Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

193. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 10, 1965, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary NEA
• Charles W. McCaskill, Officer-in-Charge, Cyprus Affairs, NEA/GTI
• Cyprus Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou
• Ambassador Zenon Rossides, Embassy of Cyprus
• Andreas Frangos, Counselor, Embassy of Cyprus

After an exchange of pleasantries, the Secretary informed Mr. Kyprianou that he hopes there will be no trouble in Cyprus since we have enough trouble elsewhere. Mr. Kyprianou responded that he doesn’t think there will be any. He continued that he expects the Security Council meeting to be very short and quiet. Kyprianou understands that the SYG favors a 6-month extension of UNFICYP; and while he sees some psychological disadvantage in such an extension—because people looking for a settlement will assume that nothing will be forthcoming for six months—on balance he feels that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages and that the 6-months extension will be passed.²

Kyprianou said that the GOC is doing its best to maintain peace. No major incidents have occurred for some months. The GOC has been trying to normalize the situation in Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca and things have been improving in those districts. The Limassol incident and other isolated incidents are accidents. There have been other isolated incidents instigated from the outside. In Limassol, the Turkish employees of Greek factories have been returning to work recently.

The Secretary asked about the economy of the island. Kyprianou said that it is not bad. Tourism has been off, but UNFICYP has taken up the slack in tourism. He said that when some people had suggested cutting down the numbers of UNFICYP, he had countered by saying that the number should remain the same since UNFICYP expenditures are important economically to Cyprus.

Mr. Kyprianou stated that the GOC has not objected to the Greek-Turkish dialogue despite its strong belief, as a matter of principle, that the Cypriots should be allowed to decide their future for themselves, and that no solution should come from the outside. Makarios does not object to the talks if the subject is enosis. If the subject is not enosis, however, the GOC does not see how Greece and Turkey can negotiate, since they cannot negotiate for an independent Cyprus. Cyprus itself would have to be brought into these discussions. After all, it is an independent country, recognized by the United Nations. Mr. Ball said that Foreign Minister Costopoulos had made the point to him in London that Greece could only discuss some form of enosis.

Kyprianou said the Greek Cypriots can never accept any solution involving any form of partition, whether outright partition or some settlement leading to partition. The reasons for this are twofold: 1) the Greek Cypriots feel very strongly against partition and 2) the presence of Turks in Cyprus would be the beginning of a new Cyprus problem. Continuous frictions resulting from partition or cession of any part of Cyprus would lead to other hostilities.

Kyprianou then asked if the Turks are really prepared to consider enosis. Mr. Ball and Mr. Talbot said the Turks apparently would consider several solutions, including enosis. Kyprianou said the Greek Cypriots feel that enosis must take place but that it must be “outright union” of all Cyprus. What will satisfy Turkey, which needs compensation for reasons of prestige? The Cypriots have considered 1) strong guarantees for the minority, and 2) some form of demilitarization similar to that in the Dodecanese islands. The Greek Cypriots are looking for ideas so long as they do not involve territorial cession. He added that the Greek Cypriots regret that the Mediator is not continuing since he could fill the gaps which might occur, for example, if the Greco-Turkish talks break down.

The Foreign Minister said that Makarios had asked him to ask whether we are now willing to tell the GOC in confidence that we favor one solution or another, and then work with the GOC to implement that solution. If, for example, we favor enosis, talks outside the Greek-Turkish dialogue could be started. Since the Greeks and Turks are now discussing enosis among other things, GOC–USG talks would not be anything the other parties do not want. He remarked at this point that only enosis will provide a lasting solution, while all others will lead to other problems. The Secretary then asked if the GOC had had consultations with Turkey. Mr. Kyprianou replied that they had not.

The Secretary said the starting point must be that conditions on the island give diplomacy a chance. Nothing should be allowed to get in the way of talks. This goes further than just people killing each other, and extends to the whole situation. He wondered if diplomatic channels might quietly dig up clues for other settlements. He does not see any formal role for the US at this time and asked Mr. Ball what he thought. Mr. Ball replied that Mr. Kyprianou is asking that if we think of anything, we should discuss it with the GOC. Our experience has taught us that the US label has definite disadvantages to both sides. The Greeks and Turks in London both thought a US role would not be helpful at this time. Based on our experience, any American role would tend to impede acceptance rather than facilitate it. The Secretary added that our role had not produced much thus far.

Kyprianou said his suggestion is really that the GOC and the USG work together. He does not believe anything will come from the Greek-Turkish talks. The GOC believes that more would come from GOC–USG talks on the basis of a solution. If the solution is independence, there is not much the US can do. If the basis is outright enosis, the consultations would be helpful. Consultations would not commit or hurt anyone. Mr. Talbot raised the question whether talks with the Turks would be worthwhile. Kyprianou replied that no direct contacts between the GOC and the GOT or the GOG and the GOT will provide a formula. He said that he felt that GOC–USG informal consultations would be the only talks that would produce results.

The Secretary then said that the removal of Turkey’s objection to enosis is of joint interest to both Greece and Cyprus. Has Cyprus discussed this fully with Greece? Kyprianou replied that it has but only up to a point, adding that if everybody was not in such a hurry for a settlement, things might be easier.

The Secretary said that he would like to point out that there is a difference between talks and negotiations. In preliminary talks, it has been useful oftentimes to have no agenda, with nothing listed and nothing excluded. In the course of this kind of discussion, a solution can sometimes be found. How would Kyprianou feel about this sort of approach? Kyprianou replied that such talks could be useful with us or the British. However, it is a question of the Turkish mentality, and the Turks are always ready to look with suspicion upon every Cypriot suggestion. The Secretary said that he did not necessarily mean GOC–GOT talks. He merely meant that oftentimes parties to a dispute are able to iron out differences through this informal type of meeting. He cited the Chamizal dispute with Mexico as an example, saying we had found a solution to a problem that had been in existence for fifty years through this approach. He cited as another example his talks with Gromyko in Berlin, when the informal talks actually revealed that there were no grounds for negotiations. He cited the technique as useful, however.

In answer to Mr. Kyprianou’s suggestion, the Secretary said that channels of diplomacy between us are always open. We are always glad to hear any suggestions the Cypriots might have, and will pass along any ideas and suggestions we might have. He asked Mr. Ball if he had any ideas on this subject. Mr. Ball stated that he would like to give some thought to this to see what we might come up with. He asked when Mr. Kyprianou planned to leave New York, and said that he would get in touch with him before he leaves. The Secretary said again that what happens on the island is very important to a settlement. He said specifically that the removal of fear from the island is a basic ingredient to any settlement.

Kyprianou then said that the Archbishop had asked him to ask what objection the US had to missiles on Cyprus. (He said he could not use the word “objection” in public, but could do so in this meeting.) The missiles are defensive rather than offensive, he said. In view of this, what objections would we have. The Archbishop is under some domestic political pressures to bring them in, since everybody knows that the GOC has bought them.

The Secretary said that he would speak very frankly. The military advantages of this missile are not very great. Any low-flying plane could easily knock them out. On the other hand, the political disadvantages of bringing them in are very, very great. The Secretary said that the Archbishop should look at this from the very sophisticated military point of view and weigh this against the heavy political disadvantages.

Kyprianou then asked why objections arose if the missiles were not very dangerous. The Secretary replied that they are politically stimulating and they increase tensions. He could see no advantage at all for Cyprus to have these missiles. He said that he could not see how Cyprus could want union with a NATO country and have Soviet missiles. Mr. Ball then said that our original difficulties lay in having NATO trained personnel also being trained to man Soviet missiles, since it was possible that they would reveal information about NATO missiles which should not be revealed. He reiterated that politically it would be very bad and that tensions would be created by the missiles.

The Secretary said that this would also create some difficulty for us with Congress. He hoped Kyprianou would urge Makarios to look at this in the most sophisticated and detailed terms with regard to what the missiles mean to Cyprus militarily and politically.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by McCaskill and approved in S and U on June 28.
2. U.N. Security Council Resolution 206 (1965), adopted unanimously on June 15, extended the mandate of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus for 6 months. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 512–513.