Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

277. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 21, 1968, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• The Secretary
• Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen

Ambassador Dobrynin told the Secretary he was leaving tomorrow for consultation in Moscow but did not know for what subject. He rather doubted it was for a Central Committee Meeting, and in any event expected to be back within a few days. Dobrynin then said he had been instructed to make the following comments in regard to the Berlin situation in response to the Secretary’s observations to Kuznetsov last week in New York.² He said he was to tell the Secretary that the Soviet Union, as was hoped was the case in the U.S., was not interested in creating a state of tension in regard to the Berlin situation. The actions by the GDR were the result of an unrealistic and provocative policy followed by the West Germans. These actions however did not affect the rights for travel of the U.S., France or Great Britain, and were not inconsistent with any foreign power agreements. The GDR had for some time exerted rights in regard to passports, visas and documentation at certain specific points in their territories and that there would seem to be no grounds for any allied concern.

The Secretary inquired what particular policy of the West German Government did the Soviet Government have in mind. Dobrynin said it was using West Berlin as a meeting place for Bundestag committees and treating it as though it belonged to West Germany. There was also the emergency measures for the West Germans. The Secretary pointed out that the emergency measures specifically did not apply to West Berlin. He then pointed out the 1949 agreements in which the Four Powers reverted to the situation which existed prior to the blockade, namely on free transit of persons and goods.³

Then ensued a discussion as to whether or not the East German actions were in violation of the 1949 agreement, with the Ambassador maintaining that they were not since nothing new was added, but the Secretary and Mr. Bohlen maintained that the power to regulate could theoretically imply the power to limit or stop. Ambassador Dobrynin did not agree with this interpretation. The Secretary pointed out in support of his argument that as he understood it a family of five West Germans would have to pay $17.50 to go into East Berlin, and he also pointed out that the taxes imposed on goods could theoretically be increased so as to constitute a real impediment to their movement.

The Secretary then inquired exactly what was it that Ulbricht feared. Dobrynin said he did not know that Ulbricht was afraid, to which the Secretary replied that he obviously was; he seemed to be concerned at the establishment of a peaceful, normal situation around Berlin, and it was not clear what he was afraid of—was it the situation in Czechoslovakia or was it simply that he was afraid of peaceful coexistence?⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S/S on June 21.
2. See Document 270.
3. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 221.
4. In telegram 13964 from Bonn, July 1, the Embassy suggested that the substance of this discussion be passed to the German Government. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15)