Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

291. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, May 21, 1967, 2323Z.

5377. NATUS.

1. In my first discussion with him since April 26, Prime Minister Kollias Friday revealed GOG’s sensitivity to official American view of situation in Greece. Our exchange started with some rather starchy references by Kollias to United States “misunderstanding” of Greek military action to save Greece. After my assertion that our biggest question is what direction new GOG will take, Kollias concluded with assurance that formation and operation of constitution-revising committee will proceed promptly. On the whole, I believe exercise was useful.

2. At first Kollias was edgy and visibly upset by what I gather was well-embellished telegram from Ambassador Matsas describing talk with Secretary May 17.² Greeks, Kollias said, are “very sorry” and he feels “great bitterness” because American friends do not seem to realize great necessity for change and continue unfavorable criticism on top of which they also cut military assistance. Greeks many times have shown they can live on cats and mice rather than betray ideal in which they believe. Greece even if left in lurch by its allies will continue to fight for real democracy and continue to love Americans and be grateful for support they have given since 1947. Greeks understand liberty and they understand need to overcome corruption of recent parliamentary process in order to restore true liberty to their country. He himself had starved and fought as simple soldier in cause of liberty and had now given up judicial career of forty years to assist in service of his country. He would never agree to serve a cause whose purpose was imposition of a dictatorial regime. Rather this government’s purpose is to establish real freedom and democracy in order to save country from chaos and catastrophe that was about to befall it. Revolution of April 21 was perhaps most civilized, most liberal and most bloodless revolution ever to occur. All information government has received from interior of country is extremely satisfactory. Eighty per cent of people share enthusiasm for change.

3. After twenty minutes of similar oratory I managed to riposte that having listened with close attention I was greatly disappointed to realize that GOG apparently had not understood major points USG has been seeking to make. We have our views on what has occurred before April 21 and thereafter. American people had not believed recent conditions in Greece ideal, but it would be unrealistic to think Americans would not have reacted to what has happened.

4. Events of April 21 raised questions which need sorting out before future U.S. road can be determined. Thus the military assistance review (whose details I spelled out to correct his assertion that aid had been cut off but also to leave him in no doubt that review could ultimately be concluded in any of several directions). However, I went on, USG is not concentrating on the past; it is not suggesting that clock could be turned back. Rather, it is looking to present and future. What direction is this government going to take? If it is to move along lines of military governments fastened on some Arab countries, for example, Americans could be expected to react. (“No, no,” Kollias objected.) If on other hand this government pursues objective of restoring representative government as quickly as possible, we could expect American policies to move in another direction. Problem is one of being convincing. As Prime Minister aware, announcement of plan to form constitution-revision committee and submit its product to plebiscite after review by government was favorable step. Yet that simple declaration not enough to persuade international opinion in face of other things that have happened in Greece.

5. We know, I continued, that Greeks can fight their battles, alone if necessary. But we do not want to see GOG isolated from world. We have been privileged to be closely associated with Greeks in their struggles, especially in past twenty years. That is why we are so much interested in persuasive evidence that GOG will indeed move briskly toward constitution revision and representative rule.

6. Speaking personally, I told Prime Minister that my colleagues in Washington had made great efforts to persuade influential Congressmen and others not to heat up American reaction before receiving firm evidence of GOG intentions. This was a difficult exercise, and I did not know how much longer it could be carried on. Assurances given now by GOG could be much more helpful in calming international opinion than same assurances given after some weeks when adverse attitudes may have grown.

7. With his adrenaline still running, though less vigorously than at first, Kollias declared that it is and has always been the desire of this GOG to have country return to normal political life as soon as conditions will permit. GOG said so in its initial proclamation to the people, and has since repeated its pledge. Prime Minister could categorically assure me that names of twenty members of committee which will be charged with revision of Constitution will be announced by end of this month. Committee will be given up to six months to prepare revision and after study by GOG this will be submitted to plebiscite. He could also assure me that with help of God and with aid (unspecified), government would be in position within one year to proclaim elections. He made it clear, however, that without aid GOG would not be in position to establish conditions that would make elections possible within this time.

8. I commented that public statement along lines he had just set out to me would in my opinion have beneficial effect. He said he could make announcement about constitution-revising committee members’ appointment without delay, but that talk about elections would be different matter since that would depend not only on GOG. Full memcon being pouched.³

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GREECE. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, Paris, and USUN.
2. Telegram 196553 to Athens, May 17, reported that Rusk had pressed Matsas on the issues of the fate of political prisoners and political repression by the Junta. (Ibid., POL 23–9 GREECE)
3. Transmitted as an attachment to airgram A–656 from Athens, June 3. (Ibid., POL 15–1 GREECE)