250. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

3550. NATUS Info. Cyprus.


In luncheon conversation January 25 George Papandreou seemed to me to be in good spirits, more sure of himself and more durable over several hours conversation than I have seen him in past year. He gave the impression of a man who has gained electoral opportunity he had long sought, and who intends to control his party despite pressures from his son Andreas. His political comments being quoted by airgram.2

He also made following comments on Cyprus question.

He is not aware of substance of Athens-Ankara discussions. PriMin Paraskevopoulos is scheduled to brief him in next several days regarding dialogue so far. Presumably PriMin Papandreou and Kanellopoulos to work out a consensus with Paraskevopoulos on what the two parties will support with regard to continuation of dialogue before May elections.
Based on his reading of press reports, he does not believe dialogue has progressed at all or has accomplished anything beyond relieving tensions between Athens and Ankara while talks have continued. He suspects dialogue in this case has been pseudonym for two monologues. He would be pleased if Paraskevopoulos could report otherwise to him. He has no objection to continuation of dialogue if he, Kanellopoulos and Paraskevopoulos agree among themselves and with the Turks on meaning and intent of dialogue.
If his assumption regarding lack of progress on dialogue is correct, he does not see possibility for arriving at agreed solution for present and therefore believes it necessary to agree with Turks to suspend attempts to reach final settlement for some time until situation has become more relaxed.
His reasoning for inability to agree is as follows: (1) enosis: Turkey will not agree unless there are territorial compensations, either in Cyprus or in Greece (Thrace and islands) which Cypriot or Greek people are unable to accept even though a government might desire to make the concessions; (2) double enosis: this is equally unacceptable because of resistance of Greek Cypriots to territorial concession this implies; (3) independence: Turks insist on restricted independence of Zurich-London [Page 528] type which again is unacceptable to Greeks because it precludes opportunity for opting for union with Greece after 5, 10 or 20 years.
If this is case, Greeks and Turkey should work to agree not on final settlement but on measures to keep situation on island under control. In this context he sees need for Crown Council with participation of Makarios. His reasoning for inclusion Makarios is that otherwise Greeks will make decision and Makarios will assume role of judging whether decision is proper. Roles should be reversed. Makarios should participate in Crown Council discussions and his forecast of coming events, Cyprus initiatives, etc. should be made part of record, and discussed and whatever consensus possible between Greeks and Makarios recorded. This is only way, in Papandreou’s view, to “control” Makarios initiatives. He kept returning to what he considers greatest problem of moment on Cyprus—state of enmity between Makarios and Grivas and constant suspicions of former that Grivas is about to pull coup against him. Because of this, Makarios considers every small act in terms of suspicion and insecurity for his personal position. He thus lashes out in various ways, all for wrong reason. If one could solve current “Grivas problem” one would have better chance of agreeing with Makarios on course of action precluding initiatives of faits accomplis which only provoke Turks.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, Paris, London, and USUN.
  2. Airgram A–400 from Athens, January 26. (Ibid., POL 14 GREECE)