Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, September 19, 1968, 1440Z.

7008. Subject: Reappraisal of constitutional referendum. Ref: Athens 6963.²

1. Embassy believes draft constitutional revisions announced Sept 16 are less important substantively than in their confirmation of emerging harder line of regime policies. Prime example is revision of Article 138. Earlier imprecise wording had given regime ample scope to control pace of return to full constitutionality. New formula, by specifying key articles that will not come into effect until government so decides, confronts Greek voters with Hobson’s choice. Rejection of Constitution would put aside any early hope of getting constitutional rule. On other hand, acceptance of this Constitution now will mean explicitly approving regime as sole arbiter of dates when Greeks can once more have constitutionally-protected civil rights, political parties and elections. In other words, regime can claim affirmative plebiscite result (which we believe to be virtually certain) as public mandate to continue government in present authoritarian form under state of siege as long as government itself believes this necessary.

2. As expected, many people here see revised draft, plus Prime Minister’s explanatory remarks, as further strong evidence of military regime’s unwillingness to relinquish power for indefinite period and that as a consequence constitutional referendum will be meaningless.

3. Realistically, any prospect of forward movement after plebiscite depends mainly on appraisal by Papadopoulos and his colleagues that this is least disadvantageous course open to them. Their weak and divided opponents will not soon persuade them that it is. Nor in Embassy’s judgment will continuation of MAP suspensions (which in fact will have consequences increasingly adverse to our interests). However, Embassy sees no reason to let regime believe we would regard favorable plebiscite result as genuinely meaningful step in itself unless accompanied by some concrete moves toward restoration of civil liberties and in direction of ultimate elections. We therefore believe it would be desirable to make these points clear to regime leaders in order to avoid any false expectations. Moreover, we would see some advantage if Department press spokesman in response to question about American views on final draft of Constitution should [garble] along lines that we continue to wish for Greece what we believe majority of Greek people sincerely desire—prompt restoration of their civil liberties and early return to representative government. Although such a statement would not be popular with regime it would advertise our continued adherence to goals we have supported since April 1967 coup.³

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–5 GREECE. Confidential.
2. Telegram 6963 from Athens, September 16, reported Papadopoulos’ statements at a press conference announcing the release of a new draft Constitution. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 7046 from Athens, September 21, Talbot reported he had informed Pipinelis that the resumption of U.S. military aid was dependent on the wording of a plebiscite proposal that permitted a free expression of will to the Greek people. (Ibid.)