59. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- The US and German Unity: A Policy of Movement
The discussion at the Secretary’s Policy Planning Meeting2 of the S/P paper3 causes us to offer the following comments and suggestions for consideration in any revision of the paper.
The Secretary asked why we could not take advantage of frequent Soviet statements (the most recent of which appeared in the USSR-GDR Treaty of Friendship of June 12) that reunification is an internal German problem and let the East and West Germans sit down and work things out for themselves. This points to one specific area in which the paper might probe more deeply; the options available to US policy.
As the Secretary pointed out, we must attempt to find some way for the West Germans to talk with the East Germans without allowing the vexing recognition issue to arise as an immediate impediment. We know the East Germans would immediately seek to use negotiations as a vehicle for obtaining recognition. In this connection the question of whether the Federal Republic will deal with the Ulbricht regime or with a more appealing leadership that might emerge from an internal liberalization process is not really relevant. At least for the immediate future, no East German government can abandon or relegate to secondary position, the objective of obtaining co-equal status with the Federal Republic in any bilateral talks.
A way to break out of this vicious circle, and to give more substance to the policy of movement in a manner acceptable to the West Germans, would be to establish a Four Power aegis under which East and West Germans could meet. As you know, the Ambassadorial Group has for some time been considering a West German Initiative on Reunification. One aspect of the German proposal is the creation of a Permanent Council of the Four Powers, the principal task of which would be to work out a [Page 133] plan for phased reunification accompanied by corresponding measures in the field of European security. The Council is also to prepare in cooperation with “German agencies” an electoral law and to deal with “further measures” regarding the German question.
We suggest considering the desirability of proposing to the Germans—and the British and French—modifications to the plan whereby the subjects to be discussed by “German agencies” under the aegis of the Four Power Council would be expanded to include an agreed “list of issues” such as you suggested at the Planning Meeting. I believe a mandate from the Four Powers would largely remove the sting of the recognition issue from such East-West German discussions and would, therefore, be more palatable to the West Germans than the direct talks we are urging upon them. It would also serve to reaffirm the basic responsibilities of the Four Powers for reunification.
At least two elements add to the urgency with which this should be considered. As we read the USSR-GDR Friendship Treaty, one of its purposes is to reinforce the division of Germany and enhance the prestige of the East German government preparatory to possible new GDR initiatives vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. It would therefore be desirable to launch an initiative soon (the form in which this is done, i.e. as a tripartite document, is far less important than the substance of the move) and to pre-empt anything Ulbricht may have up his sleeve. The fact that this is an election year in West Germany increases the odds that he will want to add fuel to a political campaign in which the reunification issue will inevitably come to the fore. The second element making for urgency is that quadripartite action on the German initiative has been slow. Ambassador McGhee has pointed out it is possible that the French and British may go along with the German initiative and that we may be saddled with the onus of obstructing it.
We have, of course, no assurance the Soviets will agree to form such a Four Power Council. However, since they have been urging us to agree to joint East-West German discussions on reunification, they might find acceptable a proposal to bring about such discussions under Four-Power auspices. If they reject it, we have lost nothing. In addition to being responsive to the Secretary’s desire to take them up on their past statements, we would (a) have buttressed our position vis-à-vis the West German Government by going along with its wish for action in the reunification field; (b) be in a favorable position to put the Soviets on the defensive on the German issue; (c) have placed the Federal Republic in a better position to reject GDR overtures that may come soon. If the Soviets accept, we will have brought East and West Germans together in a manner acceptable to the Bonn Regime and one that would not embarrass it in the eyes of the electorate.
[Page 134]While this proposal would give substance to the policy of movement vis-à-vis East Germany and fit in with our “détente” policy in a manner consistent with German objectives, we should also explore the possibilities of a West German policy of movement vis-à-vis the Eastern European satellites other than the GDR. It is important to distinguish between these two policies, though we do not consider them to be mutually exclusive. Rather, we regard them as complementary. The purpose of a policy of movement vis-à-vis the EE satellites would be to stimulate polycentrist tendencies within the Bloc and to alienate the GDR from the satellites. This is essentially Schroeder’s policy and we should examine the desirability of pushing the Federal Republic further along this road. Already there has been some success in the economic agreements concluded between Bonn and some of the satellites. To the extent these contain “Berlin clauses” they directly contravene the political claims of the GDR in the Berlin question.
Any revision of the S/P paper might also examine the question whether a modification of the Hallstein Doctrine toward greater flexibility vis-à-vis EE satellites (other than the GDR) would not be in our and the Federal Republic’s long range interests. Similarly, a non-aggression pact between Bonn and Warsaw might go some way toward reducing Polish fears of West German revanchism and further isolate the GDR. The West Germans might thereby succeed not only in driving a wedge into the Warsaw Pact; the more isolated the GDR feels, the more telling West German pressures might become in the afore-mentioned East-West German dialogue.
In sum, we think the question is not whether a policy of movement is more desirable than the other two alternatives posited in the paper (Stabilization or Force Majeure), but what our options are within the policy of movement and where they would lead us.
- Source: Department of State, German Desk Files: Lot 76 D 170, Pol 32–4 Ger. Secret. Copies were sent to Ball, Harriman, Johnson, Thompson, Tyler, Hughes, Creel, and Klein at the White House.↩
- Secretary Rusk’s appointment books indicate he met with the Policy Planning Council at 9:17 a.m. (Johnson Library)↩
- The paper, entitled “The United States and German Unity: A Policy of Movement,” April 2, is not printed. It was initially presented to an April 9 meeting of the Policy Planning Council. (Department of State, German Desk Files: Lot 76 D 170, Pol 32–4 Ger),↩