Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

232. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, May 14, 1966, 1150Z.

1441. NATUS Info. Cyprus. Embtels 1429, 1421, 1346 and Secto five (Notal).² Reviewing recent developments, Embassy does not believe Bernardes’ visit has had much effect on Turks. They have been conscious of his limited ability to improve conditions of Turk Cypriots and have never expressed much enthusiasm about his expanded instructions. They are also aware of negative US position on SYG’s four-power guarantee proposal.³ Furthermore, while pressing forward toward bilateral talks with Greece, GOT apparently does not foresee much hope in outcome of such talks unless some means is devised to move Makarios.

We believe GOT recognizes that attitude of Makarios is key to any Cyprus solution. We also believe that GOT sees need to use all available means to apply pressure on Makarios. Accordingly, this would call for rather far-flung GOT approach to problem which is foreshadowed in Turk aide-mémoire.

Following would seem to be included in this policy:

A. Bilateral talks with Greece on final solution. If it agreed that final solution currently impractical, negotiations would turn to modus vivendi. Since Turks believe realistically that even modus vivendi, or interim arrangement, would require elaborate, lengthy negotiation process, they have focused on more immediate question of welfare and security of Turk Cypriots. They have furthermore weighed in with aide-mémoire for maximum effect.

B. GOT will not exclude any reasonable proposal coming from any direction. This means it will not automatically reject Bernardes’ proposal, or more specifically SYG’s four-power UNSC guarantee, or mediation, or role by NATO powers, etc.

C. Aide-mémoire clearly sets forth Turk position to US and UK. It refers to GOT’s “new assessment of the problem” and offers to consult with respective governments. It therefore invites the two governments to take active role in situation. If they should refuse, the GOT could always assert it had consulted US and UK.

D. Use of somewhat threatening tone in aide-mémoire is not only attributable to GOT frustration and its increasingly weakening position on Cyprus. It seems also designed to spark activity in other quarters (like US) to bring pressure to bear on GOG and GOC to adopt reasonable and forthcoming posture.

E. Recent military and naval exercises by Turk armed forces seem designed to enhance credibility of eventual Turk unilateral action. They may feel need to stress to outside world that second Presidential letter to Turkish PriMin⁴ will not sidetrack GOT plans.

F. GOT also wishes to expose insincerity of Makarios in his stress of independent Cyprus at UN while pursuing pro-enosis line at least in communiqué signed in Athens and in “permission” to Athens to discuss enosis with Turkey in his absence.

G. Deadline for bringing political discussion to some kind of conclusion has probably not been established by GOT but instead depends on developments. It is unlikely, however, that GOT would allow situation to drag on into late fall or winter without action on its part unless it were persuaded that signs of progress and diplomatic activity justified delaying deadline.

H. As completely last resort, we are convinced GOT is prepared to undertake unilateral action to assist welfare and security of Turk Cypriots. In first instance, such action might well be non-military but would be supported by military units if any interference occurred.

While taking foregoing into account, we should also bear in mind that US reply to aide-mémoire along bland lines of UK reply would be negatively received by GOT. Instead we would recommend US reply along following lines:

1. As follow-up to Secretary’s remarks to reporters at Ankara airport upon departure from CENTO meeting (Deptel 323 to Nicosia, 1082 to Ankara)⁵ we should express sympathy for welfare of Turk Cypriots and convey our willingness to explore their needs with GOT. We should also indicate our willingness to discuss the means whereby these needs could be satisfied.

2. We should urge GOT to take advantage of apparent GOG willingness to negotiate outstanding issues. We would hope to keep in close touch with GOT on status of these talks.

3. We should include in our reply specific statement that we are willing in principle to do what we can to assist in promoting settlement between Turkey and Greece. We should add that timing of any such assistance would naturally depend on the attitude of negotiating parties and on our view whether we could usefully contribute to settlement.

4. We would consider desirable for the GOT to consider possibility of agreeing to reciprocal freedom of movement for Turk Cypriot and Greek Cypriot civilians to and from each other’s areas of control.

5. We would have to state frankly that we believe military action by Turkey in regard to Cyprus would be unprofitable for Turkey and unlikely to improve the prospects for satisfactory settlement.

We strongly support continuation of UNFICYP as long as situation requires it and provided other nations assist in its maintenance. We would, however, point out that climate for continuation of UNFICYP at an adequate level may rapidly worsen in the absence of evidence of sincere negotiation efforts.

Point 4 above probes somewhat into Turk intentions as decided at COM meeting in Beirut (Beirut’s 1074).⁶ Caglayangil’s busy schedule did not afford Ambassador suitable occasion to probe, but recent discussion with Turkmen suggests GOT below Caglayangil level not yet willing to show flexibility on question of reciprocal freedom of movement (Embtel 1429). Ambassador will probe this matter with Caglayangil at earliest opportunity.

In addition to other considerations, we believe we must call attention to fact that in Turkey we are dealing with moderate [illegible] party government essentially friendly to us. Not only immediate question relating to bilateral defense agreements but also shape of future relations with this government and with Turks may be affected by tone and nature of our reply. Equally important to GOT will be US attitude toward lending helping hand in negotiations with Greeks or in latter stage when Makarios must inevitably enter picture. Essentially US position should be friendly and forthcoming as possible and should avoid placing unrealistic hopes on GOT–GOG bilaterals or give impression of “passing the buck” to UN. Latter particularly important since UN not regarded here as capable of developing constructive solutions to Cyprus problem in keeping with Turk national interests.

Re timing of US reply to aide-mémoire, we inclined to believe it could be delivered to FonMin upon his return to Ankara from present travels (Brussels May 14, RCD meeting in Tehran May 18 to 23, and official visit to Baghdad about May 24 to 26). Even so, FonMin might be unavailable since he is up for reelection to Senate and election day is June 5, just before Brussels Ministerial Meeting which he expects to attend. Nevertheless, on assumption that his Senate seat is safe and that he will be available here last week in May, we believe US reply should be ready for delivery at that time.⁷

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, USUN, Paris for Crawford and James, EUCOM for POLAD, USDOCO South for Freshman, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana.
2. Telegram 1429 from Ankara, May 12, reported Turkish reaction to a Greek aide-mémoire on Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 1421 from Ankara, May 11, reported on Bernardes’ May 9–11 talks with Turkish officials. (Ibid.) Regarding telegram 1346 from Ankara, see footnote 2, Document 230. Regarding Secto 5 from Ankara, see footnote 2, Document 229.
3. See footnote 2, Document 220.
4. Not found.
5. This telegram, May 11, informed the Embassies that the Department of State was reviewing proposals that would improve the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community. (Department of State, Central Files, CENTO 3 TUR–CAN)
6. Telegram 1079 from Beirut, May 1, reported on discussions of the Turkish aide-mémoire at the U.S. Chiefs of Mission meeting. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
7. Telegram 547 from Nicosia, May 17, recommended that the United States avoid involvement in issues such as the conditions of the Turkish Cypriot minority and urge the Turks to adopt a policy of insisting on total freedom of movement on the island. (Ibid.)