Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

369. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, August 2, 1968, 1050Z.

2175. Subj: Cyprus: local talks and policy planning.

1. Month-long break in local talks provides respite from rather frenetic pace of diplomatic activity maintained since last crisis, as well as opportunity for assessment of current situation and potentialities for further progress or new problems. Our starting point is same as it was in our immediate post-crisis analyses. In words of Yost report:² “… Unless and until long-term settlement (of Cyprus problem) is reached recurrence of … crisis very likely; and … if it recurs, war can probably not be avoided.” Essential validity of this judgment should not be obscured by progress made in solving Cyprus problem since December 1967.

2. After four years of immobility punctuated by periodic, bloody crises present 30-day hiatus in local talks permits leaders (and publics) of both communities to digest several new departures of past six months. In our view maneuvering starting in January and extending through first phase of local talks boils down to following:

A. For all practical purposes Greek Cypriots have put aside enosis and Turk Cypriots have done likewise with partition. Both sides approaching problem on basis of independent Cyprus.

B. In spite of real progress in normalization by Greeks and concessions by Turks in local talks, neither side has seriously compromised basic position designed to achieve equally basic goal. Greeks want power to determine destiny of independent Cyprus commensurate with their numerical and economic power. This they view as best achieved by unitary state responsive through new Constitution to will of majority. Turks want security of life and property which they feel best protected by (a) substantial autonomy in areas presently under their control plus (b) some form of background safeguarding role for GOT. Unilateral normalization measures instituted by GOC, although seemingly compromise, actually reinforced their position because to degree integrity of Turkish enclaves lessened by Turks coming out (or Greeks going in), by economic integration, etc., unitary state strengthened. Only known Greek concession in talks is GOC agreement to pay same per capita amount for education of Turkish children as for Greek. This likewise strengthens unitary concept. By same token Denktash has offered to accept representation based on population (20 percent) for Turks in organs of government and to relinquish right of veto in tax matters. However, neither concession impinges on concept of local autonomy.

C. Both Clerides and Denktash negotiating in good faith, though each trying to “get the most” for own side, to satisfy respective leaderships, to find a formula that will both work and be acceptable to public opinion of their respective communities. Each shows sympathetic understanding of problems other has with own communal leadership. Nevertheless negative pressures are great and increasing. However, negotiating position of both sides protected by fact that both have made it clear all compromises are contingent upon, indeed dependent upon, construction of “over-all agreement” including external guarantees of some sort.

D. UNSYG Special Rep Osorio-Tafall playing active (but still discreet) role by feeding compromise ideas into talks through his contacts with Makarios and Clerides.

E. Emphasis on “over-all agreement” has activated link between internal problems bilaterally solved and external problems to be solved by multilateral international accords.

3. Problems—We see following problems representing real block to further progress:

A. Loss of momentum—Momentum generated by November crisis—which has been a primary factor in bringing us to satisfactory conclusion of first phase of local talks—appears rapidly dissipating. We detect distressing signs of complacency in some Greek quarters. Certain Greek hardliners taking position they can afford to be firm in negotiations because economic and political factors operating in their favor, i.e., economic depression of enclaves and eventual necessity of Turks having to integrate economically with rest of island. (We suspect Makarios espouses this view.) Turk counterparts genuinely fearing erosion relative security they now enjoy argue they should stick to hard position in local talks, defend integrity of enclaves, and build economic and administrative separateness of their areas.

B. Constitutional differences—against this background of decreasing positive momentum real differences in substance must be considered. Two sides have arrived at point in local talks where they must begin to bargain on fundamentals if significant progress to continue. In pursuing goal of security Turks want autonomy, i.e., administrative and police control, in areas they now hold exclusively. Greeks in striving for unitary state prefer smaller Turkish administrative units based on towns and villages with less autonomy under centralized control. They emphasize common electoral rolls, elimination of executive veto, have suggested elimination of office of Vice President and other elements designed prevent Turks from obstructing responsiveness of government to will of Greek majority. Disposition of National Guard and TMT and related question of general disarming of population also obvious major unsolved problems.

C. Guarantees—International factor—in addition to problems of restructuring Cyprus state, both Clerides and Denktash have stated everything dependent on “over-all agreement.” In short, hoped-for new constitutional arrangements will not go into operation until agreement reached on external aspects of problem, namely, for Turk Cypriots, some “adequate” provision for their security and for GOC elimination of GOT’s claimed right of unilateral intervention.

D. Compensation—Agreement on reparations for losses suffered (principally by Turks), and how they will be financed is another knotty unresolved problem area.

E. Timing—Finally, question of timing is crucial. Most important dimension concerns position of Denktash in Turk Cypriot community. He is now at height of popularity and influence and is apparently strongly backed by Ankara and GOT Embassy here. Moreover, we feel Denktash has will to compromise, imagination to find ways and means to compromise and courage and position to push compromises with Kuchuk, GOT and Turk Cypriot community. However, longer local talks drag on, more subject he is to attack by hawks in own community and more his now practically unchalleneged position will be undermined. Already Turk Cypriot dailies Bozkurt and Zafer are challenging Denktash position by opposing in advance compromises he must make and by questioning usefulness of talks. Denktash has commented to us on opposition to him in TCPA and his method so far of dealing with it (Nicosia 2169).³ Turkish Embassy (Nicosia 2142)⁴ has also expressed concern about time element in connection with Denktash’s leadership role. Other aspects of timing problem involve internal situations in Greece and Turkey. In former case, regardless of views about colonels’ regime, appears to us here reintroduction parliamentary regime would in all probability mean Cyprus would become political football it formerly was. Basically, GOG is—at least for time being—out of Cyprus equation. Old-line politicians, if they return to power, might well bring Greece back into it. In case of Turkey federal elections are scheduled for 1969. It would seem almost inevitable that opposition will use Cyprus to berate present government if matter still unsettled when elections occur.

4. Recommendations—Given our analysis of problems remaining in current situation, potential which exists for failure of local talks, probably followed by swift deterioration of Cyprus problem, and limited time available to promote successful outcome of promising developments to date, we raise following policy recommendations for consideration by Department and interested colleagues:

A. That Embassy Nicosia emphasize to GOC contacts at all levels our view that normalization by Turk Cypriots, disposition of Turkish contingent (see NKI 170 and 173),⁵ and questions of guarantees are all linked to concessions by GOC on degree of autonomy Turk Cypriots will be given in restructured Cyprus state. As stressed by Denktash, the greater the degree of autonomy achieved by Turk Cypriots, more concessions they will make on normalization and guarantees.

B. That USG as appropriate encourage maintenance of GOG-GOT and GOC–GOT contacts on external aspects of Cyprus problem which so closely linked to internal problems. Progress on external problems such as contingents and guarantees could lead to progress in local talks as well as vice versa.

C. That USG join with Brits in effort to use December mandate renewal to maintain pressure on GOC and Turk Cypriots-GOT to compromise, e.g., by limiting mandate renewal to 3 months and joining other contributors in supporting further troop reductions (Osorio currently favors three-month renewal and further 25 percent troop reduction).

D. That Embassy Nicosia join at an appropriate time (probably sometime in second phase of talks this fall) with Osorio-Tafall in pushing for demilitarization, e.g., further deconfrontation and rundown of troop strength of National Guard and TMT.⁶

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, Ottawa, and the Mission to NATO.
2. See footnote 3, Document 358.
3. Dated August 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 CYP)
4. Dated July 26. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
5. Not found.
6. In telegram 216212 to Nicosia, August 6, the Department of State approved limited contacts to support the peacemaking process, commenting that it believed the most useful aid the United States could provide would be advice to the parties about the factors affecting the opposite parties’ bargaining stance. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)