Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

191. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, December 14, 1966, 8:30 p.m.–12:30 a.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-EIGHTH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

PARIS, DECEMBER 14–16, 1966

SUBJECT

• Quadripartite Dinner Discussion of East-West Relations; Berlin; The German Question

PARTICIPANTS

• United States: The Secretary
• United Kingdom: Foreign Minister Brown
• France: Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
• Federal Republic of Germany: Vice-Chancellor Brandt
• (Appended is a guest list of other participants)²

1) Germany and the “German Question”

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, as host, opened the meeting by welcoming Brandt as the newest member of the group and asking him to begin. Brandt began by saying that he wished to discuss “the German Problem.” He was interrupted by Brown, who objected to the term, “German Problem,” saying it was rather a “European problem.” Brandt, nevertheless, continued saying that he had been at a similar meeting eight years ago “in this house” after the Khrushchev ultimatum,³ when, after he had made his presentation on Berlin and was dismissed, Dulles took his hand and told him not to be worried—the allies would not let him or Berlin down.

He reminded the group that these gatherings related to the responsibilities that the three powers have in Germany as a whole to which “they were kind enough to invite the German Foreign Minister.” He added that he saw no sign that the USSR was more willing today than last year or even the year before that to discuss the German problem, i.e., reunification.

Brown interrupted at that point saying that if that was the German problem, then it was not a German problem but a wider European one. Brandt said that if reunification was not the German problem, it was certainly the heart of the matter. Brown asked what his “priorities” were, and Brandt answered that he would come to that. In considering the German problem, Brandt continued, the Russians concentrate on three difficult questions: (a) German possession of, or access to, nuclear weapons; (b) the question of frontiers; and (c) recognition of the Soviet Zone. Nevertheless, there still may be useful areas of discussion on subjects besides trade and culture. There may even be limited areas of discussion with the Soviets on security matters. In this connection, he mentioned the FRG’s “Peace Note” of March 25, 1966, which contained offers to exchange declarations on the non-use of force with Eastern European states. He suggested (without elaboration) the possibility of somehow including the problem of divided Germany in such a declaration.

Brandt had the impression that there was a distinct difference in attitude and behavior between the USSR and the East Zone authorities toward Berlin. Soviet representatives in East Berlin seemed to feel that broader Soviet interests made it desirable not to have trouble in Berlin. The recent decrease of shootings on the Wall, and lack of other provocations, were attributable to Soviet pressure on the East German authorities. Furthermore, the USSR was now more willing to accept Berlin “into trade and other arrangements” linking Berlin and the Federal Republic.

Brandt, therefore, wanted to talk with the “Three” in Bonn on new plans for West Berlin. He wanted their “political advice” the same way as Berlin had needed allied advice in setting up the “viability program.” He stressed that he was seeking political advice and not economic aid. If there were no Soviet interference with Berlin for a certain period, then new plans might be formulated for Berlin to bring the city into West Germany’s “context, with other parts of Europe.”

Brandt said he would not raise Berlin voting rights, noting that the question was now before a Bundestag committee. It was not a good idea “to mix up the rights of the Three with the rights of the Sovereign Parliament.” Nothing would be done in this area without prior consultation with the allies. Discussion might take a year or two.

Brandt again contrasted Soviet behavior with that of the East German authorities, saying that the USSR was at least interested in doing something in the humanitarian field. As an illustration, Brandt mentioned a special office (not further identified) that had been reopened in Berlin (apparently under Soviet pressure) that permitted persons with emergency family situations to pass quickly into the Zone.

On the other hand, Brandt admitted that there was no agreement this year on Christmas passes for Berliners. Nevertheless he thought that this would not create unreasonable problems for the people of Berlin. On the whole, the pass program had worked, and had made it possible for 5.5 million individual visits to date.

The Soviets were not interfering very seriously with FRG efforts to normalize relations with Eastern Europe. The USSR was trying, however, to push the FRG into recognizing the East Zone, and the GDR in turn wanted to prevent normalization of FRG relations with Eastern European states.

2) GDR Internal Situation and Relations with the Zone

Brandt said he had little to add beyond what is generally known on the internal situation in East Germany. Economic programs are developing despite severe trade conditions imposed on the Zone by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he said, the East German managerial class worked hard to fulfill their trade obligations to the USSR in the hope of being able thereby to develop additional Western trade.

The Germans now may have reached the point where they would have to differentiate between the East German regime and the population of the area. It cannot be in the German interest to insist on isolating these people. True, there were problems even in trade and cultural exchanges. There were, of course, more serious problems in any efforts that were tinged with politics. The abortive attempt at an SED/SPD speaker exchange of last year was an example. As for the Zone’s own policy, Brandt noted that the GDR was no longer pushing the confederation idea; on the contrary, it had been dropped on the ostensible grounds that the FRG was unworthy.

Actually, Brandt thought that we would have a clearer idea of East German attitudes after the SED Party Congress in March. Reports from the Zone did not suggest any clear picture as to who might emerge as Ulbricht’s successor. The Zone, like the FRG, has a “problem of generations,” but not perhaps in the classical sense—the new generation in the Zone was developing, surprisingly enough, not necessarily a commitment to the Communist system but rather a sense of identification with the GDR qua state.

The approach of the new (Federal) German Government, Brandt said, was not to think that reunification had first priority and therefore not to use the word quite as often. He did not wish to suggest to the German people that reunification was just around the corner. This meant modified language in public statements and greater concentration on personal links in a divided country through science, cultural efforts, trade and sports. The FRG intended to create an office for intra-German problems in Bonn. Perhaps a similar office might be established in the Zone. (He did not indicate how such an office would relate to the existing Ministry of All-German Affairs.)

On trade, Brandt noted that “certain EEC countries” had bypassed the FRG in the volume of trade with and the value of credits to the Soviet Zone. The FRG would not fall behind, and would compete on the same basis as the Allies with trade and credits. It was difficult, he said, for the electrical workers in West Berlin to understand why they could not compete with Western financed plants in the Eastern part of the City. He also mentioned a plan, on which he did not elaborate, about developing a system of “travellers checks” which would have the effect of equalizing the currencies in Germany.

On recognition, the FRG would “go on as before”—they would not recognize the GDR, but below that level, the FRG would go “beyond where we are up to now in dealing with the regime in Pankow.” What the FRG aimed at was “organized togetherness” for the German people which in turn contributed to internal German and, by extension, to European détente. Naturally the GDR would resist this process and, for this reason, the FRG would be grateful if the three powers would “underline previously taken positions” (presumably on self-determination) and support and understand FRG efforts to counteract the effects of an artificial division on the German people.

The Secretary asked if the links which might open up with the Zone were being thought of as intra-German activities only or open to others as well. He foresaw problems if other European states or the US were to participate.

Brandt replied that since these activities would be “on German soil” (except for commercial links) it would make sense if the FRG were given a “certain chance” before the scene were opened to others.

Couve said he was struck by Brandt’s remarks about differences in the attitudes of the USSR and the Soviet Zone, i.e., that the USSR appeared more inclined to a relaxation of tensions than the East Germans. He added that Brandt’s plans for developing economic, personal and human relations were more the responsibility of the FRG than of Europe and the US. “You must lead the way,” he said. He added that, without having examined Brandt’s proposal in detail, “we agree and have no objection.” He said, however, that the FRG was nevertheless responsible, being after all the party most directly concerned.

Throughout the above exchange and thereafter, Brown made spirited interruptions saying there was too much talk about Berlin. He took Brandt to task for continuing to sound too much like the Governing Mayor of Berlin rather than the Foreign Minister of a country with wider problems. He drew a parallel between Brandt’s recent appointment as Foreign Minister and his own, and between their common positions as “socialist ministers” and, by implication, their relative weight and size vis-à-vis the great powers. Berlin, he said, did not dictate issues; it did not “stage the stage.” Berlin was “subsumed” in problems of wider scope.

Brandt did not agree. He pointed out that the purpose of the evening was to discuss Germany, and that divided Berlin was after all a microcosm of divided Germany. Brown nevertheless kept returning to what he called the “wider responsibilities” that Brandt had as Foreign Minister—East-West relations, relations with the US and France, and the Asian world. In making his remarks, Brown spoke rather colorfully, returning again and again to the point that what Brandt was talking about was a wider European problem and not a German one, often addressing Brandt as “my dear Willy” and admitting that he was taking this line against the advice of his staff there present.

The Secretary, Ambassador Bohlen and others tried to pin Brown down on what he meant, without any real success. Brandt defended his position by citing examples from his own experience about the utility of tending to the work on hand. In this context he mentioned one of his predecessors, Mayor Ernst Reuter, who said in a meeting wherein grandiose plans for international relations were presented, that the principal problem was to maintain Berlin’s trolley cars and get them painted. Brandt added that the German contribution to limited détente might be reasonable relations with the USSR, better relations with Eastern Europe and moves to keep “our people together.” Brown countered that it might be better to “take it easy.” He thought poorly of spending “shillings” until it had been seen whether “pence” would do.

The Secretary asked if the moves toward the people of the Zone that Brandt suggested or British support therefor could hurt Brown in Parliament. Brown said yes. Brown turned again to the question of “wider responsibilities” and in broad terms appeared reluctant to become involved in German specifics, mentioning Viet-Nam as another situation into which others could be dragged.

The Secretary remarked that as far as Viet-Nam was concerned, he did not wish to belabor the point but Britain’s treaty obligations were as clear and binding as those of the United States.

Brown again turned to his argument that there was not really a German but rather a “European” problem, saying that the Germans were in one sense a victim of the division of Europe which had been imposed by the Allies. To this Ambassador Bohlen replied that it was hardly “the Allies” but rather the USSR that was responsible.

The Secretary stressed that it was not just a European problem. He reminded Brown that the US was involved in Europe, mentioning the US/USSR confrontation in Europe, and specifically that Germany was the one place where the US and Soviet Union might conceivably go to war. Therefore it was not a “European” problem. The Secretary added, by way of illustration, that our heaviest commitments in terms of total outlay have been made in this area and that the US was therefore very much involved. We could not be excluded; therefore, it was not just a European problem.

Immediately following Secretary Rusk’s departure, and as Brown was leaving, the latter asked that participants make no statement to the press. Couve demurred. Brown said that we should only say that “European problems” were talked about. Brandt with considerable emotion said that he could not report to the Bundestag that the talk at dinner had been confined to the “European problem” but that he must indicate that the participants, in the tradition of Quadripartite dinners, had talked about Germany. Brandt, Couve and Brown then appeared to agree that they would say that talks had related to Europe and Germany.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 109. Secret. Drafted by Hirschfeld on December 20 and approved in S on December 26. The meeting was held at the Quai d’Orsay. Brandt commented on the Paris talks in My Life in Politics, pp. 156–158.
2. Not printed.
3. Reference is to Khrushchev’s November 10, 1958, speech and the subsequent Soviet note to the Western powers regarding the status of Berlin. For texts of these documents and of the Four-Power response, December 14, 1958, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 542–546 and 552–560.