Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, May 14, 1967, 1435Z.

5265. For Battle from Talbot. Ref: Athens 5264.²

1. Reftel conveys Country Team impressions of situation here three weeks after coup. To these let me add some personal thoughts as you face new rounds on Hill.

(a) Rather astonishing extent of acquiescence to coup can no longer be explained just as stunned reaction. Mood of relief has osmotically spread through community. As when power suddenly fails in boiler factory, only in this unexpected moment of quiet are many people realizing how much strain they had felt in normal high-decibel political din. Many now admit, too, to having feared destructiveness of impending electoral clashes. I’m reminded of Pakistan in 1958, when first reaction to Ayub’s coup was also sheer relief. This is a real phenomenon, not a shibboleth.

(b) How long this mood will last, we don’t know, certainly not indefinitely. Greeks are Greeks and will come to resist. But while it does, it has two major consequences: (1) it gives coup group almost ideal climate in which to consolidate control, and (2) it insulates many Greeks from impact of European and American outcry against “rape in cradle of democracy”. I am surprised at how widely we are getting rejoinders that Americans should understand it was Papandreous, especially Andreas, who strangled democracy here.

(c) This all heading, I fear, into major breakdown of genuine communication between important segments of opinion in Greece and in US. It is not merely matter of American disbelief of Greek feelings of relief at recent developments or of Greek wonderment at American lionizing of Andreas. More basic is fact that Americans and Europeans think Greece is clothed in Athenian values, while Greeks themselves remember how often in past 3,000 years—and in past 145 years since independence—they have been shuttlecocked between Athenian and Spartan concepts of government. Veterans in this century of seven wars, five military coups and at least two other attempts, one Royal assassination and three Royal withdrawals, at least three dictators, and more than 20 parliamentary governments since 1950, five of them in past 21 months, modern Greeks have enjoyed stable parliamentary rule really only between 1952 and 1965 (Papagos-Karamanlis-Papandreou). Thus I encounter reactions of “Well, here we go again. Wonder what it will be like this time. Hope it won’t be too bad; at least they’ve been rather soft to start with—no killings or anything like that”. This is very different attitude from outrage at rape of democracy, and perhaps more in keeping with cynical ennui of Eastern Mediterranean.

(d) Defining this attitude doesn’t solve our problem, nor does it suggest that present nonparliamentary regime will remain popular; far from it. But it does suggest that when volatile Greeks as usual look for some other path after some time, we should try to be ready to encourage and help them on realistic basis that neither they nor we want Greece soon to sink back into parliamentary tumult characteristic of pre-1952 period and of recent past.

(e) How to do this? Just pressing GOG to set precise dates for plebiscite and elections will not be enough, I fear. Based on previous Greek experience with plebiscite promises, date setting would not necessarily assure early return to representative government. In any event, GOG has proven resistant to our advice not only because military Ministers have already come to enjoy power but also because they seem to have persuaded themselves that setting early date (only kind they think would interest us) would inhibit their carrying through essential reforms. Despised politicians, they believe, would then merely hole-in and await time they could regain control of moneybags and patronage. And the one thing these military Ministers are determined not to do is to turn country back to same old hacks they stole it from.

(f) If Papadopoulos and company are to be diverted from road Nasser took after deciding Wafd could never again be trusted to govern Egypt, therefore, Greeks and we need to concentrate on how to get parliamentary democracy that avoids anarchy. Several Greeks, including Karamanlis and Pipinelis, have long been thinking about this. Ideas we could feed in from experience in other countries (requested in Athens 5000)³ would be helpful.

(g) In long run, I doubt we could cooperate efficiently with a Papadopoulos-dominated GOG. Frontal effort to break him now would, however, be without guarantee of success and if successful could well shatter Greece. Task as I see it is to try to restrain him and his coup associates from excesses, wrap more talent and disciplined organization around them, and keep pushing in direction of a constitutionalism that will work. Meanwhile, I believe we should continue supporting King and stay as much as possible in posture of neither giving Greeks what they most want—full aid and recognition—nor coming to definitive break.

2. I am not so presumptuous as to think all this will be useful to you, but writing it has helped me clarify my own thoughts. Good luck in arduous chores you face.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House and USIA.
2. Telegram 5264, May 14, summarized the situation in Greece 3 weeks after the coup. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 3, Document 284.