Office of the Historian

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1

Bonn, June 18, 1968, 2017Z.

13432. Subject: Quadripartite Ambassadorial luncheon discussion of Berlin access problems.

1.
At the regular Quadripartite Ambassadorial luncheon on Berlin and related problems today, State Sec Duckwitz made the following points in describing the FRG’s position on the Berlin situation as worked out in yesterday’s Cabinet meeting:
A.
The formal statement to be made by the Chancellor in connection with the June 20 Bundestag foreign affairs debate is still in preparation but will be provided to the Allies shortly.2
B.
The FRG does not contemplate an approach to Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin in the near future. The FRG has taken steps to inform governments around the world of the East German moves and of the Federal Government’s assessment of them.
C.
It is not opportune to take countermeasures in the interzonal trade area since this would be very dangerous to Berlin. Duckwitz said the FonOff would send the three Allies a detailed explanation of this position.
D.
The FRG is contemplating legislation which would bring into effect the automatic application in Berlin of Federal legislation subject only to negative action on the part of the Berlin Government or the Allies to prevent the application of individual laws. I also hope that the three Allies can provide now a favorable response to the FonOff aide-mémoire of December 1, 1967 concerning the elimination of the Berlin clause in individual treaties. In this context Duckwitz also mentioned that the Reichs-tag building in Berlin would be ready next year but his inference was not clear.
E.
The Berlin assistance law would be extended without any time limit.
F.
It was hoped that an air shuttle service could be established between Berlin and Hannover so that the total cost of travel between points in the Federal Republic and Berlin by air would not be greater than the train fare. The FRG would provide the necessary subsidies. (Further details on this available from other FRG sources are being reported separately.)
G.
The FRG hoped to utilize the laws on political parties and on passports to prevent entry into the Federal Republic of undesirable elements from the GDR whose purpose was subversion.
2.
Duckwitz estimated that the Federal outlay required to compensate for the effects of the new East German measures would be about DM 115 million annually. In connection with the travel restriction paper, Duckwitz said that Chancellor Kiesinger had opposed a public announcement on TTD restrictions alone since they seem such a small response to the situatuion.
3.
The FonOff called a Bonn Group meeting shortly after the Quadripartite luncheon during which the following further details and background emerged on the German position:
A.
The report of the Harkort Task Force deals with the possibility of action on the part of the FRG to suspend the IZT agreement3 or to begin a blanket denial of Warenbegleitscheine (shipping documents) thus stopping all shipments to the GDR. The Task Force concluded that such measures would be dangerous for Berlin and would not seriously interfere with the East German economy unless all Western countries suspended shipments. The Task Force concluded that this was not a likely possibility. This led to the conclusion that countermeasures in the IZT field were not opportune. It was decided, however, that the Cabinet should suspend consideration of measures to facilitate the East German regime such as the oil subsidy, the settlement of the PTT account and any further increase in the swing credit. Van Well said that if the Allies had other suggestions to make the German side would be glad to hear them and it was agreed that an experts meeting would be held tomorrow.
B.
The decision on IZT does not cover other possible countermeasures in related fields such as transportation. The Ministry of Transportation has completed a paper on truck and barge charges which will now be considered at the State Sec level.
C.
In considering the whole problem, the Cabinet came to the conclusion that the Allies had publicly emphasized their own rights frequently during the past months but that it would be useful if measures were undertaken by the Allies which would reinforce the Federal Government’s position in West Berlin. This would reassure the Berlin population and would be an appropriate answer to the Soviet Union and to the GDR. The FRG had thought of the Berlin clause change and the applicability of Federal legislation in Berlin as long pending issues on which action would now be useful and appropriate. Van Well could not elucidate State Sec Duckwitz’s reference to the Reichstag building. However, the [Page 688] FonOff has now informed us that Duckwitz was referring to this as a major FRG construction project which would soon be completed as an example of Federal aid. The FRG has plans to reconstruct a library as a further such project.
4.
During the meeting the German side raised for discussion the German paper on the activities of GDR trade and travel offices in Western countries. The French and British representatives said they had referred the German draft to capitals but expect that it would take several days for London and Paris to provide comment. Both reps thought it would probably be better if this FRG paper was not the next presentation to NATO. For psychological reasons it would be better to present NATO with some further paper outlining German action in either the trade or transport fields.
5.
Our comments follow by septel.4
Lodge
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, Berlin, USNATO, USAFE, USAREUR, USNMRSHAPE, EUCOM, and USELMLO.↩
  2. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1010–1012.↩
  3. Interzonal trade was regulated by the Berlin agreements of August 16, 1960, signed by officials of the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic acting as representatives of their “economic areas.”↩
  4. Not identified.↩