Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

295. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the NATO Capitals¹

Washington, July 12, 1967, 11:35 a.m.

CA-263. NATUS. Ref: Paris’ 275; Moscow’s 98.²

1. There has been cumulative but still inconclusive evidence over past few weeks that current authoritarian GOG may be giving consideration to plan for ending Cyprus stalemate irrespective of position Archbishop Makarios and those around him. However, we have no concrete evidence to indicate GOG contemplating “coup” despite circulation coup rumors in Athens and Nicosia during last two weeks.³ Recent radio and press attacks on Makarios and those around him might well have been designed to bring pressure on Archbishop to abandon his position on “genuine enosis” and we now inclined believe GOG will continue pressures on Makarios to obtain his acquiescence in GOG/GOT agreement or his resignation.

2. GOG thinking seems to comprise following elements:

a. Because of its character, it is better able than democratic Greek Government to make settlement which would meet GOT desiderata. Offer of 60-year lease to Turks suggests that GOG may go all the way and offer GOT a sovereign base.

b. Settlement perplexing and frustrating Cyprus problem would satisfy nationalistic aspirations most Greeks, and would add to GOG’s own internal and international prestige. This government more than most Greek Governments likely view honorable Greek settlement, i.e., some form enosis, as essential.

c. Makarios and some of those around him either are not prepared to accept form of enosis which would satisfy GOT, but may even prefer continued independence. GOG concerned about growth of anti-enosis sentiment being encouraged on island.

d. Existence of crypto-communist AKEL and its satellite organizations on island is threat to Hellenism as a whole. GOG also clearly concerned about Lyssarides and his influence on Makarios, and about Clerides and others who have vested interest in continuing independence of Cyprus.

3. We assume essential element in any GOG planning would be prior agreement with GOT, possibly in some detail. Thus far there no indication any such agreement reached. In fact, GOG FonMin Economou-Gouras, now in US, has informed us⁴ that in recent talks with GOT FonMin Caglayangil he still attempting to prevail upon Turks to accept long lease on Cyprus base, whereas GOT insistent on sovereign base area. In this connection, of course, it possible Gouras not privy to thinking of Athens coup group which may be willing transfer sovereign base area.

4. If GOG thinking along these lines, sequence events envisaged may be something along following pattern (though not necessarily in that order):

a. Secret agreement with GOT, providing for (1) Turkish possession of a sovereign base area in Cyprus, either at Dhekelia, or Karpas Peninsula (but presumably the former), and (2) stipulated guarantees of communal rights of Turkish Cypriot minority.

b. Neutralization, using Greek military units on Cyprus as necessary, of Archbishop Makarios, other Greek Cypriot leaders not clearly in favor of enosis, and, of course, Communists (AKEL) and others of left-wing persuasion. Such neutralization would accord with self-proclaimed objectives of current Greek leadership, and recent official statements from Athens would seem to pave the way towards, or foreshadow, some such action.

c. Placing in positions of power in Cyprus of Greek Cypriot elements in confidence of GOG.

d. Announcement, possibly in collaboration with GOT, of some form of union between Cyprus and Greece. This might take form of Commonwealth relationship, with King Constantine acting as sovereign of Cyprus, GOG assuming responsibilities for foreign affairs, defense, and perhaps also internal security, and, for the rest, internal self-government for Cyprus including careful delineation of role and privileges of Turkish minority.

5. Depending upon kind of action GOG may take, we would expect particularly strong reactions within NATO, which includes three contributors to UNFICYP—Denmark, Canada, and UK. Scandinavians are consistently critical of what they consider shortcomings of fellow NATO members (e.g., Portugal), and Danes have already raised question of Greek internal political developments. These members might well recall reiterated Greek insistence over past three years in NATO that solution to Cyprus problem was responsibility of UN. More recently, Belgium, Italy and UK have pressed for cancellation of NATO military exercise in Greece for fear of domestic reaction against cooperation with military junta.

6. Soviet Union has initiated considerable diplomatic and propaganda pressure in attempt forestall any change in Cyprus status. Formal TASS statement July 4 expressed Soviet concern with developments around Cyprus and with attempts aggravate again situation in area endangering existence Republic. Statement alleges implementation old plans for coup d’etat not accidental but result NATO plan to exploit situation in Greece extending antipopular militarist dictatorship to Cyprus. Soviet diplomats made virtually identical oral démarches to US (Depcirtel 2553)⁵ and UK expressing concern that attempt planned to liquidate sovereignty GOG asserting “certain circles NATO” are behind it. Soviet opposition was reaffirmed to liquidation Cyprus’ independence, its dismemberment, and conversion into NATO military base, noting such developments could lead to “significant sharpening already strained situation in area.” Démarches cite previous UNSC resolutions on Cyprus and call on receiving governments as permanent members UNSC take all measures to thwart these dangerous plans. Other East European communist states expected to follow USSR in strident and probably drawnout propaganda campaign. Yugoslavia, already claiming security threatened by advent authoritarian government in Athens, would probably view anticipated events as extension “imperialist” plot. President Tito alleges has shaped diverse developments such as revolutions in Ghana, Greece, Indonesia and recent events in Middle East. We would anticipate considerable Soviet and East European efforts gain non-aligned support for moves keep Cyprus question alive, even if anticipated actions were carried out effectively and quickly and with agreement Turkish government. Recourse to Security Council may be expected.

7. US position on Cyprus is that we are ready to agree to any arrangement acceptable to the parties concerned, i.e, Cyprus and the three guarantor powers (UK, Greece and Turkey). We have urged the Turks and Greeks to continue talking, but have not asked them to keep us informed about these talks.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Horner and McCaskill, cleared by NEA and EUR, and approved by Rockwell. Also sent to Moscow and Belgrade and repeated to Nicosia and Istanbul.
2. Telegram 275 from Paris, July 6, requested guidance regarding Cyprus in the wake of a July 5 Soviet statement by TASS. (Ibid.) Telegram 98 from Moscow, July 7, reported on the Soviet propaganda offensive charging Western plans for action against the Makarios government. (Ibid.) The Soviet statement expressed concern about U.S. backing of a coup in Cyprus; for text, see Weekly Digest of the Soviet Press, July 26, 1967, p. 20.
3. In telegram 17 from Athens, July 1, Talbot reported that while no evidence existed of plans for a coup against Makarios, the Junta was planning some action regarding Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
4. See Document 294.
5. In circular telegram 2553, July 7, the Department of State informed posts that Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Kohler had denied any NATO plans existed for intervention in Cyprus in a July 6 meeting with Soviet officials. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)