323. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1
770. 1. I hesitated use this precedence for following message but it will give you all some indication what we are up against in dealing with Byzantine mentality so prevalent in GOC.
2. Makarios called me to Palace 8:00 P.M. local. Foreign Minister was present. Makarios said that they had information to indicate that Caglayangil had made what purported be serious proposal: GOT would land troops in Cyprus but with no intention open hostilities unless opposed. Their idea would be to secure a beachhead and hold it and then negotiate from a position of greater equality vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus. President wanted me to know and get word to GOT that such an action would be considered an act of war and would of course be opposed with whatever forces GOC could muster.
2. I told the Archbishop that we had had similar information but from military contacts and not from anyone in authority on the civilian side of the government and we had already commented from this Embassy that such a hope on the part of the Turks was out of the question. He asked nevertheless to report this information and to make clear the position of his government.
3. Our discussion then turned to the Vance Mission and the central theme of demilitarization. I reminded His Beatitude of our conversation when the UK and Canadian HICOMers were present the other night2 at which time I had said that I doubted very much whether the Turks would be willing to go the whole way and remove their contingent. I understood that the Greek position was similar to his and that they both supported complete demilitarization and the removal of the contingent was [Page 667] an integral part of this concept. Kyprianou interjected that unless the Turks could agree to removal of their contingent, the whole proposition was hopeless. I turned to the Archbishop saying that his words to me the other day were graphic in describing the situation as not merely one of war or peace but rather one of peace or survival. This being the case would it not be better for the time being to accept a limited demilitarization which would involve the removal of non-Cypriot forces in excess to the London/Zurich treaty levels? Surely this was a question which could be decided in the talks which must take place subsequent to settlement of the present grave crisis. The modification of London/Zurich would be central to any such talks—even the Turks agreed to this. For the sake of preserving peace could this aspect of the problem not be postponed? Both the Archbishop and Kyprianou said this was out of the question.
4. Our conversation then turned to other aspects of the Turkish five points with emphasis on internal security. We discussed at some length the problem of policing and whether there would be joint UN-Greek and Turkish patrols. I had the strange feeling of being somewhere else engrossed in [garble—irrelevancies?] while the central point of avoiding war was being argued. I could not seem to impress upon them their fate hung in the balance no matter how many times I tried to bring the conversation back to the central issue.
5. As I took my leave I reminded them that Mr. Vance’s first conversations in Ankara had been discouraging and that we were now awaiting a report of his conversations with President Sunay. In response to Makarios’ question I assumed the reason Mr. Vance was not coming here at the present time was that the Turks had not accepted the Greek position as he had presented it after his consultations in Athens yesterday. I reminded him that I did not know any of the details except that the Turks had objected to the removal of the two contingents but that I would try to keep him informed if we learned of any other points of issue. In the meantime, what was needed was a miracle and I wished them good luck in finding one.
6. For the first time in my five years of knowing Makarios he was using his worry beads (I might add that the Foreign Minister and I had ours out too!).