Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Athens, April 20, 1966, 1830Z.

379. Cyprus.

1. Turkish aide-mémoire² rightly pinpoints continuing Greek and Greek-Cypriot conviction that time is definitely on their side as important reason for lack of forward movement on Cyprus issue. Present weak GOG is aware of certain dangers in permitting situation to rest as it is, but sees these dangers outweighed by risk to its own survival in granting any major concessions in return for what whole Greek political spectrum has accepted as only truly viable solution, i.e., enosis. Except for those few who talk of grasping nettle to arrest deteriorating Greek-Turkish relations, tendency of Greeks is to continue trying to keep island quiet and to play for time.

2. Implicit Turkish ultimatum would unquestionably anger Greeks. We assume GOG would deny GOC is restricting freedom of movement of Turkish-Cypriots and insist Turkish-Cypriot leaders are in fact themselves preventing their brethren from leaving enclaves and returning to their villages. Regarding other “inhuman” restrictions, Greeks would presumably contend that these are properly matters for discussion between two communities under aegis of Bernardes. GOG would also point to Turkish “inhuman” actions against Greeks of Istanbul, most of whom have been forced to leave during past two years. Finally, I believe GOG would insist (as it regularly and ruefully reminds us) that, however willing it might be to help ease restrictions on Turkish-Cypriots, its influence over Makarios is definitely limited and it is Archbishop who would have final say.

3. If Turks should begin move toward direct actions on island, even in so humanitarian a cause as aide-mémoire adumbrates, Greeks would of course go screaming to United Nations and USG to stop attack on sovereign nation.

4. I assume that Turks in their deep frustration over recent developments on Cyprus now see tactical advantage in involving USG in morass of internal problems on island at moment when they have also opened question of U.S. military facilities for discussion. As U.S. has long asserted and as aide-mémoire now underscores, responsible parties would indeed do well to press on with alleviating conditions of Turk-Cypriots. This would be true even though, as Ambassador Belcher may comment, GOT assertions about inhuman restrictions on Turk-Cypriots are not necessarily to be accepted at face value. However, I doubt USG, with its limited leverage on Makarios, can help situation by getting overly involved in details of Turk-Cypriot conditions. Would not prospective Bernades tour of capitals offer opportunity we can urge Turks to grasp for impressing on parties the seriousness with which GOT regards restraints against Turk Cypriots?

5. Fundamentally, I see no present course open to USG other than continuing to press for direct talks among parties. With departure of Tsirimokos³ and prospect that Stephanopoulos will win vote of confidence and appoint less difficult FonMin, we can hope for more active Greek effort to ease tensions with Turkey (though not, so far as I yet see, at material cost to what Greeks consider to be their interests). In this connection, we here interpret Grivas-Makarios conflict as at least in part reflecting intention of certain elements—e.g. Stephanopoulos, Costopoulos, Markezinis—to retain position on island which could in appropriate circumstances permit Athens to enforce on Nicosia an agreement which might have been reached between GOG and GOT. Though clearly not willing eschew enosis forever and thus blocked so long as Turks publicly insist on prior exclusion of enosis, Greeks may edge toward serious discussions if Turks are really disposed to find a solution. Presumably these talks would include consideration of ways of protecting Turk-Cypriots as part either of final settlement or of interim agreement that would include postponement for some years of decision on Cypriot independence, enosis, or partition.

6. Prospects for injecting realism into Greek-Turkish talks would be enhanced if Turks could be persuaded also to talk directly with Makarios regime and to permit direct talks between Makarios and Turkish-Cypriots. Recognizing how vigorously GOT has resisted opening those channels, I nevertheless believe we should push this idea.

7. If Greek political scene quiets down somewhat after current confidence debate, we here will do all in our power to rub Greek noses in realities of Turkish frustrations. At same time, I hope USG can make clear to GOT that threat of force applied unilaterally to provision Turkish-Cypriots would bring us all to a dire state.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State, USUN, EUCOM for POLAD, Nicosia, London, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana. The source text is the Department of State copy. Passed to the White House and USIA.
2. Transmitted in Secto 5 from Ankara, April 19. (Ibid.)
3. Tsirimokos resigned as Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Ministers on April 11.