Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

240. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, October 6, 1966, 0627Z.

1740. Cyprus. Ref: Ankara 1426.²

1. Tenor of speeches of FonMin Caglayangil and Toumbas before UNGA and their further contacts in New York have diminished sense of urgency about what U.S. role should be in event of break of Turk-Greek talks. Nevertheless, it may be useful for Embassy to record certain current impressions.

2. In reviewing messages re Turk-Greek talks, Embassy is struck by fact that only solid information has been provided by high Greek sources to Embassy Athens. We must remain cautious however lest these sources without malice aforethought may have misrepresented Turkish positions.

3. We also assume that both Greek and Turk positions at outset are superficially irreconcilable. We would therefore not wish to encourage idea that initial Greek positions may eventually be acceptable to Turkey or that initial Turk positions are unalterable.

4. We are inclined to believe, for example, that Turkish Government would be in deep trouble if it accepted full enosis of Cyprus with Greece and participation in NATO base, as suggested by Stephanopoulos (para 4 Athens 1293).³ If Turks are to hold sovereignty over base area and can obtain nearly complete demilitarization of island outside base area, GOT might be interested. However, we note Greek PriMin rejected this (para 2 Athens 1293).

5. When Caglayangil told Secretary enosis would be “difficult proposition” (State 46636),⁴ it may have been form of politeness to avoid appearing rigid. On other hand, Turks have long been favorable to idea of double enosis but reject unilateral enosis. Adjective qualifying enosis is important.

6. FonMin may also have in mind interim solution which would freeze status quo with aim perhaps of preventing Makarios from undertaking new initiatives pending further negotiations on permanent settlement. While we are aware of problems involved, interim solution might provide for certain Turk and Greek steps to ease tension and increase mutual confidence during period that Cyprus still remains independent state. It might not go so far as to take up Cyprus constitutional-legal problems and might therefore be easier to negotiate than permanent settlement.

7. Yet another possibility in which we see benefit is “limited accord” which in itself resolves nothing but has merit of maintaining suitable atmosphere for difficult negotiations. Such accord might provide for continued secrecy of talks, agreement on attitude toward press, immediate consultation on new bilateral and Cyprus issues vital to each side, periodic high-level meetings of political leaders, etc.

8. In reviewing various ideas ranging from “unfettered independence” to double enosis to commonwealth and condominium, we must take into account Turkish four principles. Any permanent solution must be susceptible of being interpreted as fulfilling more or less these four principles. These were described by FonMin in Ankara 858 of January 28⁵ in slightly different terms from those used by FonOff SecGen in Ankara 1394 of September 15.⁶

A. No domination of one community by the other. Permanent solution probably must grant Turk Cypriots broad rights to administer themselves, at least approaching what they now have within enclaves.

B. No unilateral modification of London-Zurich treaties. Permanent solution must acknowledge this point even in process of throwing treaties to the winds and establishing new constitutional-legal framework which would still give Turk Cypriots role in central administration.

C. No unilateral enosis. Permanent solution must include turning over to Turkey some land in compensation for enosis. Turk-Greek negotiators may have to bargain hard on which piece of land (Evros River area, Aegean offshore island, Karpas Peninsula, Dhekelia base etc.) should be turned over on what basis (Turk sovereignty, joint Turk-Greek sovereignty, long-term lease from Greece to Turkey, temporary NATO arrangement, etc.).

D. Maintenance of the balance established by Lausanne Treaty. This suggests that developments on Cyprus are of strategic interest to Turkey and position of Turk Cypriot community cannot be ignored.

9. For time being, we have no special formula to suggest. In absence of precise knowledge as to Turkish position, we believe we should merely continue stressing that it is to Greek and Turkish advantage to push talks toward settlement. As stated above we see no danger at present of an imminent breakdown and are therefore reluctant to speculate too far afield on possible compromise formulas for settlement.

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, London, and Nicosia.
2. Document 238.
3. See footnote 2, Document 237.
4. See footnote 3, Document 237.
5. Document 221.
6. Telegram 1394 from Ankara reported that Turkey would not comment on the substance of the talks with Greece. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)