104. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State 1
212. Embtel 202.2 Erkin asked me come in late yesterday to brief him on “anything you have received since we last talked”, i.e. only two days before as reported reftel.
Since nothing had as yet been received in response his questions, I armed myself with such new information as was available regarding more favorable attitude of Makarios on freedom of movement of UN peace force and food distribution as reported by Nicosia and USUN, as well as our own efforts and those of UN in that regard. Also made inventory of current developments in other fields mutual interest including turning over second $40 million loan tranche, delivery of 104–G’s and tanks under MAP, completion agreement for joint use Cigli airfield after prolonged negotiation, local currency assistance in building new labor union headquarters, imminent arrival of parachute jump training team, continuing efforts to obtain increased consortium assistance and satisfactory progress Turk parliamentary visit in U.S.
Contrary his wont, Erkin took notes on these items and then observed fundamental question remained what to do in rapidly deteriorating situation. He had lunched with Inonu who had asked him tell me situation grave as result such GOC acts as economic and physical blockade of Turks, obstructions to peace force in fulfilling mission, continuing armed attacks on Turks, breakdown of judiciary, territorial waters legislation, military secrets law, cutting of Turkish water supply and attempted removal Turk Cypriot Amb here in order replace by Turk Cypriot from Bonn and fill Bonn post with Greek. He said Inonu had asked him say that continued GOC aggression could result in Turk retaliation from air.
There ensued rather involved discussion in which I endeavored ascertain whether Erkin was talking about reaction from cumulative frustration or as result some new development. Using our relations with Soviet Union as example I pointed out that there had been recurrent situations over the years when cumulative friction had caused voices to be raised in advocacy of trial by arms but we had resisted this even at the time when we had atomic monopoly. Other examples abound; meeting [Page 220] such problems is real test statesmanship and diplomacy. To give up is to shirk our job.
Also in such tense situation was important that GOT keep careful watch on actions of Turk Cypriots. I had just received several disquieting reports in this regard, one to effect that people of Ktima had wanted pay water bill but had been prevented by Turk “organization” and another indicating Turks responsible for fray involving UN forces in Nicosia (Nicosia’s 175 to Dept).3 In drawing attention to these, I realized that general pattern of incidents showed predominance of Greek Cypriot instigation but would be deplorable if in tense situation thus created spark would be supplied by some Turkish initiative. Regardless of how it might come about, it could be made to appear that it had been deliberately created to afford excuse for GOT retaliation.
This was stiff stuff but Erkin took it well, observing in latter connection he would get message off to Cyprus immediately to enjoin restraint on Turks.
Re occasion for retaliation, Erkin inquired what had President Johnson meant when he spoke in Washington talks of war as only last resort?4 Also he already being asked why U.S. should feel warranted in taking such strong action in Vietnam (which he personally thought right) and at same time restrain GOT when it similarly inclined act in its own interest. To this he had no answer.
Conversation then turned again to type of incident which might cause GOT retaliate and Erkin mentioned, as he had in reftel, situation which could arise if Geneva talks fail and enosis carried out as purely Greek affair. Reference also made to danger of any substantial move to subdue Turks and indicated this was what Inonu especially had in mind when he warned of possible necessity of retaliation. Erkin renewed request for our views in this regard (to be borne in mind that, aside from real desire consult, these approaches could be cited as fulfilling our understanding re consultation in event decision taken retaliate in some way).
Broadening conversation, Erkin then expressed great concern re deteriorating relations with GOG, saying that, if Nikolareisis returned to Geneva with negative response, point of no return [would] have been reached between Greece and Turkey since action such as removal Greek forces from Bulgarian frontier to bolster strength versus Turks, illegal military build-ups in Dodecanese and intensive naval patrols from Mytilene to Rhodes would indicate that “Greece wants war”. Wouldn’t I agree?
[Page 221]I said definitely not. In first place would be completely irrational in view disparity between Greek and Turkish forces. Secondly, such information as I had indicated Greeks don’t want war and that this feeling prevalent in Greek armed forces.
Erkin said this not assessment of GOT, citing public statements by Papandreou re readiness reply militarily and report Greek Amb in Nicosia had expressed opinion war inevitable. This why he was asking our views since moment may come when too late for USG to do anything. I said would submit to Dept but in meantime had considerable confidence in my own appraisal and felt GOT would be making serious mistake to proceed assumption Athens actually picking fight.
Erkin then brought up subject of Makarios, recalling that in previous conversation I had suggested would be mistake to assume that public professions of identity of view between Makarios and Papandreou accurately reflected basic relationship; also that I had suggested elements of opposition to Makarios on island as well. Relating to suggestions made in past to desirability of doing something to remove Makarios from picture, he said couldn’t see how this could be done as result of Turk-Greek agreement but would rather have to precede agreement since seems Makarios still in position exert controlling influence on Athens. I said didn’t wish get over my head in unauthorized discussion but one thing seemed obvious, which was that if Turkey and Greece should come to agreement on solution which would involve enosis in one way or another, role of Makarios would pretty much disappear. Obviously intrigued by even mention this subject, i.e. elimination of Makarios, Erkin said still felt difficult reach solution as long as Makarios remained in power and speculated on possible move by Grivas to replace him. I asked if there had been any contact by Grivas with GOT. Erkin said none; all that known is publicly announced intention of Grivas to promote enosis while saying steps would be taken safeguard Turkish community.
Erkin concluded conversation by making renewed appeal “to extract something from Washington” regarding views and intentions of USG since, if Geneva talks get nowhere, necessary devise alternatives for dealing with situation. Once again he wished emphasize gravity of situation as it is developing and to make clear he not talking under impulse of emotion but “coldly and solemnly”.
While I was with Erkin he received telephone call from Deputy Prime Minister Satir who had just talked with Erim in Geneva who reported Acheson dissatisfied with proposals brought by Nikolareisis. Erkin’s first reaction was to take this as indication of final break which he had predicted but I suggested Greeks adept at bargaining in old and established Near Eastern tradition where it is not first but “last price” that counts. Now not time throw in hand.
[Page 222]Was interesting that Erim’s report was made to Satir, presumably acting on behalf of Inonu, rather than Erkin which would tend substantiate suggestion in reftel that Erkin-Erim relationship may be element in situation. However, would be mistake stress this unduly since believe what Erkin had to say was essentially what he very much had on his mind.
This tel being sent Immediate in view radio reports this morning of serious fighting in Mansura area, which is precisely type of development which could trigger Turk retaliation.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 7:08 a.m. and repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Geneva for Acheson, and London. Passed to the White House.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 103.↩
- Telegram 175 from Nicosia, August 6, reported on exchanges of fire within the city of Nicosia. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)↩
- See Document 72.↩
- In telegram 223 from Athens, August 7, Labouisse “strongly endorsed” Hare’s suggestions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP) In telegram 221 from Ankara, August 7, Hare reported that the Turkish Cabinet would meet at 10 p.m. to discuss events in Cyprus and that Erkin had promised to pass along a report to the Embassy. (Ibid.)↩