Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece ¹

Washington, August 7, 1964, 12:50 p.m.

198. From Ball to Ambassadors. Ref: Ankara Critic One Repeated to you separately.²

For Athens:

You should approach GOG at highest level with following message:

1. They should do everything possible to prevent the GOC from reacting against Turk-Cypriot population or from attempting to destroy Turkish aircraft since either action could rapidly escalate dangerous situation.

2. GOG should avoid any reaction that could contribute to escalation or impede progress being made in Geneva.

3. GOG should discourage any move by GOC to bring this matter into Security Council since this again could lead only to exacerbation of relations and interference with possibility successful Geneva negotiations.

4. We have told GOT that we strongly disapprove this demonstration and have cautioned them to take no further action that might heighten the danger of escalation.³

For Ankara:

We assume that by “demonstration” Turks intend only to fly planes over as they did on December 26 and that there will be no bombing. Please confirm this. Please also tell Erkin we are greatly disturbed by GOT decision. We are doing everything possible in relevant capitals to dampen reaction and prevent this from leading to escalation and disrupting the intensive efforts we have been making in Geneva.⁴

For Nicosia:

Please contact Thimayya and encourage him to do everything possible to prevent GOC reactions against Turk-Cypriot population. Suggest you do not inform GOC if this telegram arrives before air planes since that is not our responsibility and we do not wish to provide basis for any suspicion we are approving GOT action.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Sisco. Also sent to Ankara, Nicosia, London, USUN, and Geneva for Acheson.
2. This telegram, August 7, reported that Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin had informed Hare that in response to hostile actions, his government had ordered a “demonstration” by the Turkish Air Force over Cyprus and that Greece had been informed of this decision. “Erkin made urgent plea for USG to do anything in its power to avoid disaster, saying that GOT wants above all else is to avoid spread of hostilities.” (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 226 from Athens, August 7, Labouisse reported that Costopoulos had already urged Makarios to avoid any further provocation and, although treating the Turkish air raid as very serious, discounted the likelihood of armed intervention. (Ibid.)
4. Upon receipt of telegram 221 from Ankara indicating that the Turkish “demonstration” would involve strafing and bombing, the Department of State instructed Hare in telegram 184, August 7, to request that the Turkish Government limit its action to a “flyover” and avoid any bloodshed. (Both ibid.)
5. In telegram 197 from Nicosia, August 8, Belcher reported that, fearing the effects of a Turkish air attack, he had warned both U.N. and Cypriot Government officials of its likelihood, while urging upon them the need for an immediate cease-fire. (Ibid.) In telegram 109 to Nicosia, August 8, the Department of State noted: “Understand your reasoning behind your actions but nevertheless it is essential that we maintain confidential relationship with GOT.” (Ibid.)