Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 20, 1967, 1850Z.

15024. Subj: Conversation with Wehner. I had an hour with All-German Affairs Minister Wehner on June 19.

1. The Stoph letter and its aftermath—I said that I was aware of the importance which Wehner attached to the reply to the Stoph letter and congratulated him on having won his point. Wehner said a corner had been turned; however, there would be many others. A majority of the leadership of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary group had fought to the last to prevent a reply. If Ulbricht’s answer provided an opening, the fight would be on again.

2. Wehner said that while Neues Deutschland had been sharply negative, Ulbricht had been much more flexible. Ulbricht would be clever enough to put the ball back in the FRG’s court. He might agree to appoint a delegate for the purpose of discussing with his FRG counterpart arrangements for a meeting between Kiesinger and Stoph. In this event, Wehner said that the FRG should respond positively. There was at this juncture no need to envisage a meeting between Kiesinger and Stoph. The meetings of the delegates could be strung out for a long time, and serve precisely the purpose desired by the FRG, i.e., a discussion of practical measures to prevent a widening of the gap. If these discussions reached a promising stage, a meeting on the Ministerial or sub-Ministerial (State Secretary) level could be held. Wehner defined science and transport as substantive fields for initial discussions and indicated that Kiesinger had accepted in principle this idea that Minister of Transport Leber could hold discussions with his East German counterpart once there were prospects for concrete results. Postal affairs could be another subject of discussion if it were not for Minister Dollinger’s adamant opposition.

3. Wehner said that an Ulbricht reply along the lines indicated above would lead again to a strong negative reaction of a majority of the CDU/CSU. However, if this Chancellor led, the CDU/CSU would fall into line. If, on the other hand, he sought the advice of his party, there would be mounting opposition and long delays.

4. The Soviet attitude—Asked whether there were any indication of a more flexible Soviet attitude toward the FRG, Wehner said the Soviets were taking the position “Why are you in such a hurry?”. He said that the two leading Soviet journalists who had visited the FedRep last March had finally written their articles. The tone was patronizing; the German problem had not yet sufficiently matured for a solution; moreover, there were other more important problems. In Wehner’s opinion, if the FRG persisted in its attempts to create motion on the German problem, the Soviets eventually would have to become involved. They were already showing some interest in the proposal for a mutual renunciation of the use of force, although they were suggesting that this should be done directly between “the two German states.” Also, Kiesinger’s astute and repeated denials that the FRG, in its Eastern policy, was attempting to sow discord in Eastern Europe, and between the Eastern European countries and the Soviets, undoubtedly were having some effect.

5. Berlin—I noted that FonMin Brandt had talked about the Berlin situation at the NATO meeting at Luxembourg,² and that the Secretary had indicated that we would like to be of help. Wehner said that there was no major morale problem; some substantive problems had to be met. Important industrial investments had been cancelled and this had led to unrest among the labor force. There was also the student problem, but this was a general phenomenon throughout Germany. On top of this, the Berlin press was highly irresponsible and overdramatized the issues. Wehner said that Minister Schiller would probably discuss in Washington the possibility of holding more international meetings in Berlin. This would be of some help. Discussions were also taking place with the industrialists (Berg) for a more determined effort to maintain investments in the city. The SPD was now paying greater attention to the student problem, with good effects.

6. Voting rights for Berlin Deputies—Wehner said that he and Brandt had killed a proposal to discuss voting rights for Berlin Deputies during this week’s meeting of Bundestag committees in Berlin. They had taken the position that there would have to be preparatory discussion with the Allies before the Bundestag could consider the problem and that the time was not ripe for such discussions. He had just learned that Bundestag President Gerstenmaier, in Berlin, had called attention to the tripartite opinion on the Niekisch case. Wehner indicated that he had full understanding for the tripartite position and sharply criticized Gerstenmaier for having played up this issue. He said it was precisely this kind of unhelpful action which affected morale in Berlin. I said that we had a good record of finding practical solutions to such problems in Berlin. Wehner agreed.

7. The SPD and the coalition—In response to my question about the current mood in the SPD and the situation within the coalition, Wehner said that there had been difficulties within the SPD but these were being contained. There would be no extraordinary party convention. Instead, the SPD convention would be advanced from the autumn to the spring of 1968 and a meeting of elected delegates would be held this autumn. This would permit people to blow off steam.

8. Wehner said that unnecessary statements by spokesmen of both parties created friction within the coalition. On the SPD side, Helmut Schmidt, in his free and easy manner, was constantly repeating that there would be an SPD Chancellor in 1969. This kind of brave talk, reminiscent of “casino language of reserve officers,” irritated Kiesinger who had queried Brandt whether the SPD was toying with the idea of a coalition with the FDP. State Secretary Jahn had recently called into question the Chancellor’s authority to issue binding policy guidelines, arguing that under the grand coalition there had to be prior agreement between the two partners. Whether well-intentioned or not, public discussion of these problems was harmful as it immediately led to counter pressures from the other side. This merely embittered the atmosphere and served no useful purpose.

9. Wehner said that medium term financial planning and the financial reform were the most serious substantive problems currently confronting the coalition. A full day Cabinet meeting would be held on these problems on July 5. Painful decisions were required. In such a situation there was always room for demagoguery. Wehner indicated that he opposed those who argued that since there would have to be cuts in the social security budget, the defense budget should also be reduced. These were not comparable issues. Wehner also noted a tendency on the part of the CDU/CSU and the SPD Parliamentary groups to conclude deals between themselves in order to defeat unpopular but necessary economy measures proposed by the govt. If this tendency continued, the coalition might find itself in serious difficulties.

Comment: Throughout the discussion, Wehner was frank and candid. He was obviously pleased that he had won his point on the Stoph reply and appeared as firm as ever in his support for the grand coalition. At the same time he made it clear that he would continue to insist on using every opening that promised motion on the German problem. Wehner’s expectations on East German and Soviet reactions is probably overly optimistic, reflecting the great importance that he attaches to motion on the German problem.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential.
2. See Document 217.