Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

284. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, May 5, 1967, 1130Z.

5117. Ref: State 186592.² For Battle from Ambassador.

1. We are keenly aware of fact we risk slipping into normal relationships with GOG without specific assurances of concrete progress toward reestablishment of democratic government in Greece. It would be equally foolhardy to break off all contacts when major interests are at stake. We try to walk the tightrope.

2. Our contacts with new government have been limited and exploratory. We have reported our conversations with Kollias, Spandidakis, Patakos and Makarezos. We expect to make contact with Papadopoulos shortly.

3. Our impression is that the coup leadership is pro-US, pro-NATO, rigorously if not fanatically anti-Communist. It apparently regards itself as revolutionary with a mission of cleansing and reorienting Greek economic, political and social life on new and wholesome basis. We find little evidence it believes its mission can be accomplished within a short period of time.

4. Since the coup, information has gradually become available indicating that coup group has existed in some form or other since 1957 under aegis of Papadopoulos. Group considered itself as reformist element whose objectives were to seize power and revitalize Greek institutions generally in line with principles which governed IDEA. They considered IDEA, however, to have lost its dynamism. According to reports, Papadopoulos has long been known as “Nasser” to some of his colleagues because of his intriguing nature and his concept of role which army under leadership of aggressive middle-grade officers could play in modernizing the Greek society.

5. This junta or revolutionary group is reported to have been comprised of about 40 officers. This group seems to consider King useful symbol with which it will cooperate but is unlikely to subject itself to his control. Although vast preponderance of Greek officers are probably genuinely loyal to King, coup leadership has moved swiftly to retire a number of senior officers. They have successfully established their members in many key commands and have exploited the natural tendency for the mass of the officer corps to be responsive to command channels. Army promotions to be made in next week or two will provide important evidence as to whether traditional hierarchy has regained measure of control or whether partisans of coup managers will be advanced to key positions without regard to seniority and fitness.

6. Our contact has been too limited to form a valid conclusion as yet whether this leadership will be prepared to divest itself voluntarily of the responsibilities of government in foreseeable future. Some observers believe Papadopoulos and perhaps other officers will eventually leave army and form new political party. However and whenever current phase terminates, Greek political life in future will be vastly changed in structure and personalities.

7. We are concerned about internal political implications of current situation and its impact on long term US position here even though coup was in fact greeted with certain amount of initial satisfaction by an undetermined portion of population disgusted with protracted political instability and low public morality.

8. It is difficult predict how much time may elapse before leftist and militantly democratic elements of population recover from shock and reaction sets in. Tenor of broadcasts from bloc radios suggests Communists may consider that coup provides them unexpected opportunity to enhance their position in Greece. A large number of Greeks believe United States concurred in or tolerated coup. Many Greeks assert only Communists dispose of an organization capable of leading resistance against a dictatorship and warn that Communists must not again be permitted to become leaders of democratic resistance as in World War II. We accept essential validity of these latter points although it is difficult to weigh precise force in current situation.

9. We recognize, nevertheless, that almost any kind of government which could be created at this time would depend ultimately on Greek military for support and that consequently we must seek accommodation with them. Moreover, we are sensitive to fact that split in Greek armed forces (with possibility of actual conflict) would be extremely dangerous for Greece and for US position here. Although Greek armed forces are ostensibly solidly behind new government, there is probably growing number of officers who are aware that King did not in fact initially concur in coup and who privately feel character of coup (extensive suspension of civil liberties, seizure of control by middle-grade officers etc.) has not in fact produced type of solution to political crisis which they may have hoped for. Such sentiments, if confirmed, might exercise important moderating influence on policies of coup managers.

10. In these circumstances I believe we must attempt create situation in which coup managers will feel compelled by their own personal interests to give precise assurances and take concrete actions to implement program aimed at restoration constitutional government. These interests include GOG expectation of continuing foreign assistance of varying sorts (military, development credits, etc.) as well as general foreign and domestic reputation of the regime and support for it.

11. With no early alternative to present regime in sight, problem is how to achieve the sort of turn around to civil rule that ultimately followed the Turkish military coup of 1960. This would involve a GOG commitment to constitution-drafting to create some sort of government based on consent of governed. It should include progressive restoration civil liberties, establishment of committee of jurists to revise Constitution, plebiscite on constitutional revisions, encouragement to coup leaders to yield office to qualified civilians, elections within specified time frame, etc. Dept will have noted CAS reports indicating Papadopoulos group has in past devoted serious effort to question constitutional revision.

Crux of problem is endeavor insure through public commitments that specific action is taken as part of more or less irreversible process before this government is permanently embedded in dictatorial form. We are attempting to develop points that could be pressed, and I assume Department is also working on this in response to our request (Athens 5000).³

12. It is to these ends that Embassy is pointing its efforts. Specifically:

(A) I propose to continue urging King to maintain a position vis-à-vis the government that would clearly reflect his reserve but without ostensible hostility. Last week our immediate goal was to save King for some useful future role. Yesterday we discussed this role as well as steps he might take to overcome growing impression he may have come into full accord with coup group.

(B) We propose maintain only limited contacts with government and coup leaders and continue to emphasize that USG cannot easily carry forward programs with Greece until constitutional situation clarified. Yesterday we spelled out to Admiral Avgheris, FonMin Gouras and King that delivery main important types of military equipment has been suspended pending review of MAP and that concrete evidence that GOG sincerely moving restore constitutional government would greatly aid USG resume program on previously established basis.

(C) We probing GOG economic policies also. In view of adverse balance of payments prospects (Athens 5066)⁴ I anticipate upcoming requests for help at least in supporting Greek applications to international lending institutions. These will give further opportunities to point to moral.

(D) Washington could support this approach in several ways. For example, USG should continue to emphasize in its public statements that it is awaiting concrete steps toward reestablishment of democratic government. I recommend that in near future President Johnson make statement roughly along lines of that made by Secretary. Secretary’s statement was briefly alluded to, but not quoted, in only one Athens newspaper and ignored in others.⁵ Also, Secretary or Under Secretary could usefully call in Greek Ambassador and set forth importance which we attach to return of democratic government as a condition for full and intimate cooperation with GOG.

(E) I hope you and I can keep in closest communication on question of resuming delivery of major items of MAP equipment. In general, they should not be delivered until we are satisfied with programs developed by GOG for return to representative government. We in Embassy will make sure GOG understands this. As you know, however, I am anxious that we not get into bureaucratic bind that would impede MAP shipments when conditions are right. There is a fine line between using MAP deliveries to press for constructive policies and dismantling keystone of our mutual security cooperation with Greece. We weathered military coup in Turkey without damage to our strategic interests. We must have same objective in Greece.

(F) If Department finds above lines acceptable, we should consult with other Western powers, particularly UK and Germany, with a view to having them adopt a posture similar to ours.

13. I believe it would be premature for us to take initiative with regard to Cyprus problem at this time. Gouras and Caglayangil had 90-minute talk at Bonn and presumably will go on from there. We can add little until our own relations with GOG are worked out. There are, however, intimations Cyprus occupies very important place among preoccupations this government.

14. Initially we must speak candidly in private while in public making clear not only expectation as to line GOG will follow but also our confidence that they intend to follow such a course. Leaders of this coup are doubtless very sensitive having risked greatly and won handsomely in first phase of their program. Presumably they are also dedicated men. Although politically relatively unsophisticated, they also are probably convinced they are acting not only in interest of Greece but of West and NATO.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2. Document 283.
3. Telegram 5000 from Athens, April 27, requested guidance from the Department of State on ideas to pass to the Greeks regarding a return to democracy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE)
4. Dated May 3. (Ibid.)
5. For text of Secretary Rusk’s April 28 statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 15, 1967, pp. 750–751.