199. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1

1309. Secto 35. Secretary’s conversation with Austrian FonMin Toncic Oct 5, 1966. Fol is uncleared FYI, Noforn, subject to revision upon review.

1.
In hour-long tour d’horizon with Secretary, Austrian FonMin Toncic in company of Director Political Affairs of Austrian Foreign Ministry Haymerle and Austrian Perm Rep Waldheim discussed Vietnam, ChiRep, Albania, Mongolia, East-West relations, Common Market and Kennedy Round, Austrian draftees, UNOID, Tyrol, SWA and NATO. Fol are highlights of conversation.
2.
Vietnam. Secretary made it crystal clear that US will not permit North Vietnam take South Vietnam by force. To do otherwise would destroy credibility of US which of fundamental importance to peace and war in world, as Berlin and Cuban missile crises have proved in past. Toncic replied it was good to hear US would not sell out South Vietnam. In his view no political solution possible without first denying other side military victory. In this sense he considered “American victory” now secure. When Toncic asked why US did not destroy Haiphong, Secretary replied that all important military targets except those in heavily populated areas have been covered. (Comment: Toncic’s privately expressed views contrasted rather sharply with those expressed in public in subsequent address before UNGA, in which Toncic hewed closely to neutral line.)3
3.
ChiRep. Toncic volunteered that Austria will again abstain on ChiRep issues in GA. Secretary stated it would be big mistake for world endorse ChiCom militancy just at time when failures of ChiCom foreign policy should be persuading ChiComs that militancy leading into blind alley.
4.
Albania. Toncic reported Albanians in Vienna have for some time been making vague proposals for coming nearer to West. He asked how Austria should respond. Secretary speculated it possible Albanians are becoming restive under ChiCom monopoly and stated it would be constructive and helpful if Austrians could probe their intentions, though it would clearly be mistake for US do so. Waldheim made point [Page 530] Albanians will not change ChiRep position and continue insist Taiwan must be expelled.
5.
Mongolia. Toncic recommended recognition of Mongolia, stating Mongolia would like become Switzerland of Asia. Secretary explained US has special problem because of GRC.
6.
East-West relations. Secretary stated while bridge-building is OK, Austrians should keep one thing in mind: No vital issues such as Germany are to be settled without US. Secretary added that US did not fight World War II for nothing.
7.
Common Market-Kennedy Round. Toncic spoke at some length about Austrian desire there [share?] in economic advantages of Common Market without paying political price. “Everything would be easy for us if Common Market were to conclude trade agreement with Austria.” Secretary expressed understanding for problem, but when Toncic suggested maybe GATT would help relieve problem and give Austria a waiver in five years, Secretary explained at length importance of achieving progress in Kennedy Round by early March if protectionist course by US is to be avoided.
8.
Austrian draftees in US. Toncic asked for some kind of assurance that Austrians in US on immigrant visas not be drafted. Secretary stated that as general principle permanent residents who participate in all benefits of US system must accept corresponding obligations. Secretary admitted there was special problem with Austria because legislation conflicted with earlier treaties. Secretary pointed out selective service had worked out problem by administrative means. Secretary suggested Austria and US not engage this question as a matter of principle. Secretary pointed out to Toncic that if question gets stirred up in Austria through public pronouncements, it will also get stirred up in US Congress. Secretary suggested Toncic answer inquiries from Austrian press along fol lines: Authorities in US have complicated problem because of conflict between treaties and subsequent Congressional legislation. As a pragmatic matter we have been able work out cases that seem of special interest. We hope that can continue.
9.
UNOID. Toncic announced that in speech to UNGA (which followed hard on bilateral) he would offer Vienna as hqts for UNOID. Secretary stated he was not familiar with this particular problem but in general encouraged Austria build up Vienna as site for international mtgs.
10.
Tyrol. Toncic estimated it would take Austria and Italy about one year to settle Tyrol dispute. (In subsequent GA address Toncic spoke in moderate tones about this problem, stating that goal of current negotiations had been to establish effective and internationally guaranteed autonomy for minority. Toncic resolutely condemned use of violence to resolve this problem.) Secretary recalled that in past Austria had tried [Page 531] draw us into Tyrol dispute, and expressed hope we would be spared recurrence of such attempts.
11.
SWA. Toncic expressed his unhappiness over way SWA problem was being handled in UN. Secretary stated we too have serious reservations about African res on SWA, but expressed hope that further discussions would lead to some changes. When Waldheim raised the possibility of establishing an ad hoc commission to study problem, Secretary stated he thought this was attractive idea.
12.
NATO. Secretary explained it had become imperative that NATO jointly reassess common threat, establish new force goals to meet threat and allocate individual responsibilities. Toncic’s only reaction was that it would be dangerous if US strength in Europe were to be replaced by German strength.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Vienna and Rome.
  2. Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time.
  3. For text of Toncic’s address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1430.