Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

231. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 22, 1967, 1220Z.

3177. NATUS. Pass to White House. Subj: Meeting with Kiesinger. Following the briefing of Chancellor Kiesinger yesterday morning [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on ChiCom nuclear capability, which is being reported separately,² the Chancellor took me aside for a talk. We were alone.

1. German-US relations—I went over with the Chancellor my own concept of the current state of German-American relations as I had reported to the Dept in Embtel 2654.³ In doing so I paid particular tribute to his personal success in Washington and the high degree of rapport he had reached with the President. We should take advantage of the present state of calm and stability in our relations to go forward with joint endeavors. If any question should ever arise which he felt might be a potential source of discord between us, I hoped he would call it to my attention or write a letter to the President. I mentioned the question of our ABM deployment (referring to Sec McNamara’s speech of Sept 18⁴ which I had sent him), NPT and troop levels—as being issues which could, but I hoped would not, result in differences between us.

2. ABM, NPT, force levels—The Chancellor expressed similar satisfaction with the Washington meeting. He was writing a letter to the President bringing him up to date on events which have transpired in the meantime.⁵ He was not concerned about our limited ABM deployment. (At the earlier meeting he had asked about the probable effect of our ABM deployment on the Japanese willingness to sign an NPT—and whether the ABM might not some day be accepted as a defensive weapon and excluded from treaty control.) His principal concern about the NPT was to avoid giving the Sovs a basis for future political pressure or blackmail against Germany. If a limited duration could be agreed upon for the treaty, and he had gathered from what he had been told in Washington that this was not beyond the realm of possibility, it would be most helpful. He did not refer to the current German objections to the Sov draft Article III. As far as force levels are concerned, he could assure me that any reductions would be less than the 19,000 maximum figure he had mentioned in Washington. In fact, it might not be necessary to announce any reductions at all. He expressed bitterness over DefMin Schroeder’s stubbornness in injecting a possible 60,000 man reduction into the public debate on this issue. I emphasized the importance, from the standpoint of the American reaction, to the form of the announcement. We hoped there would be no reduction. If there is, we hope it will not be necessary to announce specific quantitative reductions which are only contemplated several years hence.

3. Initiatives to the East—I asked the Chancellor what significance he attached to the recent proposal made by FonMin Brandt to Sov Amb Tsarapkin (Embtels 2681, 2737, 2964).⁶ The Chancellor displayed a feeling of impatience with the whole affair—saying that the proposal was of no consequence. (We have learned that he was not informed in advance.) Brandt had merely advised Tsarapkin of some of the points made in the German Govt’s policy statement. In his own discussion with Tsarapkin, Tsarapkin had made no reference to the proposal. He had merely gone over the usual three Sov conditions for improved relations with the East and asked the Chancellor whether Germany could accept the bloc security proposals made at Karlsbad. In the Chancellor’s view the Sovs are determined to maintain the status quo and have no desire for improving their relations with Germany—unless the FRG would agree to accept the status quo. This is impossible. Any improvement in German-Russian relations is a very long-range affair. He is worried about excessive hopes that have been aroused by people who have spoken publicly “out of hope rather than fact” (obviously referring to Amb-at-Large Bahr whose unauthorized statements have evoked unauthorized widespread expectations from Brandt’s proposal to Tsarapkin). The possibility of Germany becoming an ally of the Sov Union does not exist. There is too deep a background of distrust. In the Chancellor’s view nothing useful could now be derived from a European security conference or an initiative on the German/European security question on the part of the West. In response to my query, he said that he did not think a visit by FonMin Brandt to Moscow was likely, nor did he think anything useful could come from such a visit. In fact, the word that he had gotten indirectly from Sov officials was that they would only be interested in seeing him. In answer to my query he made clear that there had been no official suggestion of this nature coming from the Sov side, moreover, he did not think that any good could come from such a visit in view of the present Sov attitude.

4. Eastern policy—In the Chancellor’s view his govt now has a well-balanced Eastern policy, which lies between the extremes as represented in the FonOff by Bahr-Lahr, i.e., the conservative State Sec for Econ Affairs Lahr and the liberal Amb Bahr. It is a position that he can hold with the rank and file of his party. He saw no advantage in Germany’s giving up anything on the Oder-Neisse at this time merely to assuage the Poles. It would only result in a stabilization of the status quo.

In response to my query as to the likely effect of German concessions on Polish dependence on the USSR, he replied that it was not a question of what the Polish people wanted but the position of the Polish regime—who presumably had no desire for decreased dependence. In the Chancellor’s view the present German task is a long-range effort requiring great patience to establish confidence on the part of the East Europeans, as they have attempted to do with their Western Allies. Sooner or later the East Europeans, who would like to have close ties with the West Germans particularly for economic reasons, will be willing to take steps in this direction despite the position of Ulbricht—who is not popular with the Eastern European leaders.

5. Stoph letter—I asked the Chancellor what he made of the last Stoph letter. Would it lead anywhere? Would he be willing to meet Stoph under suitable conditions? The Chancellor replied that the Stoph letter, in his judgment, was calculated to put an end to the discussion of meetings and improvement of relations between East and West Germany. He would however, make some sort of response. Had Stoph been clever he would have proposed a meeting with the Chancellor without conditions. Although the Chancellor’s counter-proposal would probably have been to demand an agenda, it is quite possible that a meeting could have been arranged. All Stoph had to do then would have been to meet, demand recognition of East Germany and—when this was not accepted—go back and make political advantage out of the fact of the meeting itself.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.
2. Telegram 3237 from Bonn, September 22. (Ibid., DEF 12–1 CHICOM)
3. Document 229.
4. For text, see Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1967, vol. VII, pp. 2545–2570.
5. The next letter from Kiesinger to Johnson, December 8, 1967, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Germany.
6. All three telegrams reported details of the Brandt-Tsarapkin initiative. Telegram 2681 from Bonn, September 11, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–USSR. Telegram 2737 from Bonn, September 12, is ibid., POL GER W–USSR, and telegram 2964 from Bonn, September 18 is ibid., POL 38–6.