322. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

2561. Vanto 24. Subject: Vance meeting with FonMin Caglayangil—November 25. At 0800 Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Hart and John Walsh, met with Foreign Minister Caglayangil to discuss results of mission’s discussions in Athens. Implications of meeting were ugly. Caglayangil was churlish in manner and cavalier in his comments on various aspects of the mission’s proposals. It was difficult to avoid conclusion during meeting that USG had been tricked into a Turkish charade [Page 665] which would come to an abrupt end at Turkish National Security Council meeting scheduled later in morning. As Caglayangil left for NSC meeting, he told Ambassador Hart that our proposals were hopeless.

Vance opened session with description his activities in Athens, including problems persuading Greeks to agree to formulation which would satisfy Turk demands that Greeks take initiative in accepting proposal plea by YG [SYG?] and in beginning withdrawal Greek units. After considerable persuasion this had been accomplished in form of draft action paper (Vanto 17)2 and side minute signed by FonMin Pipinellis.3

After glancing at documents presented by Vance and briefly discussing them with his FonOff colleagues, Caglayangil’s subsequent comments quickly chilled the atmosphere.

The Vance products were not, he said, as good as the five points presented by the US–UK-Can Ambassadors.4 In his opinion, they seemed to represent an effort to save Greek prestige without regard for Turkish prestige. The provision for total demilitarization was unacceptable to him because it conflicted with the London/Zurich Accords establishing fixed levels for Greek and Turkish contingents. The interrelation between paras and the balanced relationship between Greek and Turkish actions seemed incomprehensible to him. Furthermore the Pipinellis side note to Vance cited above was surprisingly described as a Greek ultimatum. When Vance proposed to clarify individual points Caglayangil opined that it might be helpful but would not change his assessment that Vance proposals were not acceptable to GOT.

Speaking in a more general sense, he launched series of rockets. Turkey, he said, is not faced with simple choice of peace or war. If at present acute phase of crisis, GOT is unable safeguard its kinsmen on Cyprus the damage to its social structure will far exceed costs of war. Country would collapse in anarchy if people lost confidence in army and government.

Evidently responding to yesterday’s strictures by Ambassador Hart that a Turkish war decision would seriously affect US-Turkish relations, he said he did not share this point of view. Nobody with sound mind would be shocked by Turkish use of MAP equipment against ally after the events of November 14–15. Vance responded vigorously at this point, outlining inevitable American reactions to such an event.

After Caglayangil’s departure for Cabinet meeting, Vance requested FonOff pass message to him requesting urgent meeting with President Sunay and informing Caglayangil that, if Cabinet took decision [Page 666] turn down Vance proposals, USG would conclude it had been tricked by GOT and entire exercise had been Turkish charade. This resulted in quick response that President would see Vance at 1230 today.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1525Z and also sent to Athens and Nicosia.
  2. See footnote 3, Document 321.
  3. Transmitted in telegram 2408 from Athens, November 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE)
  4. See Document 314.