Office of the Historian

132. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

Washington, August 18, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Cyprus

This is the main topic for the NSC meeting tomorrow;2 it is moving rapidly toward the point of decision. The Turk air attacks and now Soviet threats have brought the issue to a boil.

[Page 267]

Whether or not the Soviets are serious, the Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks all seem to think so. The mood on the island has become violently anti-US and pro-Soviet, which makes the Acheson plan all the harder to achieve by agreement. Makarios may be playing with fire, but once again he has moved faster than Athens—or ourselves.

The one saving grace may be that Moscow’s move is scaring Greece and Turkey into seeing reason. They may at last find a common interest in preventing Makarios and Moscow from coming out on top. But speed seems imperative if we are to push through a settlement by fiat before the Makarios-Moscow axis is firmed up.

I.
State seems to favor one more try at Geneva, in hopes that Athens and Ankara may at last stop haggling and strike a bargain. In fact, their positions are not too far apart. The gut issue is how large a base the Turks get and whether it should be sovereign or on a long term lease. It’s not clear that we have yet said everything we should to press Greeks and Turks once more, and we’ll push this with Ball tomorrow.
II.

Should this fail, Acheson and Ball are thinking of a NATO pressure play to force a solution. In essence Acheson himself would split the remaining difference between Greeks and Turks. We would then ask all the NATO powers to join us in: (a) telling Greeks and Turks to buy; (b) calling on Greece on behalf of Guarantor Powers to restrain Makarios; and (c) if this fails to maintain order, declaring that whatever violence may occur just be confined to the island.

To latter end, NATO would declare that: (a) No NATO-supplied arms could be used by Greece and Turkey against each other—if so, NATO will take measures to take back the arms and penalize the offender by denying him any more military aid; (b) the NATO powers would act under Article V to prevent Turk action against Greece or vice versa; and (c) if the Soviets intervened, NATO would move. This complex and ingenious plan raises several key questions:

A.
Granted that a NATO umbrella is desirable, can we get enough members to play? Only a majority is technically needed, but if the Scandinavians or Low Countries balked, it would look thin. Would de Gaulle cause trouble? Would many insist on full explanation of the “Acheson award” or offer amendments?
B.
What are the consequences of taking the play away from the UN and giving it to NATO? U Thant might be privately relieved, but can he publicly acquiesce? What about the SC resolutions?
C.
Do we want in effect to put the Sixth Fleet between Greeks and Turks if they seem to be going for each other? This is what is called for, since we have the only power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
D.
Could Greece really enforce the terms on the Cypriots? If Makarios smells a rat he’ll appeal to the UN and to Moscow.

III.
An alternative to bringing in NATO is Papandreou’s scheme for instant enosis. He pleads that the only way to short-circuit the burgeoning [Page 268] Nicosia/Moscow axis is to impose enosis now. Then the Greeks would make a deal with the Turks. We feel the Turks would never buy unless the terms are worked out beforehand. But if they can be, Papandreou’s plan may be simpler and more direct than the NATO scheme—or perhaps the two can be combined so as to reinforce each other. If Greeks and Turks turned to NATO (knowing already what they’d get) we’d be home.
IV.
The ultimate question is whether a Greek-Turk deal, assuming we could get one, can be imposed on the island. The evidence is quite inconclusive. Makarios has outmaneuvered the Greeks every time so far, and now he thinks he has Soviet backing. I think you will want to press George on this; the rest of us have not made much progress.

Finally, whatever road we take, we have all the ingredients of major crisis shortly. Makarios will try every trick he has, and the Soviets are now committed to make at least some trouble. Ball and Acheson must still carry the main load, but I think you’ll want at least a daily report.

This is a brief summary, and I think it gives you what you need for tomorrow, but if you have time, the relevant cables are attached.3

  • R. W. Komer
  • McG. B.4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6. Secret.↩
  2. The National Security Council met at 1 p.m. on August 19, but no record was kept of the discussion. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary)↩
  3. Not attached. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Geneva 401, 403; Athens 327; Embtel 327 Exdis.”↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears Komer’s typed signature and Bundy’s typed initials.↩