Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

230. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 14, 1967, 1407Z.

2416. Subj: Meeting with Brandt. I had a conversation with FonMin Brandt today, on the eve of his departure for what he hopes will be a three week vacation on the Tegern See. The following subjects were discussed:

1. Four-Power FonMin’s meeting. Brandt gave me the background of his own discussions and thinking with respect to a Four-Power FonMins meeting on European security, as proposed by the US, UK and German policy planners. He had talked with British FonSec Brown on this subject while they were both in Norway in early July; however, they had been limited in what they could say by the fact that the conversation was over the telephone. Brown had to go back to London because of the Chinese crisis² before he could meet with him personally. Brown had offered to contact Couve with respect to the meeting; however, he doubted the advisability of meeting in New York during the General Assembly because of the publicity that would probably be aroused. Brandt now thinks the best time and place for a meeting would be during the NAC meeting in December, perhaps at the regular Four-Power dinner preceding the main meeting. In the meantime, the respective experts in each country can be looking into the problem further.

As regards substance, Brandt “does not know whether this is just the right time for a move on the German question and European security.” It might be wise, however, to have some proposals ready when such a time comes. It would be good for the Soviets to know that the three Western Powers are thinking about the problem. In the meantime the Germans will continue probing the East Germans to see if there is any opportunity for progress. In response to my query, Brandt said that no top-level German consideration had yet been given to the possibility for a meeting between the Chancellor and GDR MinPres Stoph.

In Brandt’s view the Soviets would probably not be willing at this time to help create a “Four-Power umbrella” for discussions between the East and West Germans. His own concept of that might be put forward by the Western Allies is a “small package” at best, nothing like the “large packages” involving German reunification which have been put forward in the past. If, for example, a proposal could be made for the withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet troops—and accepted—it would at least help provide us additional warning time in the event of a crisis. Brandt emphasized that he did not believe we should aim at something that would engender a lot of publicity.

2. Franco-German study of European defense in the 70’s. Brandt’s description of German thinking on how to proceed with the proposed Franco-German study corresponded to that of Carstens in my discussion with him on Sept 1 (see Embtel 2404).³ The French had proposed at one time that both sides appoint high-level military personage to head their respective missions, suggesting for their part Gen de Brebisson. This created a problem for the Germans since they had no one comparable. Present German thinking is that there should be one group on each side headed by a political representative—in their case a FonOff man. He did not indicate whom he had in mind. He has recently heard that the French have changed their view and are now preparing to send someone from the Quai d’Orsay. I asked Brandt about the significance of the memorandum “Concepts of a Future European Security Agreement” prepared by the French unofficial Center for Strategic Studies, which had been released by the German Federal press agency (Bonn A–296).⁴ He replied that he was aware that the document had been widely distributed; however, he disclaimed that the Germans would accept its premises as a basis for the study.

3. NPT. I asked Brandt his views with respect to the prospects for an NPT. What was the status of their proposal that they become permanent members of the IAEA board? Brandt said that this was not yet clear; however, this was only one possible solution to the problem of mandatory acceptance of amendments under NPT. Since several other nations have indicated unwillingness to accept such a provision, the pressure seems to be off the Germans on this point. He understood that it would take some time before it could be determined whether or not an NPT is possible. In the meantime Germany would be happy to meet with EURATOM countries on the NPT, assuming France will join. He did not know what the French attitude was; however, he would expect that they would prefer to wait until after it had been determined whether or not the treaty would be signed. In the meantime, the initiative in the matter lay with the Belgians.

4. Letter from Mayor Albertz. I referred to the letter dated August 24 from Mayor Albertz of Berlin,⁵ advising of the creation of a viability commission for Berlin on which the Berlin representative would be Ber-thold Beitz—and requesting Allied participation. I referred Brandt to our previous conversation on this subject (Embtel 15393).⁶ Although we did not have a final US Govt or Allied position, my own thinking was still as we had discussed at that time. This should be a Berlin responsibility, to which we and the other Allies would perhaps be willing to lend experts and provide liaison officers. We would also be willing to discuss the work of the commission as it progressed, and receive its final recommendations. I did not believe, however, that we should accept formal representation on the commission. Brandt agreed that this was his concept.

I emphasized the potentially serious damage to Berlin’s reputation—even its economy—which could result from the present student unrest. So far, however, it had not reached such proportions as to require the intervention of the Allies. It was a problem that could best be resolved by the city itself.

8. Bundesrat Presidency. I said that I was looking forward to a new relationship with the Governing Mayor in his capacity, beginning in November, as President of the Bundesrat (Bonn 2401).⁷ Without specifically mentioning Berlin voting rights, I said that we were sure he would keep the distinctions in his function as Governing Mayor and as Bundesrat President fully in mind.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Paris.
2. Communist-inspired rioting in Hong Kong began on May 6, and attacks on British diplomats in China commenced on May 15. Terrorist bombings followed as the crisis escalated. The British Embassy in Beijing was sacked by the Red Guards on August 22.
3. Dated September 2. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–12 US)
4. Dated August 28. (Ibid., DEF 1 EUR)
5. Not found.
6. Dated June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GER)
7. Dated September 1. (Ibid., POL 15–2 GER)