143. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson 1


  • Rumanian Negotiations

Our talks with the Rumanians are about over, and a communiqué (which the Rumanians are now checking with the Government in Bucharest, Tab A),2 announcing the results will be released Monday, June 1. We have considered whether there is advantage in a specific White House statement when this communiqué is issued, but on balance we do not see much money in it. Will you let me know if you have a different view? Essentially we achieved what we set out to get. Agreement has been reached on the following:

To expand Rumanian trade with the United States. Rumania will be authorized to buy 11 major industrial installations (Tab B) (out of an original shopping list of 15). They will be licensed individually and negotiations with private suppliers will be conducted on a case-by-case basis. For their part, the Rumanians have given us assurances that U.S. equipment will not be trans-shipped or re-exported, and technical data of U.S. origin will not be disclosed or otherwise transmitted without explicit U.S. approval (Tab C). Estimated value of these sales, if consummated, is $30 million a year.
To begin discussions on a consular agreement.
To expand cultural and information exchanges.
To work out plans for the establishment of tourist and commercial offices in Rumania and the U.S.
To raise diplomatic missions from legations to embassies.

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The Rumanians accepted virtually every condition we levied, and this despite the fact that we rejected their request for long-term credits and made clear that the most-favored-nation treatment would not be possible for some time, since this required a major legislative effort.

As a collateral matter, the Rumanians promised to talk with representatives of U.S. holders of Rumanian dollar bonds (some issued prior to World War I), to assure them that their interest would be protected. (The Rumanians, however, insist they cannot make specific commitments on claim settlements at this time.)

Perhaps the single most significant aspect of these talks was Rumania’s determination to succeed in establishing a new and substantial relationship with the U.S.—an important factor in Rumania’s drive for independence from Moscow. However, for Rumania’s own reasons and political considerations here, there is an awareness on both sides that the pace of these developments cannot be forced. To succeed, there must be a gradualness and a logic about them, as well as evidence of continued Rumanian independence in international affairs and greater freedom for the Rumanian people—a point Averell Harriman intends to underscore before the talks are over.

McG. B. 3
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5. Secret.
  2. Tabs A, B, and C are not printed. For text of the U.S.-Romanian joint declaration, issued June 1, see Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1964, pp. 924–926.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.