Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State ¹

Vienna, September 10, 1968, 1640Z.

6500. Subject: FonMin Waldheim’s views on Czechoslovakia. Ref: State 234682 and Vienna 6459.²

1. Saw FonMin Waldheim today and conveyed to him same comments as I gave Chancellor Klaus based on State 234682.

2. Waldheim expressed appreciation and said although some members of GOA had been extremely nervous recently about possibility of Soviet move against Romania, Yugoslavia and even Austria, he did not share view that Austria was threatened. While Soviets would unquestionably move against any member of Warsaw Pact that Soviets thought might try to detach itself from Moscow’s orbit, Soviets recognize that Austria is free and independent state which, while militarily neutral, is integral part of democratic West. If Soviets moved against Austria, it would, in his judgment, only be if they were prepared for major war with Western powers, which he strongly doubted. He said in strict confidence that Austrian military had bad case of jitters and has been the source of reports that major move against other Eastern and Central European countries might take place during Sept. 7–9 or Sept. 15–16 (Vienna 6459). He said basis of these reports were rumors of sketchiest kind picked up by Austrian military, and in Cabinet meeting this morning he made clear he disagreed with them. In this connection he had also issued a press denial today qualifying as “absurd” a press report emanating from Austrian press agency that GOA was seriously worried that in event of Soviet attack against Yugoslavia, Soviets would request right of passage for Soviet troops through Austria.

3. Re Kuznetsov mission to Prague,³ Waldheim said Soviets obviously hope that this skilled negotiator can get Svoboda, Dubcek, Cernik, et al to do Soviet dirty work so that Soviets will not have to resort to further use of force. As GOA tentatively sees it, if Kuznetsov succeeds present Czech Government risks seriously alienating support of Czech people since Soviets obviously are very dissatisfied with GOC implementation of Moscow agreements and want Svoboda and Dubcek to impose full Soviet system on Czechoslovakia. Waldheim believes that present Czech leaders will remain and try to do Soviet bidding as long as they can save something for Czech people, but if they are pushed to the wall they may either resign or be removed and replaced by more pliant Soviet sympathizing Czechs, or Soviets may have to impose puppet regime maintained in place by Soviet bayonets. Waldheim thought imposition of puppet regime would be last resort for Soviets.

4. Dept repeat as appropriate.

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–USSR. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2. See footnote 5, Document 202.
3. First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasiliy Kuznetsov visited Prague September 6–9.