria.
5.
The Czechoslovak events have thus far brought no new signs of instability within the Bulgarian leadership. The presence of Zhivko Zhivkov alongside Todor Zhivkov at Moscow September 16 is not necessarily confirmation of his continued occupancy of the number two position, since he oversees economic matters, but we believe he retains this position in any case.
6.
Assuming continued Warsaw Five occupation and a continuing stalemate between Soviet repression and passive resistance from “good soldier Schweiks” in Czechoslovakia, we would expect the GOB, Moscow permitting, to diminish its defensive and justificatory propaganda, and to treat the Czechoslovak repression more and more as an accomplished fact while turning to other provocative subjects such as Yugoslav Macedonia and “revisionism.”
7.
This is likely to be accompanied by an effort to return to “business as usual” in the form of trade, cultural and eventual renewed political exchanges with willing NATO and non-aligned countries, especially [Page 145] France, Italy (whose trade is in balance) and the smaller countries. Practical commercial and financial considerations coincide with political desirability to indicate no upsurge in economic activity with regard to the Federal Republic.
8.
The revulsion felt in the U.S. for Bulgaria’s collaboration, clearly manifested by cancellation of participation at the Plovdiv Trade Fair, and the resultant dimness of prospects for improved relations under current circumstances, might well tempt the GOB to indulge in some form of self-serving reprisal. This might include well-publicized trials of one or another “American spy” to demonstrate to Moscow Bulgaria’s vigilance. (Recent rumors are to the effect that Dr. Sarafov, whose arrest as an “American agent” was recently reported (Sofia 1248),2 will soon be given the full public treatment.)
9.
Thus we look for a very cool political winter, during which the prescribed low visibility posture seems quite appropriate.
McSweeney
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Warsaw, USNATO, and Vienna.
  2. Telegram 1248, August 29, reported on Bulgarian announcements regarding a “Western” spy ring. (Ibid., POL 23–4 BUL)