Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, November 28, 1967, 1215Z.

2475. Vanto 38. Ref: Vanto 37.² Subject: Vance meeting with FonMin Pipinelis—November 28.

1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Talbot and John Walsh, called on FonMin Pipinelis at 1130, shortly after their return to Athens. Theodoropoulos also present.

2. Vance opened discussion with statement situation very grave. He then ran through events and meetings in Ankara reported septel, reporting that Greek draft accord had been badly received. After summarizing the very difficult meeting that he had in early morning hours with Caglayangil³ he handed over the two GOT documents emitting from that session, namely letter to him from Caglayangil limiting Greek withdrawal period to 45 days and GOT draft accord representing “final” Turk position.

3. Vance said honesty compelled him to state time is very short and Turks will not accept any change in draft. This is fact of life.

4. Pipinelis said this was ultimatum which he instinctively inclined reject. From beginning to end of Vance process he had tried to settle issue. With each exchange, however, Turks had raised the price.

5. While he did not seem to boggle over 45-day limit on withdrawal and did not have particular difficulties with operative paras affecting Greece-Turkey relations, para 4 concerning UNFICYP operations appeared impossible to him. Greece, he said, could take steps on its own but it cannot make decisions for Cyprus. Furthermore, he was convinced that chaos would result if Greek forces were withdrawn and the National Guard was disbanded before some other force were constituted. He said he could not recommend this to his government, since it makes no sense. Furthermore it would be impossible to carry the Cabinet with this proposition or to get Makarios to accept it.

6. Talbot then pointed out that para 4 as drafted by Turks was not operative and furthermore language implied parallelism between phasing out National Guard and constituting new force. Vance pointed out that provisions of para would be implemented by UN not by GOT. Therefore, parallelism and timing was in hands of UN. In addition, he had made perfectly clear to Turks that para as drafted was not operative. Turks have also specifically stated they have no time limits in mind re [garble—para 4].

7. This exchange somewhat buoyed Pipinelis who said he would discuss letter and draft accord with Cabinet. At Vance’s urging he agreed withhold negative decision until he talked to Brosio and to us. Vance told him we had some ideas which might help.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1457Z and repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, the Mission to NATO, and USCINCEUR.
2. Vanto 37, November 28, reported on negotiations with the Turks on Vance’s proposals for a settlement. At the end of the discussion, Caglayangil stated that the U.S. effort was at the “end of the line” and that Turkey would accept no further modifications of the proposal. (Ibid.)
3. See Document 328.