Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

32. Airgram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State ¹

A–285

Sofia, January 26, 1966.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Assessment

REF

• CA–5400, Nov 17, 1965²

Relations between Bulgaria and the United States have improved. They are reminiscent, however, of the first smiles one gets from a few-months-old baby. One is not entirely sure whether the smile is real or simply a gas pain.

Draft NSAM 304³ lays down three criteria for our “differentiated policy” toward the countries of Eastern Europe: (1) internal liberalization; (2) national independence; and (3) progress in re-association with the West. It might be useful to comment on Bulgaria’s progress under each of these headings.

1. Internal Liberalization. A year ago we reported “no concrete evidence of political liberalization.”⁴ It is probably fair to say that there has been some in 1965. The regime’s new economic theses give greater autonomy to individual enterprises. Although the reform leaves numerous strings available to an economically jittery regime, it places Bulgaria among the moderately progressive regimes of Eastern Europe—according to an RFE analysis alongside Czechoslovakia and somewhat ahead of the USSR, Poland and East Germany. Since last spring the regime has allowed private craftsmen to engage in business more freely. If the regime holds prices steady, the wage hikes announced at the end of the year may help the population. The presence in Bulgaria during 1965 of a million foreign tourists—equivalent to one-eighth the population of the country—has had an impact. Reportedly foreign tourists were put up in 1,500 private homes in Sofia; Western newspapers were available in Black Sea resorts; a rent-a-car service was established; etc. The regime exhorts its citizens to caution, but the Bulgarians’ desire for the economic benefits of tourism inexorably force some acceptance of increased contact with the West. So, too, does the contact which accompanies Western trade.

There have been a few other signs: a satirical political review last summer, a few more political jokes on the radio, two or three mildly “daring” plays during the past couple of seasons, comments by foreign visitors over the past year or two about “less fear,” progressively more private cars over the past several years, a report from RFE that “mail from Bulgaria has now begun to reach RFE,” absence in the press over the past six months of reported prison sentences for telling political jokes and death penalties for black-marketeering, no recent reports of deportations, a contemporary art show put on this year while permission was refused last year, a report that Bulgaria, together with Czechoslovakia, has started to authorize the sale of state-owned houses to private buyers, etc. The atmosphere is of a slight easing.

The abortive plot last April⁵ does not seem to have reversed this cautious, unconfident inching liberalization. The plot seems to have been more episode than earthquake. Apparently the plotters wished to move closer to the Yugoslav example. Apparently they inspired considerable popular sympathy. Apparently they were poorly organized. The regime tried to play down the affair, giving light sentences. In its wake, the security organs were reorganized and party control within the army was tightened. The security forces in Bulgaria are probably now even more closely coordinated with the Soviets than before and enjoy the technical sophistication which this support implies. Prime Minister Zhivkov has told me openly that the Bulgarians are increasing resources devoted to “counterintelligence” against us.

2. National Independence from the USSR. A year ago we reported that the Bulgarian leadership had given “no indication that the example of independent nationalism set by nearby Rumania had any appeal whatsoever.” The generality of Bulgaria’s satellite status still holds, but one has to be a trifle less categorical. The Bulgarian effort to improve relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania has produced some verbal movement. In successive joint communiqués with Tito and Ceausescu, Zhivkov subscribed to the idea of “independent parties” and “non-interference” in the internal affairs of the various Communist states. This is not the first time Zhivkov has played the chameleon. Nevertheless, these publicized statements affect the atmosphere within the Communist Party here, and more nationalistic elements have a peg on which to hang their arguments.

Apart from Bulgaria’s over-touted historical and cultural affinity to the Soviet Union, her economic situation ties her to the USSR in Zhivkov’s phrase, “in life and death.” With two billion dollars in Soviet credits since World War II, Bulgaria is industrializing—having climbed from an industrial production representing 15% of the total in 1939 to over 50% at the present time. Bulgaria will soon be importing over 40% of her expanding energy needs—mostly from the USSR. Bulgaria’s foreign trade is 50% with the Soviet Union and, even in the other direction, Bulgaria ranks as the USSR’s fourth largest trading partner.

Zhivkov is neither a Tito—with flare and following—nor a Sekou Toure—who, for Guinea’s independence, gloriously defied economics and common sense. More like the East German regime, the Bulgarian Communists need USSR support to stay afloat. There are a few signs that Bulgaria may be playing a bit cozy with the Soviets of late,⁶ but the prospect is for Bulgaria to remain Moscow’s reliable satellite.

3. Progress in Re-association with the West. During the past year Bulgaria has developed its ties with both the neutralist world and Western Europe. Zhivkov’s trip to the UAR and Ethiopia⁷ was but one example of this trend. Bulgaria is trying to branch out, and even has a few dizzy economic dreams. Among these were a 37 million dollar loan to the UAR; a joint banking enterprise in Beirut; multifarious and dubious economic activities in Ethiopia, negotiations for mammoth Japanese-built tanker ways in Burgas, talk of a joint British-Bulgarian hotel complex on the Black Sea, feelers for U.N. technical assistance (including some American specialists), etc.

Zhivkov continued the policy of improved relations with Greece and Turkey. The Bulgarian Government has made an effort, albeit with lapses, to develop more cordial political, cultural and economic relations with France, Italy, the Benelux countries and Great Britain, probably in that order. Trade and tourism from West Germany produce an impressive balance of about 40 million dollars in each direction. However, Bulgaria faces an uphill struggle in trade with the West, as it must sell more and more non-agricultural products as its economy changes and expands. If Bulgaria’s trade with the West fails to grow apace, Bulgaria will automatically slip further into the Soviet and CEMA trade embrace.

4. Relations with the United States. A year ago it looked as if there was no way to go but up. Our year-end assessment spoke of “a hardened Bulgarian attitude“, inactivity, stagnation, dwindling contacts, increased police operations against the Legation, the manhandling of US personnel on three occasions, minimized US-Bulgarian contact, pressure to extend closed zones, and the second assault in a year on the Chancery.

If anything, the first months of this year saw movement further down. The Bulgarians reacted to the extension of the Vietnamese War with still another assault on the Legation offices and, for the first time, on the Residence. The early months of 1965 also saw imposition of still further travel controls, violently offensive anti-American propaganda in the windows next to the Legation (including exultation over American soldiers’ coffins) and the rejection of cultural exchanges.

After a probable low point early this spring, relations appear to have slowly improved. It might be added that the Bulgarians have been excruciatingly cautious in any moves that might be described as constructive. Why? First, there is the Soviet tie and America’s role as the Socialist Camp’s great enemy. There is the ten year hiatus in American-Bulgarian relations and their legacy of suspicion. Moreover, other Western diplomats note a general Bulgarian passivity and inertia, perhaps a result of long-standing isolation and backwardness. The Bulgarians may not be advanced enough to sense and appreciate their need of contact with the West. They may be afraid of it—like the eminent Bulgarian solid-state physicist who recently came to America as an exchangee and found he was at “graduate-student level.” While the Bulgarians desire Western embassies here, they would like them to nestle like parsley—decorative and irrelevant.

What signs of movement have there been? There has been no repetition of the destructive attacks on the Legation since last February—the longest period without them since 1963. There has been a resumption of more normal—for a Communist country—official and social contact between Bulgarians and Legation personnel. (Last November Legation officers hosted 14 occasions at which 58 Bulgarians attended.) Access to Bulgarian officials, including the Prime Minister, has been facilitated. The police “blockade” of the American Legation offices has been mitigated, although intimidation and post visit interrogation no doubt continue. Casual visitors—the man who saw his daughter’s picture in our window, the woman who wants to buy a Christmas card, or the student who wants to borrow a book—have increased from virtually none to one or two a day.

In the past year the consular business of the Legation has doubled (citizenship cases from 24 to 65, immigrant visas from 7 to 17, and non-immigrant visas from 123 to 321). The Bulgarians gave agreement in principle early in the year to negotiate a Consular Convention, although they have not yet followed through. In November and December the first of two of some 18 hardship visa and citizenship cases were moved toward solution.

In the economic field, the first substantial Bulgarian deals with American firms and their European affiliates were made. These included a 15 million dollar contract with the French Schneider group of which about half will go to Litwin and Standard Oil of Ohio. This will also bring to Bulgaria the first supervising American engineers since the War. Other contracts include a Coca-Cola plant, and the renovation of some tobacco factories—bringing American Machine and Foundry about two million dollars. The year 1965 also saw the first American chartered aircraft bringing tourists to Varna, and the first Bulgarian merchant ship calling at a U.S. port.

In the public affairs and exchanges field, there has been some motion. Exchanges have worked out in the field of English teaching, medicine and agriculture. The Bulgarians have expressed interest in a library science exchange. The exchange program between the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences is continuing. The Bulgarians have arranged substantive programs for such diverse visitors as composer Peter Mennin, poet William Snodgrass and Judge William Henry. A number of American journalists have come, with a Sulzberger interview with Zhivkov, a similar offer to Daniel Schorr (he declined because, on checking, he found it probably wouldn’t be used on CBS) and the first direct American news broadcast from Bulgaria in recent years by Ed Morgan (for technical reasons, of unusable quality). Radio Sofia used VOA materials (without attribution) for the first time and the Bulgarian authorities, after some back and forth, permitted the American Minister to go on nation-wide radio-TV on July 4, as Mrs. Anderson had done before.

Vituperative anti-American window displays next to the Legation have not been in evidence for the past three months, contrary to previous practice. The Bulgarians have not interfered with the expanding circulation of the Legation’s Bulgarian language Cultural Bulletin—now up from 1,000 to 2,000 copies. The Bulgarians also did not obstruct a lecture this month in the Legation’s ground floor library—the first time the library has been put to this use since November 1964. The Bulgarians have not so far interfered with the initial mailing of the Legation’s new Bulgarian Science Bulletin, the first issue of which was put out this month.

The Bulgarians have offered us a good site for the 1966 Plovdiv Fair. The Legation’s expanded book presentation program has not been impeded; and a gift of books to the National Library resulted in an exhibit of the gift books in the library’s permanent exhibit hall. There has been no instance since last spring of an announced exchange being canceled, although two American exhibit proposals were rejected on the flimsiest of excuses. The Bulgarians have been unresponsive to American offers of performing artists and ensembles. Net impression: some improvement.

5. Conclusion. To return to the three criteria of NSAM 304, the past year has seen cautious movement toward internal liberalization, a continuance of Bulgaria’s satellite role, and some progress in re-association with the West and the United States in particular. Bulgaria is not totally among-the-missing in East Europe’s “quiet revolution“; but it is among the most quiet, and among the least daring. The mounting gravity of the Vietnam War provides something between an excuse and a reason for Bulgaria’s caution and negativism. A certain passivity and harvest of isolation were added brakes.

Actually, Bulgaria’s conservatism has had some positive results. It is an interesting incidental fact that Bulgaria’s collective farmers still legally own their own land. Bulgaria never did a root and branch Marxist revision of its English language textbooks. Bulgaria never renamed George Washington Street in Sofia or Franklin Roosevelt Street in Plovdiv, never came under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, never imposed a ceiling on American diplomatic staffs, and never instituted a system of prior travel notification for attaches or others. It settled its outstanding financial claims with us, and does not stand afoul of the Johnson Act. It adheres to the Berne Copyright Union, and only this year ratified outstanding revisions to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.

Assuming that in the future the trend continues up, we envisage two phases of development in our relations. In the first phase we shall continue to seek progress towards a Consular Convention, resolution of outstanding citizenship and visa cases, progressively freer access to our offices, continued protection of the Legation, expanded official and social contact and increased exchanges. On all these counts there has been progress in 1965, but not a complete resolution. Our request for reciprocal radio rights, a moderation of anti-American propaganda next to the Legation, and multiple entry diplomatic visas fall into this “Phase I” category.

When both sides are ready for larger steps, we may hope to turn to a cessation of VOA jamming, a substantially more ambitious exchange and public affairs program, the introduction of American newspapers, a general moderation of anti-American propaganda, reciprocal reduction of travel restrictions, and closer Bulgarian adherence to general norms of international dealing in trade and other fields. Among the things America can offer is Most Favored Nation treatment, greater cooperation in trade, review of our attitude toward PL 480 and credit; and possible elevation of the status of the two countries’ missions. Of all these possibilities, MFN is what the Bulgarians really want most from us. Our success with the East-West Trade Bill will be crucially important for our prospective relations with this country. Whether or not we decide ultimately to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding MFN, the fate of the bill in Congress will greatly influence the psychological atmosphere here.

Our opportunities may be greatest at present on the psychological front. We believe expansion of exchanges in both directions is to our advantage as a stimulant to meaningful contact and means of impact. In the exchange field, the Bulgarians have been passive, reluctant and disorganized. But we, too, need a more positive attitude, more vigor, more interest and more willingness to give deft leadership to the U.S. private sector. In another context, Freud once said that the lines of cleavage are in every crystal, but you don’t see them until the crystal breaks. We must apply our wedges where we can; and chip away at Bulgarian backwardness, isolation, and fear.

Nathaniel Davis
American Minister

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2–3 BUL. Secret. Drafted by Davis and Tuch. Repeated to Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Berlin, Paris for USRO, Munich, and Vienna.
2. This circular airgram requested an annual political-economic assessment of the host country. (Ibid., 2–3 BUL)
3. Document 4.
4. Airgram A–274 from Sofia, January 24, 1965. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 BUL)
5. On April 22, 1965, the Bulgarian press reported that the Bulgarian Government had uncovered and defeated a plot led by a senior Communist Party official and the commander of the Sofia military garrison.
6. The Legation was interested to see a recent INR Research Memorandum which said that “there emerged signs of possible strain in Bulgarian-Soviet relations.” We do not yet see clear evidence of this here, although the pros and cons of this possibility are discussed in the Legation’s A–286 of January 26, 1966. [Footnote in the source text. The INR Research Memorandum was not identified. Airgram A–286 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–USSR.]
7. October 1965.