249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1

124890. NATUS. Subj: Cyprus. Following is FYI Noforn subject to revision upon review summary uncleared Secretary-Turk Ambassador [Page 526] Esenbel Memcon Jan. 24th re Cyprus.2 Other subjects discussed reported septel.

Turk Ambassador Esenbel said Cyprus and Czech arms problem was one of three major subjects on which Prime Minister Demirel had asked him convey GOT views to Secretary. GOT wanted Czech arms placed under continuous UN custody, considered “control” measures offered through U Thant-Makarios agreement unsatisfactory, did not trust Makarios, and lacked confidence in Greek capacities to deal with him. Turkish people, he added, were puzzled and frustrated in looking at Cyprus issue, and although they basically tended to trust U.S., had been disappointed in past U.S. attitudes. This was situation which leftists exploited.
Demirel, he said, might be compelled carry out openly and unapologetically measures such as airdrop of weapons to Turk Cypriots if Czech arms distributed, although he hoped to avoid it. With Cyprus problem one never knew what would happen. Sooner a real solution was found, the better. Nevertheless, GOT entertained doubts caretaker GOG could negotiate seriously in resumed dialogue.
Secretary said U.S. had not invented Cyprus problem, U.S. not guarantor power, yet it concerned us deeply. Requested Esenbel to convey personal, private message to Caglayangil urging that Turk-Greek dialogue be resumed. Secretary said earlier dialogue had revealed that both governments had responsible, serious attitude. Caglayangil should not despair of present GOG. Present attitude in Athens appeared good, he said, and he suggested such non-political government might possess advantages over successor government in seeking constructive solution in which Greek compromises would be necessary. Asked his personal comment be passed Caglayangil that little to lose and possibly something to gain in resumed dialogue.
Secretary said he personally convinced GOG did not know of arms deal, and noted GOG actions to prevent distribution had been timely. Secretary viewed U Thant-Makarios arrangement as retreat for Makarios. Abuse of agreement would permit UN, U.S. and others to move in vigorously. We are working hard in UN and Nicosia to tighten agreement, but U Thant had accomplished something. In urging U.S. to exert still greater pressures, GOT was giving U.S. credit for more leverage than we possessed. We cannot deliver on Makarios, he concluded, any more than Turks can.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority; Noforn. Drafted by Draper; cleared in IO, NEA and S/S; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to USUN, Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris.
  2. Not found.