Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

353. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, January 9, 1968, 1315Z.

3099. 1. Mr. and Mrs. Andreas Papandreou called on me at home January 8. Andreas seemed well, vigorous, responsive and as articulate as ever.² He dismissed his fainting spell several days earlier as not important or serious but rather as an incidental effect on his metabolism of excitement of being released. Similar incidents had occurred in past years. He said he had not been mistreated in jail but that eight months of confinement with armed guards always physically present has inevitably taken their toll and his strength and energy were naturally reduced. He was now rebuilding them. Worst period in prison was last twenty-four hours after amnesty had been announced but before he was certain it would apply to him.

2. Since his release he had discussed possible future plans with his family but not with anyone else before this conversation. He found many reasons to stay in Greece, but he would then have to remain close to home and concentrate on writing since any serious contacts with old friends and associates would be subject to misunderstanding by regime. Also so long as he remained in Greece he would be a factor and possibly an embarrassment to regime causing it to act more defensively. Thus without inflating his own importance, he had come to feel that perhaps the regime could move more freely toward constitutionalism once he had left the country. In any event, he had decided to return to United States. He had applied for a Greek passport and had reason to think it [garble—would] be forthcoming shortly. If so, he would like to start promptly for the United States. I told him we could give him visa quickly. We also discussed possible effect on him of Supreme Court decision in Afroyim case. I explained that Court had not ruled on questions involving a citizen who took Ministerial oath of allegiance to foreign sovereign and that therefore decision could not be presumed to have given him fresh claim to U.S. citizenship. Any administrative or further judicial interpretation could, of course, modify this position, but as of this date no such finding had been made. Andreas asked if his acceptance of Greek passport now would reduce his prospect of resuming American citizenship in event of later broad construction of Afroyim decision. I responded that to best of my knowledge it would not.

3. Papandreou said he had decided that for indefinite future, “which could be very long time,” he would abandon political activities and return to academic career which would now be focussed on broader developmental economics than on his earlier mathematical econometric specialty. With several university offers in hand, he had ruled out Middle Western possibilities (Minnesota, Northwestern) but had not yet decided whether to go back to California or another West Coast institution or to settle on East Coast. It would depend on kinds of contacts he might have in one place or other.

4. Our talk, which has relaxed and friendly throughout, also included candid discussion of some of Andreas’ past activities and his appraisal of present prospects in Greece. Ostensible purpose of call, however, was to express thanks for Embassy’s intervention “to save my life” on first night of April coup and thereafter. Andreas said he was aware of my approaches to coup leaders and Embassy’s concern for his family and deeply appreciated our interest. I commented that Embassy had been prepared to offer assistance to his family if need arose, particularly if he or they should ever appear to be in imminent danger, but happily this had not been necessary. We discussed how much he may have been in actual danger of being killed. I suggested that although I was grateful for his appreciation of Embassy’s efforts, in fact maximum danger had probably come immediately during his arrest, before Embassy knew what was going on. Once regime had him in custody and world knew it, any physical attack on him would have been hard to justify. Certainly we had not discovered any indication that regime ever planned to execute him. Papandreou agreed with this assessment. Pattakos had told him junior members of Junta wanted to get rid of him but that Pattakos had overruled them. When after forty-eight hours or so Andreas understood that there were no political killings, he felt his own situation much safer. It could however have been different story if top coup leadership had lost control to more activist juniors.

5. Throughout this phase of our conversation, Andreas made repeated references to comfort he had gained by knowing USG and Embassy maintained lively interest in his situation.

6. While in prison Andreas had thought through events between July 15, 1965 and April 21, 1967, he said. He had come to see situation from perspective of Greek state as a whole without partisan distortions. Now that that phase had passed, and he could talk without sounding as if he were trying to make marks for future, he wanted to make clear what position he had held vis-a-vis United States, since he felt there had been misunderstandings between him and American Embassy and perhaps some bias in reporting. Ever since 1961 he had believed Embassy and State Department had favored Greek rightists and strong role for King. He reminded me that he had asserted this to me in Washington after Greek elections of 1961, which he felt had been distorted not by domestic influences alone (a delicately-phrased assertion that CIA had intervened in those elections). Whatever Embassy may have thought in 1965–66 and 1966–67, he had never advocated departure of King from Greece but merely limitation of King’s ambition to play de Gaulle by precise delimitation of Royal powers. Also, he had never advocated departure of Greece from Western Alliance; on contrary, Greece unlike Tito’s Yugoslavia could not survive neutralism because its position would not permit this. Finally, whatever criticisms of United States policy he had made, he had not attacked U.S. policies as an enemy but rather as member of family. Having been an American citizen, he had felt he could be as frank as Senators Fulbright and Morse without putting into question his basic belief that United States and Greece must continue closely together.

7. I told Papandreou I accepted these statements. From our point of view, Embassy (and I as former newspaperman accustomed to importance of separating news from editorial opinion) had tried to maximum extent possible to avoid bias. His father and he had asserted to me early in my tour in Greece that Embassy had neglected importance of Center Union³ without discussing prior situation which I had not known at first hand. I was confident he would agree that in 1965–67 period Embassy had maintained close contacts with Center Union and I personally had seen his father quite frequently as well as other prominent members of party. Andreas acknowledged that. I went on to observe that he should know that in 1960’s, at least (which only period I could speak of personally, not having previously been in government service), both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had determined firmly that there should be one United States policy in a country. It was thus unrealistic to speak of separate diplomatic, military and intelligence policies. Papandreou interjected that he was glad to hear “this important statement.” I continued that while Andreas and his father had both assured me that they followed same policies despite differences in style, I had subsequently concluded that in fact there were substantive differences between them. Andreas acknowledged that he and his father in the end had disagreed on policy points. He reiterated, however, that this had nothing to do with their joint view of the importance of the American connection. His own strategy had been to try to detach as large a faction as possible from the Communist-front EDA Party in order to assure an electoral victory for the Center Union. He admitted this was a risky policy, but felt that he could have carried it off despite his father’s doubts.

8. Andreas spoke of American influence in Greece and the importance of getting this country back on constitutional lines. I responded that in early Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan period American influence had apparently sometimes been used tactically, to extent of insistence upon broad-based government to carry out reconstruction and development programs. However, as with other countries well along development trail, in recent years we had held that Greece itself (rather than outsiders) must be mainly responsible for its political, economic, and social development, and that we could no more take responsibility for its failures than for its successes. It was on this basis, that we had not intervened with King last spring to set up temporary government that would have sidetracked elections and presumably averted military coup. Similarly, at present stage, we are not in position to tell Greece what kind of government it should have. Papandreou commented that in many ways this is a pity, since present rulers of Greece need advice. I noted that no one in Greece is unaware of fact that Americans would find repugnant any permanent military dictatorship in Europe in 1960’s. Key policy question for us, I added, is whether gradual restoration of democratic and parliamentary rule is more likely to be accomplished if allies turn their backs on Greece at present juncture of work with government of day. Papandreou said that not even while in prison had he ever suggested U.S. should not recognize this Greek government, nor would he now. In his view delicate task for U.S. would be to work with present regime while letting Greeks know our purpose is to urge country toward restoration of constitutionalism. I noted this is precisely posture we developed after April 21 coup.

9. I noted that in U.S. Andreas would find American public opinion toward Greece sharply divided, with important elements of academic community taking different line from other significant groups such as major Greek-American organizations. On how best to deal with present situation, Andreas again said he had been doing much thinking in prison, and that we could count on him not to exacerbate policy attitudes in U.S. He recognizes that present regime is well in saddle, that any immediate opposition would seem likely to be generated only by more extreme elements within revolutionary group, which would be worse than present leadership, and that restoration of constitutional patterns might take long time. I mentioned Turkish experience of plebiscite on first anniversary of military takeover in 1960, followed by elections six months thereafter and then for some time by a civilian government under shadow of military veto before parliamentary institutions firmly reestablished. While Greece is not Turkey, I hazarded view this country might be in for similar process. If constitutional referendum held within next six to eight months and first elections within year thereafter, this would not necessarily be bad. Andreas commented that process should not be allowed to lag too long but also that there danger in trying to push it too fast because junior officers might react to strong pressures by refusing to permit any progress at all. He felt present group, despite its power position, is insecure and uncertain. Because of this, I said we had for some time felt it important that the regime commit itself to constitutional progress at least one step at a time. Now a constitutional draft had been produced practically within promised six months framework, and inclusive dates had been announced within which referendum would be held. This constitutes progress of sorts though we can make no substantive judgments about prospects without seeing constitutional draft as produced by Mitrelias Commission and as revised by government. Before chance to appraise rigidity or liberality of government’s draft, I personally would doubt wisdom of pressing for fixed date for elections. Andreas said he agreed fully.

10. The Papandreous promised to let me know as soon as they get definite word about his passport. Department will be advised when visa application received.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 GR. Confidential; Limdis.
2. On December 23, 1967, the Junta announced that it would be releasing Andreas Papandreou and other political prisoners. On January 2, Margaret Papandreou requested a meeting with Talbot in order for her husband to discuss his future plans. In telegram 2929 from Athens, December 23, Talbot raised the likelihood that Andreas would request a visa to return to the United States and outlined means of arranging the most “expeditious” issuance of a non-emigrant visa. (Ibid.)
3. See Document 214.