133. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

425. From Acheson. Ref: Nicosia 345 and Athens 343 to Dept.2 Instant enosis, whether staged by Papandreou or by Grivas on his own, seems to us here to contain fatal flaw that Turks will not stand still for it or [Page 269] after it unless they have prior assurance from someone they trust that it will be quickly followed by settlement meeting their essential demands. What Grivas proposes to offer Turkey falls far short of this and so does what Papandreou has indicated he is willing to do up to now, although he has been distinctly more forthcoming than Grivas.

Furthermore, we have clear impression from Erim and Sunalp, with whom we had discussion this afternoon, that Turks do not trust either Papandreou or Grivas.3 They regard Papandreou as deplorably weak and Grivas as bitterly anti-Turk.

Therefore, I think that coup d’etat in Cyprus at present time would appear to Turks as clear double-cross and that they would be most likely to blame us for putting up smoke screen of Geneva talks and leading them down the darkened path. Whether they would or would not, I should be extremely surprised if their response to coup were not immediate invasion with all consequences that that would have.

We may not be able to stop Grivas, but I think it would be unwise for us to connive with him unless he is willing to go whole way in granting rights to Turks. We should be able to deter Papandreou for present, and I think we ought to try to keep him on the Geneva path.

Tubby
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, London, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
  2. Telegram 345 from Nicosia analyzed intelligence information. (Ibid.) Telegram 343 from Athens, August 19, reported that Cyprus had offered a lease on a 50-square mile base to Turkey after the completion of enosis. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 426 from Geneva, August 19, Acheson reported that Erim had made clear his government’s preference for dealing with other Greek political leaders. (Ibid.)