Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

192. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, June 1, 1965, 1225Z.

1779. Andreas Papandreou came to see me last evening.

He said his father’s conversation yesterday morning with Turk Ambassador Tuluy had gone well. Although understanding reached during Costopoulos-Isik talks in London provided that Greek Ambassador Sgourdeos would discuss possibilities Cyprus solution in Ankara with GOT, PriMin had moved directly into the matter with Tuluy. According to Andreas (who had not been present himself), PriMin followed very closely line which PriMin had outlined to me last week (Embtel 1754),² i.e.:

(A) GOG prepared to discuss enosis, immediate or deferred;

(B) GOG prepared to give consideration to any reasonable system of protection for Turk minority;

(C) GOT security interests much better preserved by inclusion Cyprus in NATO as result of enosis. GOG and GOT both confronted by Slav-Communist pressures and would continue to have common defense interests even if NATO ceased to function;

(D) Question of Turk prestige is problem to be dealt with although it is subjective and not susceptible satisfaction on basis of logic or of right. GOG prepared to discuss this matter in effort to find bearable concessions which might assuage Turkish prestige. Exact nature of what such concessions might be was apparently not discussed.

Although no specific conclusions were reached, PriMin was pleased with Tuluy’s general reaction. Tuluy at one point proposed an Urguplu-Papandreou meeting, to which Papandreou apparently replied that he is prepared to accept but wished to await prior measure of agreement.

I inquired whether any word had been received from MOD Garoufalias presently attending NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Paris.

Andreas said Garoufalias had had conversation with his Turkish counterpart and had reported that latter seemed disposed to discuss question of enosis.

Andreas said he also wanted to apprise me of an important new development in Cyprus problem. On basis information he had received personally yesterday as well as information also received by Costopoulos two things are now clear:

(1) Makarios and GOC are not prepared to give any concessions to achieve enosis—“no British base, not even a pair of shoes”. GOC will, however, mask its position by speaking loudly of unconditional enosis. Most Greek political leaders believe Makarios does not want enosis. This is a conclusion which he (Andreas) is coming to accept, but of which he is not yet irrevocably convinced since Makarios is a very clever politician. Although public opinion in Cyprus can be readily influenced, pro-enosis sentiment on the island is at the moment much less than it was six months ago.

(2) Makarios will call for Presidential elections by June 15.

I said I understood that Makarios had specifically promised during meeting of Crown Council not to take any action regarding elections unless his legal position were challenged by Turks (Embtel 1672).³ Andreas confirmed this and said this had been recorded in minutes of meeting. However, Makarios is basically apprehensive that once his mandate has legally expired his position will depend to a large extent on attitude which GOG would adopt toward him and he does not wish to make himself vulnerable to possible pressure from GOG.

Andreas noted that Turkish reaction to elections might seriously jeopardize any prospect of successful GOT-GOG conversations and might even provoke military intervention by GOT.

Question of Makarios’ policy was discussed yesterday during meeting of Cabinet Political Council (PriMin, Stephanopoulos, Costopoulos, Mitsotakis, Tsirimokos and himself. Garoufalias in Paris). During meeting PriMin declared his intention maintain present GOG course, to continue talks with Turks, and to break openly with Makarios if need be. PriMin transmitted long message to Makarios. Andreas acknowledged that in face this situation GOG might wish to accelerate discussions with GOT. In any event, he emphasized it is very important that substance GOG-GOT conversations be kept highly confidential and protected from premature disclosure to Makarios.

Comment: Position attributed to Makarios by Andreas does not seem surprising as moment of serious GOG-GOT conversations approaches and in light Nicosia’s recent reports including Belcher’s conversation with Makarios.

Andreas’ own position is, however, somewhat obscure. As Dept aware, Andreas is widely considered to have close and sympathetic relations with Makarios and to have played an important role in rejection of Acheson plan last summer.

In this connection Costopoulos commented to me recently that inasmuch as Andreas was also present during my conversation with PriMin on May 26 regarding GOG Cyprus policy, substance conversation had probably been reported to Makarios. In short, while I believe Andreas was factually accurate, I am not entirely certain whether he is basically supporting Makarios or GOG at this juncture.

Anschuetz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis; TOG. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.
2. Telegram 1754 from Athens, May 26, reported a conversation with Prime Minister Papandreou in which he restated his basic positions. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1672 from Athens, May 8, reported discussions at the Crown Council meeting on Cyprus. (Ibid.)