Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece ¹

Washington, May 10, 1967, 3:55 p.m.

191368. NATUS. Ref: Athens 5135, 5144, 5148, 5182.²

1. Your excellent telegrams over weekend have been read carefully here. Dept deeply appreciative your thoughtful analysis.

2. We agree that our approach to new Greek Govt must be to walk tightrope and that problem is essentially how to show people in Greece and elsewhere that U.S. (and King) not attached to new govt, while at same time working with GOG to get Greece back on constitutional road. As you state, our chief effort now must be to create situation in which coup managers will feel compelled by their own personal interests to give precise assurances and take concrete actions towards restoration of constitutional govt.

3. As we see it, major problem of next few days and weeks is to convince GOG that it must take specific, concrete steps to demonstrate to world that it sincerely plans to return to constitutional govt. As you have pointed out to King, vague assurances of good intentions will not suffice. Govt plan to appoint committee of eminent jurists to revise constitution, as announced by Pattakos, is step in right direction but, as DCM emphasized to Makarezos, to be fully effective must be accompanied by announcement of dates when revision will be completed and when plebiscite will be held to approve final document. Your suggestion that King use occasion of birth his child to announce timetable for return to constitutional rule is excellent one and you should encourage King to attempt obtain GOG approval such move. Also important will be nature of persons appointed to revision committee. Ideally, they should be persons of international stature; in this connection, govt may wish consider appointment of some eminent foreign jurists to such committee.

4. We are somewhat encouraged by your description King’s policy of cooperating with new govt at same time retaining image of separateness from them. We also feel his effort to encourage senior officers of known loyalty to reconsolidate their command authority is wise move and could be crucial factor at later stage. You should continue to encourage King to apply pressure on new govt by selective non-attendance at certain functions (as described to you in Embtel 5135) and we share your view that Embassy should follow King’s lead and thus indicate clearly to coup managers our support for King’s efforts.

5. In addition to positive steps by govt we wish to encourage, we should also use our influence with King and Kollias to discourage further repressive measures by govt, such as establishment special military courts, abolition political organizations, and recently announced elimination of municipal elections. New govt has real public relations problem which could be alleviated somewhat by more restraint by coup managers in public announcements.

6. Most urgent question as far as American and international public opinion is concerned remains, of course, fate of political prisoners and particularly of Andreas Papandreou. We fully aware of deep opposition on part of coup managers to release at this time of Andreas Papandreou and other political prisoners. However, you should continue to impress upon them at every opportunity fact that to large extent world image of new govt will be based on its handling of prisoners’ question and trial of Andreas.

7. As occasions arise where such action can serve useful purpose, we plan continue press GOG in desired direction through public statements. Concerning the calling in of Greek Ambassador here to stress importance of early return of GOG to democratic processes, Amb. Matsas has been recuperating from recent operation and thus far has not been available. We will do so when he returns to duty.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GREECE. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Owens and Brewster and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Paris, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
2. Telegram 5135 from Athens, May 5, reported King Constantine’s view of the Greek internal situation. (Ibid.) Telegram 5144 from Athens, May 5, reported a conversation with King Constantine regarding changes in the Constitution imposed by the Junta. (Ibid.) Telegram 5148 from Athens, May 6, reported Pattakos’ comments on constitutional reform plans. (Ibid.) Telegram 5182 from Athens, May 9, reported on Embassy efforts to push the Junta to a return to civilian rule. (Ibid.)