Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

86. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 15, 1964, 9 p.m.

132. From Acheson. We met again with Turks this afternoon, and I handed them copies of piece of paper in reply to Erim’s questions which he sent me following yesterday’s talk.² My memorandum, text of which is being telegraphed separately,³ contained in fair detail outline compromise plan which I had previously sketched orally to Turks and to Greeks. It also contained certain arguments in rebuttal of military objections raised yesterday by Sunalp.⁴

After reading paper carefully, Erim opened by saying he still considered that full partition, with space for all Turkish-Cypriots, was only satisfactory answer to problem. Failing that, no safeguards could protect Turk minority against long-term pressures which would be exerted by Greek majority. Once again cited case of Crete and added Western Thrace as examples proving that Greeks always found means to make life unendurable for Turkish minority.

He then said paper I had given him, nevertheless, provided “first sign of way out” he had seen. Questioning brought out that he meant that paper accepted principle of Turkish sovereignty on part of Cyprus. Once this was granted, Turks would have firm basis for claiming full area they would need to accommodate all Turk-Cypriots. They could show, as they had explained to me yesterday, that they were entitled to an area of the island proportionate to their percentage of its population and its present land ownership, plus their proportionate share of public lands which were not privately owned either by the Greeks or the Turks. This would approximate areas they had suggested in their partition schemes.

I responded that if Turks considered full partition was only possible solution, I would of course be willing to present this to Greek rep, but I had absolutely no hope of its acceptance.

There ensued somewhat confused exchange, during which Erim once fell back on his earlier thesis that he would rather see a Greek fait accompli, which Turkey would denounce and refuse to recognize and for which it would exact political and economic revenge, than acquiesce in solution which would not be permanent and would not protect Turkish-Cypriots. I countered that Turkey would lose tremendously by such an attitude and that consequences would also be extremely rough on Turkish-Cypriots. Sunalp joined in with strong words about how Turks were ready to die for national good, himself included, and implied that it really wouldn’t mean too much if a lot more Turkish-Cypriots did get killed.

At this point Erim made a calming gesture and gave me to understand that perhaps after all there might be room for a little bargaining on the basis I had suggested. Possibly, he said, we could get the Greeks to expand area of Turkish base or, as he preferred to call it, “Turkish area” to point where it would accommodate substantial number of Turkish-Cypriots. Turkey could call this partition, while Greeks might call it something else. At any rate, Erim intimated he would go back to Ankara and see what reaction there would be. We could talk again next week.

I said I would do my best with Greeks but could guarantee nothing.

We agreed that if anything developed during Erim’s absence we would communicate with each other through Embassy Ankara and Turkish Mission here. (Turk Perm Rep has been present at all our talks.)

Would appreciate any suggestions Department has and especially comments on paper I gave Erim. Unless otherwise instructed, I have in mind giving Greek rep a suitably modified version of it if initial reaction from Athens to our conversation yesterday seems to warrant it.⁵

Tubby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. Not found.
3. Telegram 129 from Geneva, July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)
4. Sunalp posed a series of military objections to Acheson’s suggestion during a July 14 meeting. Acheson reported on these talks in telegram 117 from Geneva, July 14. (Ibid.)
5. In telegram 136 to Geneva, July 15, the Department of State noted the Sunalp’s comments indicated less flexibility in the Turkish position than the United States had been led to believe. It requested that the Embassy in Ankara sound out the Inonu government on these issues. (Ibid.)