91. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
223. From Acheson. We had go-around yesterday with Turks with Gen. Oberbeck from HQ US CINCEUR and Col. Gussie from Nicosia participating. I began by telling Erim I had made new approach to Greek rep to urge that Papandreou make greater effort to meet Turkish security need.2 He thanked me. I mentioned that I still had no word as to whether British would be willing to share their base on Cyprus, as suggested by Greeks. Erim commented that this idea of using British bases not even within scope terms of reference given him and Sunalp by GOT; he was not prepared discuss it and hoped it would not be considered seriously. I said I had made clear to Nikolareisis my belief that bases would not do from Turkish point of view. I added that my military advisers (Oberbeck and Gussie) had agreed with Sunalp’s arguments that sharing base would be very difficult and unsatisfactory.
At my suggestion, we then reviewed at considerable length and with considerable argumentation what Turkey’s minimum needs might [Page 197] be. Taking idea of base on Karpas Peninsula as basis for discussion, Sunalp explained that Turkey considered it had to have on Cyprus facilities and space for one division, 14,000 men, plus a port, an airfield and one squadron of aircraft. For this, he said, TGS considered even whole peninsula would be inadequate, primarily because of its narrowness and lack of [garble—space for dispersal?] and also because it would be bottleneck from which deployment would be difficult. It also lacked major terrain feature for defense.
Oberbeck and Gussie vigorously and ably took issue with this thesis, pointing out that area of more than 200 sq. miles comprised within peninsula was considerably more than we considered necessary for all peacetime purposes for one of our own larger divisions. Gussie stressed that in fact there was good road network on Cyprus and deployment from base of peninsula should be easy. On score of defensibility, our side made point that if major attack threatened Turks would clearly not sit on base awaiting it but rather would move out into other parts of island before attack took place. Apart from this Gussie pointed out that relatively small number of men should be able to hold peninsula until reinforcements arrived.
Sunalp countered with various arguments, including: (1) political situation might not permit Turkish deployment in advance of attack (e.g., allies had repeatedly prevented Turkey from moving against Cyprus during present crisis); (2) outlets for peninsula were not in fact satisfactory despite Gussie’s assertion; and (3) because of location Cyprus, Turkish establishment there could not be regarded as being on normal peacetime basis; in Turkey, Turk Army units were always kept dispersed over a wide area because of imminent possibility of attack. Therefore, greater area was needed than would be required for American division in U.S.
At one time Oberbeck made point that if Turk military on Cyprus were threatened with major attack it was inconceivable that Turkey would be alone. To this Sunalp responded emotionally that Turkey’s allies had done it no good since last December.
Debate went on for some time. Finally Sunalp asked Oberbeck to give his honest opinion from point of view of member Turkish General Staff as to whether with one division on Karpas Peninsula he could fulfill three missions I had suggested in my earlier memorandum:3 (1) to deny island to an enemy as base of operations against Turkey; (2) to keep open approaches to ports of Mersin and Iskenderun; and (3) to provide guarantee against future mistreatment of Turk-Cypriots. Oberbeck replied flatly that he certainly could fulfill these three missions under circumstances [Page 198] specified, and gave reasons. Sunalp’s smiling rejoinder was that if Oberbeck were Turkish officer “he would be retired tomorrow”. Col. Gussie intervened along same lines and also got himself “retired”.
A couple of times I tried to get Turks to recognize that any arrangement would have to be compromise between what was ideal from military point of view and what was practical. I think Erim was probably fully conscious of this although he did not explicitly say so but Sunalp was stubborn to the last.
It is too soon to say what effect of all this may be; I think it was very useful exercise and probably impressed even Sunalp. Oberbeck, Gussie, Jernegan and I will meet again with Turks at lunch tomorrow.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and USUN.↩
- See Document 89.↩
- See Documents 86 and 88.↩
- In telegram 241 from Geneva, July 28, Acheson reported that further discussions with the Turks had not yielded any progress. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)↩