87. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

116. 1. In hour’s talk with Prime Minister this Sunday afternoon, he elaborated on urgency with which he viewed need for solution Cyprus [Page 187] problem. He underlined that he wanted to facilitate Mr. Acheson’s work as much as possible and pointed out that, to this end, he had in radio address last night for first time stated that security of Turkish state, as well as protection of Turkish minority, was subject for discussion. Nikolareizis had been called back from Geneva and he was seeing him in evening to give him instructions for his future meetings. He said Nikolareizis could have full and frank discussions with Acheson.2

2. Papandreou pointed proudly to new picture of President Johnson on his bookcase and stated he felt very sorry that he had put on appearance of stubbornness in Washington in countering proposed procedure for getting on with Cyprus problem. He said that he genuinely believed then, as he does now, that until adequate preparations undertaken direct talks would very likely lead to a breakdown and possibility of a clash. He recalled Turkish riots in Istanbul in 1955 as example of what Turks do when talks not going their way. He stressed with great earnestness that he wanted to avoid Greek-Turkish clash at all costs; “war was one hundred times more serious for Greece than for the U.S.,” and it was for this reason that he wanted to get on with substance of problem rather than procedures. He had therefore been disappointed that there had been no conversation as to a solution in Washington and only the stress on sitting down for talks with the Turks. With Turkey’s continued threats and rigid position, this was impossible under existing circumstances. However, talks now under way in Geneva were right approach in moving toward solution and GOG intent on facilitating them as matter of urgency. The need for urgency was that Makarios was moving closer to Soviets and Nasser and was making moves without consulting GOG. He hinted that if too much time elapsed a full independent Cyprus, under strong pressure from the East, might not opt for enosis.

3. As to a solution he reiterated that Turkish minority should be provided all guarantees necessary, including UN supervision—“whatever you want.” For sake of Turkish security and meeting “national prestige” aspect of the problem, he stated Greece would agree to a conversion of British bases to NATO bases with Turkish troops and commander. From Kyprianou he had heard that both Wilson in the UK and certain HMG sources were prepared to consider this solution. He said UK could either retain sovereignty or relinquish it—in either event arrangements could be made for NATO take over under a Turkish Commander. This latter point (which could be provided for in agreement between parties), in Papandreou’s mind, should meet fully any claim by Turkey on security or prestige grounds. Papandreou did not see any possibility for a Turkish sovereign area on the island. After all, London-Zurich Agreements [Page 188] had only gotten Turkish troops onto the island; giving them a sovereign area now after nearly 100 years in which Turkey had no claim to sovereignty on the island, would be an unacceptable step for any Greek Government as well as for Cypriots. However, GOG would be prepared to turn over Kastellorizon as a base. (There was also hint that some other concession might be possible, but it was not spelled out.)

4. Papandreou touched on Greek troop increase on island, calling them volunteers and “tolerated deserters.” He gave no figures but insisted that they were there to prevent violence, whether from within or without, but most importantly to check and control Makarios and other Greek-Cypriot military groups.

5. When I raised question of Makarios’ harassing actions re materials for Turkish-Cypriot refugees, as well as Greek-Cypriot military moves in Temblos and Mansoura area, he stated that Makarios was being called to Athens July 26 and he would impress upon him how counterproductive these actions were in that they goaded the Turks.

6. Brewster’s and my over-all impression was that Papandreou very anxious to get on with a prompt solution and that he was eager to see gap between Turk and Greek position closed as soon as possible in Geneva. He fully supported actions of both the UN Mediator and Acheson in their efforts to reach a solution. He stated Greeks and US must at all time talk like “relatives”, because Makarios, USSR and especially UAR were now acting like “relatives.” But he cautioned that ultimate solution must be generally acceptable to Cypriot people or else fighting could not be controlled. We consider that Papandreou seriously believes his suggestion set forth in paragraph 3 is as far as he can push Cypriots.

Labouisse
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva, Ankara, Nicosia, and London. Passed to the White House.
  2. The Embassy reported on Nikolareisis’ meeting with Papandreou in telegram 126 from Athens, July 21. (Ibid.)