Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

279. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/20

Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 7 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTY-FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24–25, 1968

PARTICIPANTS

• Federal Republic of Germany
  • Mr. Brandt
  • Mr. Duckwitz
  • Mr. Ruete
  • Mr. Van Well
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Stewart
  • Lord Hood
  • Mr. Maitland
  • Mr. Benchley
  • Mr. Parsons
• France
  • Mr. Seydoux
  • Mr. Puaux
  • Mr. Schricke
  • Mr. Maniere
• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Assistant Secretary Leddy
  • Mr. Springsteen
  • Mr. Puhan

SUBJECT

• Quadripartite Dinner

After welcoming his guests to the Quadripartite Dinner, Mr. Steward asked Mr. Brandt to give an account of how he saw the situation in Berlin. Mr. Brandt said that if time permitted, he would also like to discuss German views on European security and the renunciation of force.

On Berlin, he thought the measures taken by the East Germans were part of a political program. A risk existed that the Soviets would be encouraged by their current success and seek to implement further measures. He thought the Alliance as a whole was called upon to do something about the East German restrictions. He indicated three areas in which action could be taken:

1. Manifest Western solidarity, to make clear that harassments would bring the Allies more closely together. FonMin Brandt expressed his appreciation for the statements of support from his colleagues and for NATO’s efforts in the field of temporary travel documents (TTD’s). He said it was important that political statements were devised to influence the Soviets.

2. Strengthen the viability of Berlin. He said the FRG Government would be promulgating a law which provided for substantial economic aid to Berlin. The FRG would also assume the burden of the levies imposed on passengers and traffic to Berlin. He felt that, in connection with Berlin’s viability, we must make it clear how important we regard the ties between the FRG and Berlin. He assured his colleagues that they need fear no juridical arguments, but he wished to emphasize that the ties between the FRG and Berlin were of vital importance. He asked for a clear reply by the Allies to the Soviets in support of FRG efforts. He suggested it might be useful if the legal advisers in the Bonn Group were to study how the Western sectors of Berlin could be “linked to” the FRG in the absence of reunification.

3. Demonstrate to East Berlin that measures like their recent ones do not pay. He said countermeasures had to hit them where their greatest concern lies, namely in their desire for recognition.

Mr. Brandt said the East Germans knew that they were giving up certain economic advantages when they took their most recent actions. The Western Germans had been prepared to grant them a petroleum subsidy, and to make payments for postal services rendered by the East Germans. They discounted these economic advantages and opted for political actions. Thus, Minister Brandt felt countermeasures in the economic sphere would not be very effective. He urged his colleagues not to fall victim to the view that the Germans were running away from using IZT to counter the East German measures. He noted IZT trade had decreased greatly in 1967, by more than 11%. There was another decline of 13% in the first 3 months of this year. The GDR was trading more with other Western countries as well as with the East of Europe. He asked what measures could be taken. He said it was important that the Three Powers in the Allied Travel Office make absolutely clear when they refuse TTD’s to East Germans that their action is in response to East German travel restrictions which directly affect the Allies responsibility. He asked if the Three could look into the possibility of transporting some Germans who were refused admittance by the GDR by Allied Military transport to and from Berlin. In other words, Minister Brandt said, we would like to move not only into the air but by land. He recalled the use of travel orders issued by the Allies to Germans when he was in Berlin.

Mr. Brandt asked what would happen if countermeasures failed. Mr. Brandt said Berlin was an essential problem which could not be excluded from East-West discussions. He added that there could be no détente which excluded Berlin. Minister Brandt said Kiesinger felt that we all must insist upon a withdrawal of the East German measures. Mr. Brandt made a distinction between travel into the GDR itself and transit travel from the FRG to Berlin. He pointed up the additional burdens which the East German measures imposed on the little man in Germany. He said a family with 3 or 4 children, going on vacation from Berlin to the FRG, would have to add another 50 DM’s to their costs. He said this was not a theoretical but a very real problem.

Mr. Brandt recalled his conversation with Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov. He said Abrasimov had insisted that he was seeing Brandt as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Ambassador’s Counselor in picking up the German Foreign Minister in West Berlin for the meeting had demonstratively addressed him as “Mr. Party Chairman”. Mr. Brandt said he had made it very clear to Abrasimov that the Germans regarded the situation created by East Berlin as very serious and that it could have very serious consequences for FRG-Sov relations. Mr. Brandt said Abrasimov rejected these arguments. He regarded the East German action as normal and said it represented only a change in formalities. He cited figures to Brandt to show that travel to Berlin had increased since the East German measures had been put into effect. He assured Brandt that the Soviets wanted no trouble. He accused Bonn of creating all the noise. He warned Minister Brandt against any manifestation of FRG activity in Berlin, mentioning in this connection a planned CDU Party Convention and a meeting of the Bundestag, which Minister Brandt said incidentally had not been planned. Abrasimov, according to Mr. Brandt, told the Foreign Minister that the FRG’s claims to Berlin had increased since Brandt had come to Bonn.

Minister Brandt said on other subjects he could discover no change in the Soviet position with the possible exception of some Soviet interest in trading with West Germany, particularly in the field of natural gas.

Minister Brandt said Abrasimov claimed the FRG aide-mémoire of April 9 regarding the renunciation of force had been entirely negative, but in later discussions said he would not exclude following up on it. He indicated that Brandt’s presentation of the case might influence the Soviet reply.

Mr. Brandt said the Soviets don’t like the Grand Coalition in Bonn, in which respect they did not differ from some of his people. Brandt said he asked Abrasimov if he thought that any future German government would be more likely to bring about better relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said we were very much concerned about the East German measures, both when looking towards the past and looking towards the future. Looking towards the past, they were a violation of Quadripartite Agreements. Looking towards the future, he said one could ask “What next?”. He reminded his colleagues that Chief Justice Marshall had said the power to tax is the power to destroy.

The Secretary told of his talks with the Soviets.² They took essentially the same line with him that Abrasimov had taken with Brandt. They expressed their intention not to increase tensions in Berlin, and said they did not mean to interrupt access to Berlin nor to interfere with the rights of the Allies. The Soviets said the East German restrictions were formalities. The Secretary continued that he did not get the impression the Soviets were contemplating or would contemplate the elimination of these measures. He gave it as his estimate that the East German action had been carefully considered in advance and was not the result of weekend deliberations. He felt the Soviets would be rather stubborn.

The Secretary said his impression was that these moves were rather clever. The Soviets and East Germans could say that what was being done was in accord with normal international practice. The Soviets were emphasizing those aspects where differences between the Allies and the FRG exist on the status of Berlin. They judge these measures will not seem worth a crisis to the Allies. The fact that people and goods continue to move makes it difficult to work up a great deal of excitement. Thus, the Secretary concluded, the situation was not very satisfactory.

The Secretary suggested that we should examine the steps we can take to make it clear to East Berlin that action like that taken by the East Germans does not pay, but more specifically to make it absolutely clear that real interference with access is unacceptable.

The Secretary agreed with Brandt that the countermeasures thus far suggested were not too promising. He thought that conceivably it was one of Ulbricht’s objectives to reduce contact between Berlin and the Federal Republic. It may be that Ulbricht was frightened of developments in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary thought these measures may be another kind of wall to prevent further contacts. He said the countermeasures which could be taken by the U.S. alone were not meaningful. There was little travel or trade between the United States and the GDR. Perhaps 50 East Germans came to the United States in the course of a year. He stated U.S. preparedness to examine with our allies what measures could be taken which would not hurt West Berlin.

The Secretary suggested further that we ought to examine new possibilities of reinforcing the viability of the City of Berlin. He thought the East German measures gave a special urgency to this task, to reassure West Berlin in a very tangible way. He thought the Bonn Group might wish to concentrate on this aspect. In this connection, the Secretary paid his respect to the attitude of the FRG toward the viability of Berlin.

The Secretary suggested that the two administrations of the two Germanies might somehow deal with the problem of German access to Berlin. The arrangement proposed by Mr. Brandt earlier for a lump sum payment for services rendered by the East Germans might make it possible to link the question of access with other matters of interest to the East Germans. We would like to make them realize that consultation and agreement are necessary.

The Secretary speculated regrading Soviet approval of the East German action. He thought the timing was both curious and ominous. He referred to Minister Brandt’s statement that the East Germans had discounted in advance the advantages of arrangements with the FRG which would have been profitable to them. He said surely the Soviets must have known that the East German restrictions would make signing of the NPT by the FRG more difficult. The Secretary thought the explanation may be found in Eastern European developments. He felt that Ulbricht’s concern with Czech developments had motivated the move. The Secretary denied that passage of the emergency legislation by the FRG had anything to do with the Berlin situation. The Secretary concluded by saying that we take the situation very seriously and we want to make absolutely clear that we will not allow Berlin to suffer.

Ambassador Seydoux began his remarks by recounting the conversation between Alphand and Soviet Ambassador to France Zorin a few days ago. Zorin’s reply, according to Seydoux, was not unlike that of Soviet officials elsewhere. Seydoux said his Government was much interested in Kiesinger’s and Brandt’s statements in the Bundestag on June 20.³ He expressed his admiration for the way in which the German Government was dealing with the problem. He referred to the questions raised and measures indicated by his German colleague, i.e., “linking Berlin to the FRG,” the transport of German civilians in military cars, etc. He stated that the French were, of course, ready to study these problems. He felt the best place for studying them was in Bonn but he cautioned that all would have to make sure that measures undertaken would not create graver problems than they solved.

Seydoux said he was also very much interested in the Secretary’s remarks. He associated himself with the view that the situation was very serious and repeated French readiness to examine all proposals but again, he cautioned, the measures must not create more problems than they solved.

British Foreign Secretary Stewart agreed with the assessment that the situation was very serious. He complained that there was no justification for these measures and that they were taken without consultation after the FRG had made determined efforts to improve relations with Eastern Europe. Perhaps it was this effort on the part of the FRG that caused the restrictions to be imposed. Mr. Stewart felt the U.S.S.R. was losing support in Eastern Europe. He suggested that some may be hoping the FRG would slacken off its policy of détente which would suit the Soviets very much.

The Foreign Secretary said he found Gromyko very hard and unyielding during his last visit to Moscow.⁴ He said that if the FRG slackened its policy of détente, Moscow could say it never had been real.

The Foreign Secretary thought that with regard to Mr. Rusk’s reference to the NPT, the Soviets could always turn FRG hesitation to sign into propaganda against the FRG. He was certain the Soviets wished to maintain the thesis that Germany was always to be feared. It was his view that the Soviets would like to provoke the FRG into a reversal of its current policies.

Mr. Stewart said that all had agreed on countermeasures which were right, proportional and supportable. They should drive home the need of the Soviets to take seriously these measures.

Mr. Stewart found Minister Brandt’s suggestion of closer links between Berlin and the FRG entirely suitable. He recommended that the proposal of the German Foreign Minister to have German civilians carried by military automobiles to Berlin ought to be considered. He felt further the Bonn Group should also study measures to help with the viability of Berlin. He thought we could not rule out further measures because of the seriousness of the situation. Like his French colleague, he cautioned prudence.

The Foreign Secretary said the problem was to move with great care in order not to inflame the situation without however losing all in the end. The Foreign Secretary concluded by saying to Mr. Brandt that he wanted a manifestation of Western solidarity. He believed that the German Minister wanted a statement out of this meeting.

Foreign Minister Brandt said he would like to make an addendum. He noted that it was not very difficult for a citizen of West Germany to sign a paper when travelling to Berlin, stating that he was a citizen of West Germany. He thought it was more destructive however for a Berliner to have to state that he was a citizen of a “separate political entity”. He had no doubt that this in the long run would affect the morale of the people in Berlin.

The Secretary agreed that the use of the term “separate political entity of West Berlin” was contrary to Allied concepts and could cause problems. He felt this matter could best be examined by the Quadripartite Bonn Group.

Mr. Brandt made a reference to the Secretary’s remarks regarding the recent German emergency legislation. He said the Soviets had overestimated the opposition to these laws on the part of West German labor leaders. The opposite effect had been achieved, even among students. He called this a serious miscalculation.

Mr. Brandt said he also wished to note that the Eastern European countries had reacted negatively to the East German measures, citing Czech and Yugoslav newspapers and press associations to prove his point. He noted further that Italian Communist papers will weigh in against the East German measures. He said Ulbricht had stopped tourist traffic to Czechoslovakia and has forbidden the sale of a Czech Communist German-language weekly paper in East Germany. As a result, the Czechs would make it a daily even though there were not too many Germans in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Brandt turned to FRG eastern policy. He said both Chancellor Kiesinger and he would not allow themselves to be provoked by Ulbricht into a position not their own. He said FRG foreign policy had received very strong support from the Bundestag.

Mr. Brandt noted that the German Government had some problems with morale, both in Berlin and the FRG itself. He asked his colleagues to avoid using the word “protest” since people had concluded that this was an empty gesture. He thought a further possibility to give Moscow some additional food for thought existed if the third world would support the FRG. He felt the third world would understand that the East German actions were contrary to the spirit of détente.

Mr. Brandt thanked his colleagues for their remarks regarding the viability of the City of Berlin. He thought any additional help that could be given in this regard would be most welcome. He assured his colleagues that when he spoke of linking the City of Berlin to the FRG, he did not intend to raise old legal controversies. He said he wished to state once more that if his colleagues believed there was any sense in going back to the idea of establishing an international authority on access to Berlin—a proposition for the two administrations to control traffic to Berlin under an allied umbrella—he would be willing to go along. However, he remained skeptical.

In conclusion, the German Foreign Minister asked that a statement, which would emerge from this Quadripartite Meeting should be added as an appendix to the NATO communiqué with a paragraph early in the main communiqué referring to the appendix. He felt under no circumstances should a reference to Berlin by the Fifteen become point 12 or 13 of the communiqué. He said such slighting of the serious situation which had been created would disappoint the German public. He also asked for language less legal but more political.⁵

There followed a brief discussion regarding the line to be taken with the press after this meeting. It was generally agreed that the Four would point out that they had discussed solidarity of the Allies, the seriousness with which all of them regarded the situation and further measures to deal with it. The Secretary thought we should say that there had been a complete review of the situation. Full agreement had been reached that the East German measures were serious and contrary to international agreements and long standing practice. He suggested further that we would say that we would be discussing these matters with the other allies after which we will make our plans known.

The meeting adjourned at this point after designating four advisers to work on a draft of a statement.

DINNER

At the start of the Dinner following the Quadripartite Meeting, Mr. Stewart asked Mr. Brandt to say a few words about the European Security Conference problem which Brandt had mentioned earlier in his presentation.

Mr. Brandt said whenever the subject of a European Security Conference arises the question is how to deal with East Germany. He said the FRG proposal is to create a kind of link so that when the time comes a new relationship would have been reached between the two parts of Germany.

Continuing, he said, however, that the security conference idea is blocked. He said he saw this on his recent trip to Yugoslavia and noted that not even all of the Group of Ten felt as strongly as the Dutch, the Belgians, and the Danes on the NATO side.

He noted that the FRG had said in Aide-Mémoires to the USSR⁶ that it intended to work on proposals on an exchange of non-use of force declarations. As far as East Germany is concerned he sees some formulas which would not recognize the GDR as a state but which would not exclude it from participation. He said that the FRG has found a formula which contains several important elements.

He said that we must make clear to the USSR that not regarding the GDR as a sovereign state does not mean that declarations between the FRG and the GDR would be invalid. He stressed that they would be valid and that the validity would run from the declarations themselves and not from the manner in which the GDR was treated.

He recalled that the FRG had said in 1954⁷ that it would not use force, and it does not propose to re-open this issue. He said that the FRG will incorporate its ideas in a paper that he suggested be considered by the Bonn Group.

The Secretary welcomed this idea and noted that the US finds itself in a situation where it is often necessary to reach agreement with regimes that we do not recognize, citing Hanoi and Peking.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 303. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved by S on June 27. The meeting was held at the British Embassy.
2. See Document 270 and 277.
3. For text of Kiesinger’s statement, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1010–1012. For text of the Brandt statement, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 264–267.
4. Stewart visited Moscow May 22–23.
5. For text of the NATO communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 75–77.
6. For text of the December 14, 1967, and April 9, 1968, German aides-mémoire, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 980–982 and 997–1002.
7. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1954, pp. 520–521.