60. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1
47. For the President, Secretary and Under Secretary only. I called on the Chancellor today at his request. I had been told that he wished to inform [Page 135] the President of the results of his meeting, held on July 3 and 4, with General de Gaulle.2 The Chancellor prefaced his remarks by stating that what he had to tell me was of such a confidential nature that he would appreciate it if I could by some arrangement see that the message I would send the President was destroyed after it had been read. If any of his confidential revelations of what had taken place in his talks with General de Gaulle became public, it would be extremely embarrassing to him. Although I did not commit precisely to such a procedure, I assured him that special precautions would be taken.
The Chancellor continued that the talks had been “tough” ones. He had made it clear that he could not agree to de Gaulle’s concepts. He had told de Gaulle that the decisive point for him was his relationship with America. He had said to de Gaulle that he (de Gaulle) seemed “to have the impression that we Germans are vassals to America. This is not true.” de Gaulle had attempted to persuade him that the American policy of détente would lead to the abandonment by the U.S. of efforts toward German reunification. Erhard had attempted to persuade him otherwise. In a situation of tension there is less possibility that offers toward reunification would be successful. Without close ties with America, Europe has no protection. Germany would never renounce its ties with the United States.
de Gaulle proposed that Germany and France should together develop a European policy. The Chancellor replied that this is fine, but why should there be any insurmountable differences between such a policy and American policy? For that matter, the whole free world should have similar policies. de Gaulle had pointed out some of the existing differences in policy—making particular reference to China. Erhard had explained the current American attitude toward China, pointing out that the situation in South-East Asia, in which China was deeply involved, was a matter of “life and death” for America. Under such circumstances he felt that Germany must be loyal to its ally. de Gaulle had taken the line that the U.S. would inevitably become so involved in its contest with China, that we would seek an accommodation with the Soviets at the expense of the German problem. Germany must look to Europe for a solution to its problems.
Erhard had repeated that Europe could not get along without the United States. In the event the U.S. withdrew, the Soviets would be tempted to make some adventure in Europe. de Gaulle had not understood the U.S. and German objectives in seeking a détente.
The Chancellor then proceeded to describe General de Gaulle’s real views as to how he felt European unity could be achieved, which was basically [Page 136] through the development of a much closer relationship (almost a union) between Germany and France with, he added as his own interpretation, “Germany as a vassal.” Germany and France would take the decisions, presumably with little consultation with others, who would then be “forced to their knees.” Erhard had asked de Gaulle how he could expect the smaller nations to accept such dictation. He pointed out that they would be in the same relationship to France and Germany that de Gaulle says Europe is to the U.S.
The Chancellor reported that his private discussion with General de Gaulle was often “dramatic.” de Gaulle had said, “We can unite Europe if you will only take a decision favorable to France. This is not possible because of your ties with the U.S.” Erhard had replied, “Germany must have an alliance with the United States. However, this is not directed against France.” He pointed out to de Gaulle that de Gaulle himself had, in their previous meetings, stressed that the Franco-German treaty was not directed against the U.S. and that he, de Gaulle, had wanted an alliance with the U.S. Erhard said he had told de Gaulle that before Europe could act, as such, it must first unite. Germany and France could not act more closely in concert until they could reach a larger area of agreement on fundamental issues—such as NATO. France appears to favor a NATO composed of national armies, whereas Germany prefers an integrated force. He asked General de Gaulle how Europe could be defended without a NATO including the U.S.?
The Chancellor, in order to bring out de Gaulle’s views, said that he had told de Gaulle that he assumed, after the U.S. election, de Gaulle would wish to meet with President Johnson. At this time he would have to discuss the NATO problem. What would he tell President Johnson? He characterized de Gaulle’s reply to this question as the first clear expression he had ever heard of de Gaulle’s real views. de Gaulle had replied that his concept involved the United States on the one hand, and a united Europe on the other strong enough to be an equal partner with the United States. An alliance would then be negotiated between the two providing for their mutual protection.
Erhard had replied that he was anxious to help in developing such a plan, but what, for example, were de Gaulle’s concepts of the plan in its strategic, financial and other specific aspects? Would it mean, for example, that France and Germany will in the future supply arms to Greece and Turkey that are now being supplied by the U.S.? Does he imply that there will be equal nuclear strength in Europe and the United States? Present U.S. nuclear strength is much greater than that of the force de frappe. If Europe insists on making its decisions independently, it is not realistic to expect America to continue to defend Europe. What would be the position of Europe in the meantime? What would constitute its nuclear [Page 137] defense? Would the force de frappe be a European force, available for the defense of all of Europe, or a French force?
de Gaulle had replied bluntly that it would be a French force. The Chancellor had responded that he would rather be dependent on the U.S. than France for Germany’s nuclear protection. Sensing that his reply had been too absolute, General de Gaulle had then sought to soften it, saying that perhaps the U.K. would also make its nuclear force available to Europe. Perhaps there would be a European government which would control its own nuclear force. The Chancellor had replied that de Gaulle’s nationalistic approach precluded the creation of a European government. de Gaulle did not disagree with him.
At this juncture Minister Westrick intervened to comment that I should know that a Die Welt article, written from Paris just before de Gaulle’s visit, was known to have been inspired by de Gaulle. This article had said in effect that all of de Gaulle’s efforts up to this point to unite Europe had failed. Presumably this was Germany’s fault. The purpose of the article had, according to Westrick, been to prove that the only remaining alternative lay in what de Gaulle had now proposed—a Europe based on closer German-French cooperation.
The Chancellor, in response to my question, said that he and de Gaulle had not discussed the Common Market nor the grain price question. This had been left for the Ministers concerned. The position of the U.K. had not come up either. If Wilson comes in, he anticipated that Britain would probably not apply for membership in the Common Market. Although it was not said, he assumed de Gaulle would oppose U.K. entry in any event. de Gaulle’s ideas for the political unity of Europe seem to go beyond the Common Market. He seemed to feel that the group he was seeking could exclude some of the Six—and might include others outside the Six. Erhard confided that he himself had sometimes wondered whether it would be necessary to include all of the Six in a European political union.
The Chancellor admitted that the results of the discussions were meager. de Gaulle was not willing to take steps toward European political union along the lines Germany envisaged. de Gaulle was not thinking even in terms of a revived Fouchet Plan,3 but a French-German (with Germany as a vassal) hegemony over Europe. Erhard was, however, not yet willing to give up, and had agreed with de Gaulle that their FonMins would study the unity question further between them and produce a draft which could be reviewed at a later date. When de Gaulle had mentioned to him the desirability of their coordinating their foreign policies, he had said, “You say you want to work out common foreign policies, [Page 138] however, I hear of your policies only in the paper,” mentioning de Gaulle’s policy toward China, Israel and the Arab states, and Greece and Turkey. “You are asking me to sign blank checks.”
The Chancellor then asked me rather abruptly whether we had any suggestions as to how we could improve our own relations with de Gaulle. He had been thinking that, after being rebuffed by him (Erhard), de Gaulle might as a tactic turn to the United States.
I replied that we would welcome an improvement in our relations with de Gaulle. President Kennedy had been disappointed not to have been able to meet with him following his visit to Germany. I felt sure that President Johnson would, after his election, be glad to meet with de Gaulle if it appeared that anything constructive could be achieved. Our impression, however, was that de Gaulle was so inflexible on so many points of policy diametrically opposed to ours, that it would be impossible to reach agreement with him short of abandoning our policies. I assured him, however, that we would never reach an understanding with de Gaulle at the expense of the Germans or agree to let de Gaulle speak for Germany or Europe.
The Chancellor speculated that de Gaulle’s thinking might turn to a French-German-US–UK grouping, whose leadership he thought the other European countries would accept. There was no reason why this could not be accomplished within NATO. The Chancellor did not, however, appear to be proposing this himself.
Comment: Although some reports about the impasse reached in the discussions between Erhard and de Gaulle are circulating around Bonn, not even Foreign Office officials appear as yet to have a detailed version of what took place. One report, probably accurate, is that de Gaulle’s relatively restrained attitude on Saturday morning was the result of his conversation with Adenauer, during which the latter asked that the French President take a less rigid and extreme position since adherence to the latter could only weaken that wing of the CDU/CSU which favored even closer Franco-German cooperation.
The President and Department may wish to consider a response to the Chancellor from the President, including as a minimum an expression of appreciation for his confidence. Such a response might, however, be utilized to convey substantive comment on some of the issues raised by the Chancellor from an overall U.S. viewpoint.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 4. Secret; Nodis. A notation on the source text reads: “Bundy. No other distribution.”↩
- They met July 3–4 at Bonn to discuss European defense and cooperation.↩
- Reference is to a plan for a draft treaty of a “Union of European States” developed in 1961 by an EEC Committee headed by Daniel Fouchet.↩