30. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
McGB—
SUBJECT
- Schroeder, the German Reunification Proposal, Etc.
Without over-dramatizing any particular piece of information, it seems increasingly clear that Schroeder is not as much in control of Germany’s foreign policy as we expected or he hoped he would be after Adenauer’s exit. In fact, under continuous attack from the right (Adenauer, Strauss, Krone, et al), distrusted by segments of his own party, lacking Erhard’s full support, having no personal political following, and losing foreign policy initiatives to Willy Brandt, Schroeder’s performance for the past months has been halting, ragged and unimpressive. He seems less confident, more intimidated and increasingly concerned about his political future than during the last days of the Adenauer government or even the Erhard visit to Texas.
[Page 69]Going from the general to the specific—Schroeder went off skiing when the pass issue reached a critical point; he seemed perplexed and a little annoyed by the Secretary’s expression of concern at Germany’s relations with Yugoslavia; he turned down a suggestion that Thompson and Tyler discuss with him—during a Miami stop-over next week—the knotty German reunification plan; and now according to McGhee (see attached)2 he insists that this plan, despite its problems, be submitted to the Soviets as a Western opus “for German internal political reasons” and expects four-power agreement on this when the Foreign Ministers meet at The Hague in mid-May.
The German proposal in its present form is not only uninteresting and unsatisfactory; as a Western initiative, it would be the wrong kind of proposal, in the wrong form, at the wrong time. It has nothing of interest to the Soviets and there is nothing to indicate that the Soviets would be receptive to such a gesture. Its potential mileage is absolutely zero. And despite this, Bonn has been unyielding in insisting that the plan had to remain substantially intact as now constituted.
We cannot push the reunification plan aside so long as the Germans insist upon it. However, despite Schroeder’s apparent reluctance to handle this as a German creation with allied endorsement—that in effect says this is a worthy cause which we are prepared to consider sympathetically—this in fact seems to me the only way we can deal with it. As an allied proposal, it makes almost no sense. As a German product, we could pass it off as a Bonn initiative, sympathetically supported by the allies, which the Soviets, in turn, could treat for what it was worth.
In any event, this is an issue to which we are going to have to face up in the next weeks and some decisions will be necessary.