296. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1
SUBJECT
- Normalization of US-Greek Relations
We have had a number of interdepartmental discussions recently on the subject of normalizing our relations with the Greek Government.2 Both in the Regional Group under Assistant Secretary Battle and in the Senior Group chaired by Under Secretary Katzenbach, with Ambassador Talbot present on both occasions, certain steps in this direction have been agreed upon. I am in accord with the conclusions reached.
From the point of view of our relations with Greece, I consider the steps outlined below important to our interests. Ambassador Talbot is returning to Greece at the end of next week and should be able to tell the Greek Government something positive on this score shortly after he arrives.
Recommendation: That you approve the actions described below:3
Foreign Policy Aspects
- 1.
- Since the April military coup we have withheld delivery on certain major arms to Greece and been quite cool in our relations with the Government with the idea not only of exhibiting disapproval of the methods by which the junta seized control but also, hopefully, of encouraging some return, however gradual, to more constitutional processes.
- 2.
- We now believe these tactics are no longer useful and that, if continued longer, may be counterproductive. The King has come to the same conclusion. Ambassador Talbot considers it quite possible the Greeks, although highly desirous of close relations with us, may adopt the same tactics by causing certain difficulties with some of our facilities there.
- 3.
- We have in Greece facilities important to the Air Force, the Navy, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and USIA; they have increased [Page 625] in value since the Arab-Israeli war. That war underlined the importance of Greece (along with Turkey and Iran) to U.S. interests.
- 4.
- We propose that Ambassador Talbot be authorized to inform the Greek Government of certain relaxations as set forth below, making clear that future actions in this regard will be related to progress in the restoration of constitutional processes: (a) a coastal minesweeper ($2.9 million); (b) one F–104G trainer ($1.5 million); (c) sidewinder missiles and related equipment which are excess to the needs of the Netherlands (no charge); and (d) 175mm cannons (8–$1.05 million). These items were chosen (a) as having a clear NATO context and (b) as obviously not lending themselves to the suppression of civil disturbances.
- 5.
- We believe we should not release just yet either tanks, helicopters, or other heavy equipment. (With respect to FRG shipment of military assistance to Greece, particularly including tanks, we believe we should give the Germans the go-ahead signal in the near future but not just at this time.)
Congressional Problems
- 1.
- Although the timing of this action is not particularly favorable
given the concern in Congressional quarters with respect to arms
programs, both sale and grant, nevertheless, we believe we must
proceed and that the over-all interest of foreign policy requires
that we do so as soon as possible. We judge that although there will
be some adverse reaction in Congress and elsewhere, it will not be
great and can be reasonably contained by stressing the following:
- a.
- This is a minimum step.
- b.
- Greece, like Turkey and Iran, emerges as particularly important to the U.S. given the uncertainties in the Middle East and the Soviet thrust in that area.
- c.
- It is essential that we maintain Greece as an active and functioning member of NATO under whose umbrella the arms programs are developed.
- d.
- We must avoid pressing Greece in the direction of the French with their lukewarm and unhelpful posture in a NATO context.
- 2.
- If you approve the above course of action, we will undertake a certain amount of educational work on the Hill. How much can perhaps better be determined after the appearance on July 26 of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on military assistance programs.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt Rostow, Vol. 35. Secret; Nodis.↩
- An interdepartmental regional group discussed the issue on July 6. A July 13 memorandum to Rusk from Battle reporting its recommendations is in Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 553, Org. 3. The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) discussed the recommendations on July 19. A July 24 memorandum by Brewster summarizing the conclusions of the SIG meeting is ibid., Lot 71 D 6, DEF 19.↩
- Rostow endorsed the recommendations of Secretary Rusk in a July 22 memorandum (attached to the source text), but President Johnson took no action on the recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt Rostow, Vol. 35)↩