283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1
Washington, May 2, 1967, 7:47 p.m.
186592. For Ambassador from Battle.
[Page 598]- 1.
- Would appreciate receiving your early views on where we go from here with new GOG, and how fast.
- 2.
- There is feeling here that King seems to be giving way too rapidly in his relationship with new regime and that perhaps he should be withholding more cards at this time in order be able ensure meaningful concessions.
- 3.
- There is also concern lest pressures within Greece for us to enter into normal relationship with regime result in our moving in that direction without having gained anything in return. We feel we must not permit our leverage to be dissipated thus.
- 4.
- Regime has made a number of appropriate statements with regard to its desire that Greece return to a constitutional situation but the timing of this development is of course left imprecise.
- 5.
- Meanwhile hostile pressures against the GOG are building up abroad and in this country, with urgent reference to the fate of political detainees but also based on a profound distaste for the coup regime.
- 6.
- Although we have spoken in general terms to the new leaders about need to lift restrictions on civil liberties and to establish goal of returning to constitutional normalcy, we have been precise so far only with regard to detained political figures. We have been pondering whether we should seek to pin regime down to a definite blueprint of political steps in direction of normalcy and if so what this blueprint should be and how soon we should put it forward. The price would probably have to be the relaxation of our restrictions on military aid and the commencement of normal relations with the GOG, with the resultant disadvantages for the U.S. image. We would of course have to satisfy ourselves that the regime meant what it said and that real progress in the direction indicated was likely.
- 7.
- We wonder whether it would be a good idea for you to discuss this whole question with the King in order to obtain his views. At same time you might wish to intimate that from the tactical point of view it might be better if the King should move more slowly in reaching an accommodation with government leaders.
- 8.
- It has also been suggested here that we might use our present leverage to try to push the GOG further in the direction of a Cyprus solution, perhaps by pressing for agreement on a sovereign Turkish base on the island, or perhaps on the transfer of Grivas. We doubt we have enough leverage to move the GOG very far on Cyprus, even should we decide to accept the disadvantages inherent in trying.
- 9.
- Most of these are difficult questions to judge with any sense of certainty, and we feel the need of your wise counsel in helping us consider them.
Rusk
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Rockwell, cleared in NEA, and approved by Battle.↩