Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

217. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Luxembourg, June 14, 1967, 0930Z.

486. Secto 18. NATUS. Following is report of June 13 Quadripartite supper meeting between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Ministers Couve de Murville, Brown and Brandt. It serves as approved memorandum of conversation.

1. FRG efforts with East Germany—After brief discussion Middle East situation and speculation about possible special UNGA session (to be reported septel) Brandt led off discussion on FRG relations with East Berlin regime and their effects on FRG relations with Soviet Union and EE.

Brandt said that since December NATO meeting, Ulbricht has increasingly followed policy isolation vis-à-vis FedRep. This dominated recent SED Congress. Clearly, ruling group in East Berlin does not want contact with FRG. Nevertheless FRG is offering contacts; accepted Stoph letter; and today has sent reply.²

Brandt said FRG not optimistic regarding reaction to reply, but aims to convince its allies, neutral countries, and other Communist states that FRG willing to accept reasonable modus vivendi. Seeks to reach agreements where these are possible, is willing put aside problems on which agreement not possible, but cannot accede to Ulbricht demand that his regime be accepted by Germans as foreign country or that it be legitimated on democratic or national grounds.

Brandt said it would mean much to FRG if allies would regard its moves with respect to East Berlin regime as German contribution to détente but not as signal to treat that part of Germany as separate state.

2. FRG-EE relations—Brandt then described current state of FRG relations with EE. Said that after new FedRep Government had undertaken policy of improving Eastern relations, Ulbricht regime and Soviets had taken counter measures which have slowed up progress but have not destroyed the FRG policy or its future prospects. Brandt said there was considerable evidence of continued interest in EE for developing relations with FRG. For example, after Karlsbad conference, Czech privately contacted FRG reps for exchange of views. Brandt thought this might lead to exchange of trade missions and perhaps more. Poland has made some private contacts, but Brandt not very optimistic early progress could be expected here. Thought diplomatic relations would come with Czechs and Hungarians before Poles. Yugoslavs eager for diplomatic relations, but FRG has not yet found the right formula.

Brandt said FedRep wishes to put more emphasis on improving relations with Soviet Union. There are some signs, he said, that Soviet attitude toward FRG has recently become less aggressive. Said he expects to see Tsarapkin June 15 and will explore Soviet attitudes further.

Brandt said it more apparent now than six months ago that FRG must make clear to Communist countries that it not seeking to isolate Ulbricht regime from rest of Soviet bloc. Brandt said he thought there might be some Soviet interest in FedRep proposal re exchange of declarations on non-use of force on matters relating to the German problem. FRG might be willing, if Soviet interest develops, to extend declaration not only to USSR but also to her allies. He anticipated that Soviets might in that event ask whether FedRep declaration would also be binding on allied troops stationed on German soil. Of course the FRG answer would have to be “no.” Brandt, responding to Secretary’s query, said Berlin would also be excluded and Allied rights unimpaired. Brandt thought it might be useful for FRG to explore entire question with US,UK and France.

3. Reply to Stoph letter—Couve de Murville at this point stated that he had read the reply to Stoph, and thought it a good letter. He called it an important step. While he wasn’t at all sure there would be a reply from the other side, the document was important as a new definition of FRG position. Brown said he agreed. Secretary Rusk asked Brandt what FRG intended to do if Ulbricht regime replied that its Ministers were prepared to talk with FRG Ministers.

Brandt said that FRG intention was to use State Secretaries, but that if prospects were otherwise favorable, and some technical subjects come up within the competence of certain Ministers (e.g. Minister of Communications), he did not rule that out. Contact between Ministers of Foreign Affairs was out of the question, however.

Secretary asked Brandt whether he had had any private indications re possible reaction of Ulbricht regime to the letter.

Brandt replied that the dominant group, which holds very rigid views, would have preferred to receive no answer. Now this group will have to debate with less doctrinaire colleagues as well as with other bloc countries. The FRG letter is being published on June 14 together with a FRG declaration of policy.

Secretary Rusk asked whether it would be useful to discuss this problem with Gromyko if latter comes to NY in near future. Brandt thought that it would be useful if we could let Gromyko know that we thought well of current FRG efforts to develop contacts with the other part of Germany.

Secretary said he felt line FRG was taking was constructive and well reflected the confidence of FedRep and its population. Thought it useful for FRG to stay a step ahead of East on this matter.

Brown agreed with Secretary. Said he was impressed during recent visit in Moscow by extent to which Soviets had changed in their reaction to Bonn. Thought that Soviets would continue anti-FedRep propaganda but more quietly than before. When he had supported FRG people like Brandt, Wehner, and Erler in talks with the Russians, the Russians had replied skeptically, but without invective, that they would wait and see.

4. On question of Soviet attitudes, Secretary said he had impression until blocking of Straits of Tiran that there was quite a debate between moderates and militants taking place in Moscow. He asked whether current developments in Middle East would tend to discredit the militants. Had someone in Soviet Union made serious mistake in estimate of Arab military ability?

Brown thought that the militants in Moscow might be strengthened rather than weakened. Nevertheless, someone will be called to account in Moscow for the mistaken judgement that the Arabs could take care of themselves militarily against Israel.

Secretary asked whether Soviets have the mistaken impression that we control Israel and had acted in bad faith in telling Soviets we would counsel moderation. Brown said he was convinced Soviet leaders knew we did not control Israel.

5. Berlin morale—Brandt then reverted to Berlin. Said he was worried that situation there was deteriorating psychologically. Economic problem did not seem so serious at present. Berlin unemployment lower than in FRG. Brandt pointed to recent Berlin student demonstrations, said these were more or less the same students who in 1961 and 1962 had risked their lives against the Wall and to rescue their compatriots. That these students are now turning their energy to destructive demonstration results from the psychological frustrations which are becoming a serious problem in Berlin. Brandt thought that in addition to the factors making for unrest among the students everywhere, Berlin presented special problems. After a genuine détente comes, Berlin will find a new role to play. Until then, it will suffer from frustrations. Brandt said that of course the plight of the civilian population of Berlin in this respect is an FRG problem. Brown said that any organization suffers a letdown after release from the tensions of crisis; in the absence of crisis, it is inevitable that the spirit of Berlin would be subdued.

Secretary Rusk thought that Berlin suffers from the fact that an illusion of détente has been created without the reality. As a result, Berlin at present has neither the stimulus of crisis nor the opportunities that would come with genuine détente.

Brandt said that the Berlin government would set up a committee to work out various ways of putting new life into the city. The FRG would cooperate. He asked that US, UK and French reps in Berlin show sympathetic interest in the activities and plans of the committee when it is established. Secretary Rusk thought it might be possible to make greater use of Berlin for international meetings of a technical or cultural nature. This might be psychologically useful. He also suggested that Brandt talk to the three Ambassadors in Bonn to explore quietly what can be done to help ameliorate the situation.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,NATO 3 LUX. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
2. See footnote 2, Document 216.