292. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Talbot) to the Country Director for Greece (Brewster)1
Dear Dan:
In view of the distribution given even Exdis telegrams, I would prefer for some time to report to you by letter some of the more sensitive items that emerge from my conversations with the King. This will give you direct control of distribution of this sort of information in Washington—a control that I believe to be essential in these circumstances.
Yesterday the King described further steps in his thinking about how to meet a confrontation with Col. Papadopoulos and the Revolutionary Council, should one occur.2 His visits to military units scheduled for June will, he hopes, give him a chance to test the loyalty and discipline of units to which he might want to turn. He thinks that the 20th Armored Division (General Erselman) and other Third Corps elements along the [Page 616] Evros River (Gen. Zalocoris) might provide him a welcome in case of need. His tentative idea in the event of a confrontation would be to get his family out of the country and then make every effort to get to the north by plane or ship (presumably Royal Hellenic Navy ship) in order to base himself with loyal units, broadcast to the nation, and announce that he was moving south toward Athens to reassert his command over the Armed Forces and his headship of the nation. The success of such a plea, he feels, would depend in part on the loyalty of the Greek Armed Forces, but very substantially also on United States actions. He would hope that we could work out a plan between now and early June which I could then discuss in Washington. He continues to think how fine it would be if the Sixth Fleet could be in the area at the time of confrontation. Its mere presence would probably turn the tide, in his view. He hopes that he and I could also talk, however, about the possible availability of Marines to come ashore peacefully as in Lebanon in 1958, should the need arise. I immediately cautioned him against expectation of any involvement of U.S. forces. It is a long time since 1958, conditions are different, and any such action could be taken only on the express instructions of the highest levels in Washington. I would not want him to draw false encouragement from anything I might either say or not say in response to his comments. He said he understood this but that “we should think of some plan before you go to Washington, so that you can discuss it there in detail.”
This is the King’s second foray with me on the question of his own contingency plans if it should become impossible to carry on with the present government. Presumably he will raise it again when I see him sometime in the first week of June. We are working on some thoughts here, which I hope to get to you promptly, but I will urgently need the Department’s instructions and guidance in coping with further stages of development of the King’s ideas.
With best wishes,
Yours sincerely,