Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 19, 1968, 1924Z.

13515. Subj: Brandt-Abrasimov conversation.

1. Assistant Secretary Ruete called in the British, French and US DCMs to report on the Berlin aspects of the Brandt-Abrasimov conversation. Ruete explained that the other aspects of the conversation, which covered détente in general and mutual renunciation of the use of force, would be reported on personally by Brandt to the FonMins in Reykjavik on Sunday.²

2. Ruete first reported on the origins of the meeting and some of the atmospherics. Brandt was invited in his capacity as SPD Chairman. Abrasimov emphasized this point, at one time making a disparaging remark about Tsarapkin and saying that it is much better to have “man to man” talk between members of Central Committees: like Brandt and himself. Another peculiarity of the meeting, Ruete said, is the fact that as late as 8 p.m. yesterday the East German news service, ADN, was saying that Brandt was still in West Berlin, even though he had been in East Berlin since 4 p.m. The implication was that the Soviets and the East Germans were not on the same wave length.

3. Ruete said that the origin of the meeting was a Soviet invitation to Brandt three weeks ago, before the East German measures on June 10. Immediately after receiving the invitation, Brandt had cleared the idea of accepting with the Chancellor. Ruete said that Brandt had done this because he was aware that the meeting was a potential “coalition splitter” and he wanted to be very sure that he and the Chancellor had a full understanding from the outset. Then came the East German measures on June 11, before Brandt had a chance actually to visit Abrasimov. Brandt again got the Chancellor’s approval for the meeting, taking fully into account the new situation created June 11. (Comment: Ruete’s account was not clear on whether the immediate initiative for holding the meeting yesterday came from Brandt or Abrasimov, and questioning by the DCMs failed to clear up this point. The obscurity suggested that the immediate initiative came from Brandt.)

4. In reporting on the meeting itself, Ruete read carefully from Brandt’s written report. Brandt introduced the subject of Berlin. He referred to the East German visa measures as a “grotesque” thing to apply to Germans on German soil. He also said the East German measures were contrary to the whole effort at détente, both politically and psychologically. Brandt cited Chancellor Kiesinger’s March 1st answer to Tsarapkin³ as proof that the FRG wants no aggravating of the situation in Berlin.

5. Abrasimov answered with what Brandt characterized as three defensive arguments: A) The East German measures had nothing to do with existing international agreements, and the East Germans were entirely in their rights in doing what they did; B) The volume of traffic has not in anyway been affected. To prove this Abrasimov pulled out voluminous statistics on traffic for individual days before and after June 10; C) In general, the Soviet Union wants no tension in and around Berlin.

6. Abrasimov further said that the FRG has no political claim to West Berlin. Abrasimov said that the Soviet Union has never put into question the right of West Berlin to work culturally and economically with the FRG.

7. Later in the evening, the subject of Berlin came up again, this time raised by Abrasimov. He raised it in a curious way, asking Brandt what he should report to Brezhnev as Brandt’s main point on Berlin. Brandt replied that he should tell Brezhnev that he, Brandt, had stressed the damage which would result for all concerned, including the détente effort, from the East German access measures. Abrasimov then said that the real problem was the efforts of the FRG to politicize West Berlin. He cited the holding of the CDU Parteitag and the plenary session of the Bundestag in West Berlin as examples. Interestingly, Abrasimov disparaged the importance of the FRG emergency legislation, strongly implying that this had simply been used as a pretext by the East Germans.

8. Brandt again referred to the Chancellor’s March 1 message to the Soviets to show that the FRG has no claims on Berlin and wants no tension there. Brandt then repeated that the East German measures were serious and spoke particularly about the burden which they place on the average man. They hit hardest those least able to bear the burden economically. Brandt at this point suggested that it might be possible to work out a kind of “lump sum” overall settlement, negotiated directly between the FRG and the East German government, for all the costs of the use of the Autobahn. This presumably would substitute for the individual charges for visas and the movement of goods. (Comment: Questioning of Ruete by the DCMs made it seem that this proposal had not been thought out within the FRG and may have been a spur of the moment idea by Brandt.)

9. Significantly, Abrasimov reacted quite positively to this idea. Brandt felt that this was an encouraging sign.

10. Ruete said that Brandt’s general impression of the whole conversation was that it was neither discouraging nor encouraging, but he did feel that Abrasimov was trying to make clear that the Soviets wanted no worsening of the situation in Berlin. There was also, by indirection, some flavor of the Soviets not being entirely with the East Germans on the June 11 measures, but this was nothing you could put your finger on.

11. In a press conference earlier this afternoon Brandt carefully dodged questions about the substance of his talks with Abrasimov. He stated merely that they had discussed questions of mutual interest, including, of course, the situation in Berlin.

Lodge

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. See Document 278.
3. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 988–989.