187. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
1519. Ambassador called last night on PriMin Papandreou and FonMin Costopoulos. DCM was also present. Bourguiba had just completed a 3-day official visit2 and Papandreou was evidently tired from obligations involved in visit. Despite PriMin’s weariness, he seemed relaxed.
Papandreou initiated discussion by having Costopoulos read text of GOG statement on Plaza report (Embtel 1517).3 PriMin observed that there is basic “contradiction” in Mediator’s report since it recognized right of self-determination but then suggested Cypriots should deny themselves that right because of threat from Turkey. Thus Plaza was in effect asking Cypriots to renounce rights guaranteed by UN Charter because of threat by one member of UN against another. GOG is, however, attempting mold its policy in harmony with Plaza report, since it is GOG view that Plaza should continue his role. There are two aspects to Cyprus question: first is need for provisional settlement and secondly final solution. Until now, GOG policy has been to wait for submission of Mediator’s report. Now that report has been issued, basic question is what to do next.
In view of “vacuum” currently existing following publication of Plaza report, GOG would like to demonstrate “good will.” GOG had “obliged” Makarios to give “real pacification” to Turk-Cypriots. First step is to begin negotiations between two communities on Cyprus. However, to do this Mediator must play role. Since Kuchuk would not [Page 396] respond to simple request to talk, Makarios will seek Plaza’s assistance. Makarios, he continued, has had erroneous idea that Cyprus exists in isolation and consequently has assumed that by terrorizing Turk Cypriots they will submit. This, however, ignores fact that Turkish state and UN exist and since Makarios’ “defeat” in his relations with Moscow Makarios no longer has courage to insist on his own policy.
Papandreou then referred to question of direct negotiations between Ankara and Athens. Papandreou observed that new Turk Ambassador, Tuluy, is “difficult” but that he has organized mind and could give intelligent answers “even when we disagree.” He had told Tuluy that until now he had refused negotiations not because he is uncompromising, but because he has perhaps been “wise.” Failure of direct negotiations could lead to rupture in relations between GOT and GOG. Even now time is “not yet ripe.” Talks now would simply mean each side would air its views, with GOT advocating partition or federation and GOG supporting enosis. Result would be stalemate or even worse.
Rather than holding talks between GOG and GOT now on substance of problem, more meaningful step would be to “show our good will” and thus win time. Both sides must try to progress on day-by-day basis through maintenance of contact through diplomatic channels. Beginning will be by pacification in Cyprus “through total protection of Turkish minority.” He had told Amb Tuluy time is necessary because there will be elections in Turkey in September or October and present GOT would find it difficult to make sacrifices immediately before elections. Thus, as GOG sees it, appropriate schedule is for negotiations now in Cyprus between two communities with help of Mediator to be followed by negotiations between Ankara and Athens after Turkish elections. Although Tuluy did not express agreement he said he would transmit these thoughts to his govt.
Question of final solution still remains, Papandreou acknowledged. From point of view of GOG it is not imperative find an immediate permanent solution since time is working for Greeks. Greeks control 98 percent of area of island and 98 percent of its military force. Situation cannot remain stationary, however, because (1) UNFICYP cannot continue forever and (2) Turkish restiveness cannot be indefinitely restrained. Plaza report had made it clear London and Zurich are unworkable and that there can be no federation and no partition. Therefore, there are only two possibilities for future of Cyprus: (1) completely independent Cyprus and (2) Cyprus as part of Greece—enosis. Put another way, choice is between “oriental” (pro-Soviet) Cyprus and “occidental” Cyprus, which through union with Greece would become part of NATO.
Papandreou then outlined GOT criteria in Cyprus solution. Basically, they are (1) protection of Turkish minority, which GOG was willing [Page 397] to guarantee, (2) security of Turkish state, which GOG could provide through Cyprus’ membership in NATO, and (3) GOT prestige, which GOG is willing to “assure”.
With regard GOT prestige, PriMin said settlement could be handled in such way it would seem to be Turkish victory. When Ambassador pressed Papandreou on what GOG could actually give which would meet demands of Turkish prestige, PriMin could only answer that “something” would be given, but that he did not know precisely what at present time.
Papandreou then reverted to practical steps which could be taken to ensure provisional tranquility. He said GOG wished collaborate with GOT for complete pacification of island and that he had repeated this to Amb Tuluy on previous evening during reception for Bourguiba. Even if GOT rejects Plaza report, GOG will seek to find way to bring about peace on island in conjunction with Turks. PriMin reiterated that GOG is working to create situation in which war would never arise as result Turkish “misunderstanding.” If conflict came it would be only because Turks wanted it and not due to misunderstanding of Greek intentions. Papandreou referred to fact that Tuluy had given Costopoulos an aide-mémoire (Embtel 1454)4 containing list of things GOT believes endangers Turk community on Cyprus. GOG is giving it serious attention in hope correcting most conditions to which GOT objects.
Ambassador referred to question of Soviet SAM’s for Cyprus. Papandreou said this question is finished as far as GOG is concerned and that DefMin Garoufalias had given strict orders that no Greek be involved in any aspect of this program. When Ambassador pressed for information on what arrangements Makarios had made for training of Cypriot personnel and delivery of additional missiles, Papandreou disclaimed any knowledge. However, Costopoulos referred to rumor reported by Grivas that Egyptians considering training Cypriots in use of the missiles without knowledge of GOG. Costopoulos asserted he had instructed Greek Ambassador who had been in Athens during Kyprianou visit to inform GOC that if such thing happened, all agreements between Cyprus and GOG should be considered as terminated (sic).
Comment: Conversation provided additional evidence of GOG desire to work sincerely with GOT toward reduction of tension on Cyprus and to maintain continuing contact with Turkish Ambassador Tuluy to this end. Papandreou has had two conversations with Tuluy and Costopoulos at least three, including one this morning.
GOG seems confident of its ability to encourage a reduction of tension in the island. GOG also appreciates fact Plaza report represents substantial tactical advantage for Greek case which, accompanied by [Page 398] decreasing tension on the island, might hopefully create a situation in which new efforts find solution could be fruitful. However, this calculation would collapse if Turks, aware that time is on Greek side and sensitive to increasingly less favorable position of Turkish case vis-à-vis world opinion, were to permit initiatives by Turkish community which might galvanize situation into new crisis.
Recent references in Athens press to Acheson plan as well as from Papandreou’s formulation of final solution as choice between “oriental” or “occidental” Cyprus make it rather apparent that GOG hopes involve USG again in process finding solution. For time being at least, it appears our role here should be to encourage intensification GOT-GOG contacts in hope that in process certain general areas of understanding will eventually emerge which would provide valuable preparation for the time (perhaps after GOT elections) when GOT and GOG will feel they are in position to address problem of final solution on the merits.