Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

29. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 22, 1964.

SUBJECT

• German Initiative

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • S/AL—Ambassador Thompson
  • EUR—Mr. Tyler
  • BTF—Mr. Ausland
• U.K.
  • Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
  • Mr. Greenhill, Minister

Lord Harlech opened the discussion by saying that there were five alternatives under consideration: 1) for the Allies to propose creation of a Four Power Council and then let the Germans publish their paper; 2) for the Germans to publish their paper and the Three Powers to support it; 3) for the Germans to advance their proposal to the Four Powers; 4) for the US, UK and France to advance a tripartite paper to the Soviets; and 5) to do nothing. It looked doubtful that it would be possible to reach agreement on a tripartite paper which looked like a serious negotiating proposal. The British had not been encouraged in this regard by the Butler/Schroeder talks in Brussels. One possibility, therefore, was to let the Germans publish their paper and for the Three Western Powers to support it publicly. If, however, we want at this time to get into discussions with the Soviets on Germany, we might let the Germans publish and then the US get together with the Soviets and suggest that they get their bilateral talks going again. The purpose of these talks would be to bring discussions back around to the questions raised in the US Principles Paper.

Ambassador Thompson said that German Minister Lilienfeld had just been in to tell him about a talk with Ambassador Knappstein, who is in Bonn.² Knappstein reportedly said that Bonn has now decided that it would like a Three Power initiative. This had upset the German Embassy, which had come around to the point of view that a German proposal would be best. When Ambassador Thompson asked Lilienfeld if he thought the French would go along with this, Lilienfeld did not reply. Ambassador Thompson went on to say that with regard to the British proposal for us to follow up on a German paper, he thought this would not work, because the Soviets would have to refuse to talk under these circumstances.

Lord Harlech said he had come to the conclusion we would have to let the Germans run into a brick wall in order to let them learn what they are dealing with.

Ambassador Thompson said he told Lilienfeld we could understand the German desire to take an initiative on German unity but that he felt this was inconsistent with a desire for negotiations with the Soviets.

Lord Harlech said the Germans were in a dilemma. They were not prepared to make negotiable proposals but at the same time were not prepared to talk on peripheral issues. They either had to make a meaningful move on German unity or make one of the kind they now have in mind and run into a stone wall.

Ambassador Thompson said he thought the best thing would be to let them surface their proposal as a German declaration or as a note to the Four Powers. We would then have to expect the Soviets to blast off and allow some time to pass before we made any new proposals for negotiations.

The Secretary remarked that he was not quite sure what the Germans were after. He had noted that they didn’t want us to come to Miami to talk to Schroeder.

Mr. Tyler said he thought Schroeder was caught between his role as Foreign Minister and domestic pressures on him.

The Secretary said Ambassador McGhee had the impression that domestic issues weighed heavily with Schroeder,³ despite what Schroeder said to Butler to the contrary in Brussels. The Secretary asked if we knew who was working on this problem in the Foreign Office in Bonn. Ambassador Thompson said he was sure Carstens was involved and noted that their leading Soviet expert, Reinkemeyer, had recently died.

Lord Harlech said he thought the best thing now to do was to suggest that the Germans get in touch with the French.

The Secretary said he had discussed this question briefly with Couve in Manila,⁴ who said the German idea was not a good one but didn’t quite know how to say no. The Secretary added that he has been trying for several years to get Berlin and Germany off the front pages. In a certain sense we have been successful and have what might be called a modus vivendi regarding Berlin. Now the Germans want to put it back on.

Mr. Tyler remarked that a modus vivendi on Berlin was all right with the Germans but not a modus vivendi on Germany. They didn’t want a repetition of 1959, when Germany was discussed for about a day and then the rest of the conference was devoted to Berlin.

The Secretary said if we put the heat on the Soviets now on Germany and they respond in the way they have to, we may find ourselves in the ironic position of trying to get ourselves back to the situation in which we now find ourselves, where things are quiet on Berlin and Germany.

Lord Harlech said it’s hard to go further until we know more about the new German position and the French reaction. He had the impression that Ambassador Thompson feels that now is not a good time to make a move on Germany.

Ambassador Thompson replied that he felt this strongly because of the situation in which the Soviets find themselves. The East Germans are pressing the Soviets for action on Germany and Berlin and an initiative on our part might only play into their hands. He added that he thought we should now try to move things back toward a German paper, which we make favorable noises about and which the Soviets recognize as propaganda.

Lord Harlech said he thought Mr. Butler’s preoccupation in talking with the Secretary would be to try to make something out of the proposal for a German initiative and to get negotiations going with the Soviets such as regarding a Four Power Council. The Secretary noted that this would take a major change in the French attitude. Lord Harlech agreed.

Ambassador Thompson noted that the French are at present on board on a German proposal but won’t remain there if the discussion shifts to a Three Power paper.

The Secretary asked if the Germans had tried to inject into their trade discussions with other East European countries the question of German unity. Mr. Tyler replied that we didn’t really know. The Secretary noted that the Germans didn’t want us to deal with East European countries without pressing the case for German unification, although they apparently do.

The Secretary said he considered the absence of European security provisions in the German paper a fatal flaw. If someone, such as the Germans, wants to speak his piece without discussion of European security, the question is how to do this with the least harm.

Lord Harlech said unless we could get a tripartite paper which goes far beyond the present German paper, he thought the UK would prefer a German paper. The situation would now have to be re-evaluated, however, in light of the new German position. He thought that Butler would still prefer to let the Germans publish their proposals and have the US get in touch with the Soviets bilaterally about a Four Power Council to discuss the questions covered in the Principles Paper.⁵

The Secretary asked why Schroeder had declined to see anyone in Miami. Ambassador Thompson replied he thought he was probably tagged as a black devil in the Ambassadorial Group for raising so many questions about the German paper. He thought, however, that Schroeder was probably still thrashing around and not yet prepared to talk to anyone.

Lord Harlech asked when Schroeder would get back to Bonn. The Secretary said he thought he wouldn’t get back until just before the NATO meeting.⁶ Ambassador Thompson added that Ambassador Knappstein would return to Washington next Wednesday. The Secretary remarked that it appeared that no one on the German side was terribly steamed up about their initiative.

Mr. Greenhill said that the Ambassadorial Group could finish up a German paper pretty quickly now.

The Secretary said he thought the Foreign Ministers should discuss at The Hague the question—if the Soviets are quiet in Europe because they have their hands full, is it a good time to press them?

Mr. Tyler remarked that the Germans are not under the impression that the Soviets are going to be forthcoming. They are preparing for action on German unity because they feel that the Hallstein doctrine is slipping and because they are under public pressure to do something.

The Secretary said we have been eroding the Soviet position on a separate peace treaty and settlement of the Berlin question on that basis and were much better off than we were in 1961. He recognized that little had been accomplished in this time on German unification, but not much had been accomplished on it before either. He then asked Lord Harlech if Butler believes discussions at this time with the Soviets would be useful. Lord Harlech replied he thought that Butler did. The Foreign Office has always taken the line that if there is no pressure on Berlin, it is a good time to discuss with the Soviets a possible modus vivendi. Mr. Tyler remarked that we now have a de facto modus vivendi. The question was, would talking to the Soviets make it more solid?

The Secretary remarked to Lord Harlech that he was sorry we had no particular bright ideas at this point. Lord Harlech agreed that the situation was a bit murky.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Ausland on April 23.
2. A memorandum of the April 22 conversation is ibid.
3. McGhee reported on domestic considerations weighing on Schroeder in telegram 3263 from Bonn, March 12. (Ibid., POL 32–1 GER)
4. During the SEATO meeting April 13–15. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL 32–4 GER.
5. See footnote 4, Document 28.
6. April 24–May 15.