Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

Washington, September 6, 1968, 1620Z.

2478. Subject: Meeting with FonMin Manescu.

1. Manescu received me for fifty minutes at 1530 Sept 6 and in response my initial query for his views current situation now that he had been back in Romania for few days made following points:

A. Manescu had just seen President Ceausescu and Premier Maurer and they again asked Manescu transmit through me, as Manescu had done through Ball in Sept² appreciation of Romanian government and of themselves personally for President’s Aug 30 statement which they considered wise and efficacious. Manescu said statement had had “cooling” effect on a dangerous curve which might have led to the worst.

B. Danger was not completely over and it was important that this statement, which President said was not on behalf of any particular administration but the position of the United States, should not be allowed to die, to be discarded or pigeonholed. Manescu did not presume to advise on how this could be done but Romanian leaders thought statement still served useful purpose.

C. Though Manescu’s first meeting with Ball had been noted in Romanian press, last one had not nor had President’s statement — all for “obvious reasons.” Nevertheless he could assure me that Romanians not just government were aware of this statement and the Soviet reaction thereto in Washington and elsewhere and they appreciated what President had done.

D. Manescu paid tribute to Secretary for making point to Dobrynin that US information and actions not based on anything Romanians had said.

E. Romania remained faithful to its commitments but otherwise was determined to make its own decisions in its own interests as it saw them without any dictation from outside. It desired to have good relations with all states. Whether Romania had relations with this or that state was a question only for Romania.

G. Expressed his own deep appreciation for understanding and treatment he had experienced in New York especially for part played by Secretary, Ambassador Ball and Buffum.

2. I gave Manescu gist of Yugoslav and Romanian reports of Soviet troop deployments in Hungary and Bulgaria as well as our evaluation of these reports contained State 232256.³ Nevertheless I would like to have his views. Manescu replied that as he had said before “danger was not over.” Romania remained watchful. However, Manescu neither confirmed nor denied these reports. But he asserted firmly that Romania was determined to defend itself against invasion.

3. Referring to report (Bucharest 2477)⁴ coming to Embassy’s attention only this morning that Soviets had delivered “ultimatum” two days ago demanding cessation of provocative statements by Romanians and permission for Soviet troops to transit Romania to Bulgaria, Manescu replied saying first alleged Soviet request for joint maneuvers on Romanian soil had been subject discussion with Ball on Sept 2. He said it true that one or two years ago small limited joint maneuver had been held in Romania. He could now say on authority of Ceausescu that no such request had been received from USSR recently. As for this morning’s report reaching Embassy Romania would not and could not change its attitude toward invasion of Czechoslovakia for to do so would be to invite similar action against itself, he denied knowledge of reported request for transit of Soviet troops to Bulgaria but said he would nevertheless convey this report to Ceausescu and Maurer. Manescu commented that natural in dangerous situation people should become somewhat alarmed and he specifically referred to especially large purchases of sugar and flour by population.

4. Comment: I have little doubt that Manescu came from seeing Ceausescu and Maurer as he was five minutes late for our appointment and had sent his secretary-interpreter Celac to waiting room who explained Manescu had been delayed at Council of Ministers. Manescu, while outwardly calm and measured in expressing his views, appeared clearly worried that, as he put it, “danger was not entirely over.”

Davis

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USUN, USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw.
2. In telegram 6368 from USUN, September 3, Ball reported that he had “met briefly” with Manescu the previous day. Manescu “was basically relaxed though not unconcerned” about the possibility of Soviet intervention. (Ibid., POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH)
3. Telegram 232256, September 4, forwarded Yugoslav and Romanian reports on Warsaw Pact troop movements. (Ibid., POL 27–1 RUM)
4. Telegram 2477, September 6, reported signs of Romanian apprehension regarding Soviet intentions. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3)