114. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State1
Budapest, August 27, 1968,
1210Z.
1814. Subject: Hungary after the Czech events.
- 1.
- In seeking to assess the implications for Hungary of its participation in military occupation of Czechoslovakia, one is struck by the general popular mood of dismay at the turn of events, by the seeming discomfort of most officials, and by the cliche-laden sterility of arguments by which the press and other media are attempting to justify action taken. Whatever may have been the actual role in influencing events of the meeting between Kadar and Dubcek on Aug. 18 (Budapest 1796),2 no one is claiming that Hungarian leaders tried to the end to prevent military intervention. The essentially satellite character of Hungarian policy in the crunch is all too painfully clear.
- 2.
- There are rumors circulating in Budapest that Kadar’s personal position is in danger given his early endorsement of reformist developments in Czechoslovakia, his widely-publicized mediatory role, and his apparently only last-minute conversion to need for forceful measures. He has certainly been left in an exposed position and his prestige is bound to suffer seriously. We doubt, however, that his actual position as Party First Secretary is in any significant danger at this time from putatively ascendant hard-liners, and there is no indication that he is losing control of Hungarian Party apparatus.
- 3.
- We have had reports from good sources that some of the Hungarian troops which were first sent in to Czechoslovakia have had to be replaced by new units. Apparently the troops, who were stationed in Hungarian-speaking area of Slovakia, became infected with views of local population. It can be assumed that the returning troops will bring back their own version of the occupation and that this will filter out to the population at large, which is in any case highly skeptical of regime’s explanation of events. This incident is symptomatic of domestic problem facing the regime as a result of Czech events which is likely to persist and continue to give trouble.
- 4.
- Clearly, so far as Kadar’s position is concerned, as well as internal developments in Hungary generally and the whole complex of Hungarian relations with both Communist and Western countries, much will depend on the actual outcome of Czech situation and any repercussions [Page 322] this may have on Soviet leadership situation and Soviet policy. Until smoke has dissipated it will be difficult to see clear directions in these key areas.
- 5.
- There is little doubt, however, that Czech developments will seriously impede efforts which Hungarians have made to improve relations with West generally, at least in the short run. This may come about not so much as result of Hungarian unwillingness to pursue such a course as lack of Western receptivity. The Hungarians may indeed try to press their efforts to improve bilateral relations Western countries, and even be prepared to make concessions to this end, as if to compensate for their role in the occupation of Czechoslovakia.
- 6.
- Among all the current rumors and reports, we are struck by one hard fact, namely the intensity and sharpness of Hungarian press criticism of Romania and specifically of Ceausescu’s role. Weekend Hungarian press carried several extremely harsh criticisms of Romanians, in effect equating their role to that of NATO countries. We note that press shifted its ground August 27, muting attacks on Romania and turning to criticism of Yugoslavia. It would seem that there will be a palpable deterioration in Hungarian relations with Romania and Yugoslavia. In case of Romania especially, such a climate is likely to revive latent nationalist differences centered on always sensitive Transylvania problem. If only in this sense, Czech events mark a new stage in complex relationships in Balkan politics.
- 7.
- Postscript. Current Budapest joke: Question: What are the five armies doing in Czechoslovakia? Answer: They’re trying to find the guy who invited them.
Hillenbrand