Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

238. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, September 16, 1966, 1532Z.

1426. Ref: State 46636; Athens 1343 and 1293.² Cyprus.

1. In light Secretary’s conversation with Caglayangil and in anticipation his forthcoming meeting with Toumbas, I am putting down these thoughts to clarify a few points in hope this message may be useful to Secretary before meeting with Toumbas.

2. It seems agreed among us (Athens, Nicosia and Dept) that present Turk-Greek dialogue offers best hope for permanent settlement of Cyprus issue for some time to come. We also recognize that sincerity of both sides and secrecy of talks are good omen. Our fear lest dialogue fail if Greek Government should fall encourages me to believe that USG should use available time to make concerted effort to contribute to success of present negotiations.

3. I realize that we have been well burned before in trying to mediate Cyprus problem and are therefore reluctant to let ourselves be dragged into the middle.

4. In present circumstances, we are also handicapped by lack of knowledge. We have some idea of Greek proposals and of Greek attitude toward Turkish reactions. We do not have any idea of Turkish proposals nor specific Turkish attitude to Greek proposals nor of Nicosia’s likely attitude to either side’s position. We really do not know how close or far apart the two sides are on any issue.

5. We should probably recognize that our decision to intervene in Turk-Greek negotiations may well be based less on careful assessment that we can help bridge relatively narrow gap in two sides’ respective positions than on sheer hunch and on feeling that we cannot turn down plea for help from two NATO allies who come to us as fair and impartial friend after having virtually exhausted their own resources.

6. If Caglayangil and Toumbas meet in New York at end of September, their meeting should give us important indication whether talks losing momentum. Despite certain urgency, I would recommend that we await results of that meeting and evaluation of subsequent situation by respective Foreign Ministers before taking any steps (known to parties) to help out dialogue.

7. If after that meeting both Foreign Ministers agree on U.S. taking active role in dialogue, I believe that will be propitious time for offering services of experienced figure like Ambassador Bunker. In regard to Makarios we should focus hard on any suggestion Embassy Nicosia may have which could help us neutralize his talent for upsetting applecart.³

8. On balance, time is approaching when we shall have to take risk of more active involvement if we are seriously concerned about alternatives to peaceful accommodation. Attitude of Turks and Greeks in this dialogue since June gives me some ground for optimism that we may be able to help them, and Cypriots, to find some way out on Cyprus issue. I therefore wish to reaffirm line expressed by Secretary to Caglayangil that we are prepared to seize opportunity for constructive action.

9. I will have more to say later on detail of various proposals.

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, and USUN.
2. Regarding telegram 46636, see footnote 3, Document 237. Telegram 1343 is Document 237; regarding telegram 1293, see footnote 2 thereto.
3. In telegram 410 from Nicosia, September 19, Belcher commented that Makarios might prove more amenable to talks as a result of the perception that time was favoring the plans of the Turkish Cypriots. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)